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Abstract: This dissertation is a study of social and environmental conditions inside 
rural industrial labor camps throughout the U.S. South between 1905 and 1965. The use 
of peonage labor, i.e., the coercion of labor against ones’ will through indebtedness or 
violence impacted nearly a fourth of rural workers in the postbellum south, particularly 
in isolated railroad construction sites, lumber operations, turpentine camps, and 
commercial vegetable farms. Though employers’ various peonage labor regimes 
changed within the context of the camps’ physical environment and evolved over time, 
they continually took advantage of marginalized social groups, immigrants, African-
Americans, and the poor. The relative inability of workers, their families, and reformers 
to prosecute employers and foremen for labor abuses stemmed from the collusion of 
local law enforcement and the indifference of federal government officials. Ultimately, 
broader market forces of globalization and technology changed peonage labor regimes, 
not the enforcement of federal statues outlawing the practice. 
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Introduction 
  
 In May of 1906, Collie Sanders, known by his fellow workers as “White Child,” 
hired on as a guard in a railroad construction camp located deep in the forest outside 
Maryville, Tennessee, owned by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, the forest. Sanders 
recalled that when company foremen brought “the first bunch of hands” into the camp, 
they appointed five guards—including Sanders and a man named Will Jones—to watch 
the men. The chief foreman, Martin Condon, gave Sanders and Jones their instructions. 
“He told me if anybody started out of the camps to halt them, and if they did not halt, to 
shoot them and make them stop.” Sanders explained that he only shot at a worker once 
in the few months he worked at the camp. “I didn’t know who he was; I could not tell 
whether I hit him or not, but I carried out my instructions and shot to hit.” Sanders 
reported that he personally witnessed the foreman, Martin Condon, shoot at two 
workers named Ed Leonard and “Red Shirt” when they ran away from the camp one 
night.  
 The Department of Justice agent deposing Sanders requested, “I wish you would 
explain just how you and the others were stationed on guard—that is where did you 
stand and where did the others stand, to keep people from escaping?” In Sander’s 
response he revealed a crucial aspect of peonage labor camps in the deep South: that 
employers and managers used the physical environment to retain labor in rural-
industrial labor camps. “The way they had us stationed out, no one could pass; no one 
unless we were asleep or they swam the river. The river was one side and the mountain 
was on the other and nothing could go up it but a bird or some fowl of the air.” Sanders 
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went on to explain that foremen and guards arranged the tent quarters between the 
railroad right of way and the riverbank.   
 Often, the condition of peonage was fluid; men hired under the pretense of wage 
labor found themselves subjected to inhumane treatment from merciless bosses. The 
day after “Red Shirt” and the others escaped, the foreman, John McGee “went down 
towards Maryville hunting the men that got away, but he did not find them.” Sanders 
and another man, Ed Pool were discharged from their post as a guards, and the 
company fined them fifty dollars each for allowing the men to escape. Sanders and Pool 
both were forced to work on the railroad to pay off their debt. Sanders recalled that 
before the escape and his demotion and fine, he owed nothing to the company and that 
he never received any money while employed in the camp. Sanders then added, “When I 
was out on guard, Mr. Martin Condon told me that if I would let anybody get away he 
would kill me.”  
 Once trapped inside the camps, workers experienced violence as a signal part of 
the human and non-human landscape. Connie Sanders explained that outside Maryville 
that summer nearly all the workers were under guard and could not leave the camp 
without a pass, “and they can’t get a pass until they are out of debt.” Sanders witnessed 
Martin Condon strike Ed Forney with a pickaxe handle, forcing him to the ground and 
breaking Forney’s back so that he could not get up and walk. When officials asked one 
worker if he’d seen Condon mistreating men in the camp, he replied “Condon beat up 
people there and they moaned and groaned like anything…especially ‘Slim’…when he 
got through beating him it looked like his arm was broken and his head was bleeding.” 
When the official asked what Condon was beating him for, the man replied “he was 
beating all the men out to the cut [that] morning.” 
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 Investigators asked if the workers saw dead bodies in the Maryville camps and 
the responses revealed that the natural features inside the camps often concealed but 
occasionally revealed the violence that occurred there. One day Sanders saw Brady 
chase two women and a man up the mountain, after they brought dinner to the men in 
his camp. “After that,” Sanders explained, “we could smell something dead up there we 
believed to be the dead body of the boy Brady shot.” The investigator asked if Sanders 
ever saw any bodies in the river. Sanders explained, “One evening it rained and the river 
rose a little, and just about dusk I saw a body come floating down the river, and a crowd 
of white people came down looking after it. They laid it on the rock and it stayed there 
until about six o’clock in the morning.”  
 The Maryville camps revealed not only the use of debt and violence to coerce 
labor, but the use of black guards, the separation of workers by race within various 
camps, and the shared suffering of black and white labor. Sanders did not recall if the 
body in the river was white or black, but he reported another occasion in which the 
foremen fished a black man’s body out of the river with a “trot line.” When officials 
asked Will Kelly if he’d seen any “colored men floating down the river,” he replied he 
had not, “but I heard of lots of them.” Kelly then continued, “I saw one white man; they 
took him out just below us at the next camp.” Workers of all colors and backgrounds 
met violence inside rural industrial labor camps, though owners manipulated ethnic and 
racial groups to enforce a subordinate labor force. Another black worker noted, “Just 
across the hill from us was a camp where they worked white men, between the 
mountain and the hill.” He noted that the white men were locals and “not foreigners” 
when he explained that they often came into the black camp. “They knew all that was 
going on there, but they were stopped after a while from coming in.” And then he 
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described an odd incident of biracial labor solidarity, “They [the whites] told us several 
times just to be patient and they would show us that this was a free country. They also 
said they were going to come down and wreck our camp on account of the bad 
treatment we were getting.” 
 At its core, debt peonage relies on violence; however, the peculiar and evolving 
manifestations of peonage in the twentieth century South also reflected the economic, 
political, and cultural forces associated with modern Progressive change. Connie 
Sanders’ testimony about the L&N railroad camps in Tennessee compares closely with 
multiple incidents of peonage labor camps investigated by the Department of Justice 
between 1905 and 1967 throughout the rural South. The industrial impulse of 
exploiting the rich natural resources of the rural South into profits for business relied 
upon recruiting and managing workers for the treacherous labor of turning islands, 
swamps, and forests into productive economic and ecological engines. Employers 
trafficked in labor, bringing men from as far away as New York City and Philadelphia 
south to places such as Brunswick Georgia, Miami, the Florida Keys, and to forest 
outposts such as Lockhart, Alabama and Maryville, Tennessee. Southern employers also 
recruited marginalized workers from within the south, enticing them by buying out 
their debts from previous employers, and threatening violence against workers who 
expressed a desire to quit. Transporting men and material across thousands of miles 
cost time and money, costs that were passed on to workers themselves through debt 
peonage regimes. Finally, once inside remote rural-industrial labor spaces, workers 
were physically guarded, beaten, chained, whipped, placed in cages, locked in holes dug 
in the forest floor, shot and killed, and buried in the same land they labored upon. 
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 My research builds on Gunter Peck’s call for viewing “geographies of labor,” 
Jacqueline Jones’ examination of the rural working poor in the postbellum South, and 
Mart A. Stewart’s call for an emphasis on workers’ primary relationship with their 
physical environment through “labor on the land.” Workers in the rural industrial 
South engaged the physical environment largely through their exposure to landscapes 
and climate, yet they were also part of a global market economy dominated by 
employers’ profit motives. Employers hired agencies to recruit desperate marginalized 
workers using idealistic rhetoric about the supposedly benign southern environment. 
Companies then brought workers into isolated places where foremen subjected them to 
harsh labor in terrible conditions. In order to retain laborers that repeatedly resisted 
such exploitation, foremen brutalized workers, and colluded with local law enforcement. 
Federal agents from the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
were sporadic and inconsistent in their efforts to expose and prosecute labor agents and 
employers, and their inability to do so stemmed from the invisibility of the system and 
the reluctance of the state to interfere with industrial employers’ interests. Ultimately 
market forces and federal initiatives freed most white and black southerners from the 
most extreme forms of peonage labor; however, undocumented immigrants continue to 
suffer under coercive labor regimes enforced through indebtedness and violence.1 
 As an example of a working class environmental history, I approach workspaces 
and all the human and non-human natural phenomena at play in the labor camps. I                                                         
1 Gunther Peck, “The Nature of Labor: Fault Lines and Common Ground in Environmental and Labor 
History,” Environmental History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April, 2006) 212-238; Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free 
Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 1880-1930 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Jacqueline Jones, Dispossessed: America’s Underclasses from the Civil War to the 
Present, (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life, Labor, and 
Landscape on the Georgia Coast 1680-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Karl Jacoby, 
Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation 
(Berkeley: University of California press, 2001).  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define Environment expansively to include not only the topography of landscapes such as 
islands, oceans, forests, swamps, and rivers, as well as climate and weather, but also 
disease, vegetation and wildlife. I also include in this definition the human constructed 
spaces such as train cars, shacks, tents, sawmills, juke joints, and tomato fields. This 
study explores four cases of southern peonage work camps to show the effects of the 
landscape, weather, climate, and wildlife on working conditions of laborers inside the 
camps. Though Employers seemed to profess a Progressive or conservationist vision of 
utilizing natural resources, conflicts inside the camps did not stem from disagreements 
over land use, rather over the harsh character of the physical environment coupled with 
horrendous labor conditions. In each case, employers, workers, foremen, and reformers 
utilized environmental rhetoric to project their vision of opportunity or violence onto 
southern landscapes. 
 The enormous task of constructing the Florida East Coast Railway across the 
island seascape of the Florida Keys led industrialist Henry M. Flagler to hire labor 
agent Frank Sabia to recruit men from the urban North for the project. Sabia 
intentionally misrepresented the physical environment of the Keys, promising men 
skilled labor jobs in mild, pleasant surroundings because he was paid per head for those 
who he sent to the South. Workers who made the long, arduous trip encountered 
violent armed guards who locked them on trains, caged them on Miami piers, and 
forced them into treacherous island labor camps. Literally trapped on the Keys islands, 
men endured torrid heat, clouds of mosquitoes, and hostile labor bosses. They suffered 
injuries from pick axes, dynamite, poisonous plants and abusive guards. Many grew ill 
from exhaustion, dehydration, hunger, and disease. Workers consistently attempted and 
occasionally escaped from the islands with the help of local fishermen. Eventually in 
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1906, federal agents exposed the brutality, illness, and vice in the camps, though they 
failed to convict Frank Sabia for his part in indebting the men through transportation 
charges. Employers and recruiters expressed notions of environmental opportunity and 
man’s ability to harness and transform nature for the betterment of society, but workers 
subjected to the toil and hardship in swamps and forests expressed their own sense of 
dehumanization and oppression in the context of the wilderness. 
 Almost simultaneously, inside E.E. Jackson’s modern industrial lumber 
operation deep in the pine forests of southern Alabama, workers faced a similar but 
unique set of dangers related to the mixture of machinery and timber that fostered a 
more fluid set of human and non-human relationships. Like Flagler, Jackson relied on 
labor agents in New York and Philadelphia who recruited marginalized workers for 
labor constructing railroads and cutting trees outside the company town of Lockhart. 
The Jackson labor camps employed white Northerners, European immigrants, and 
southern black workers. The distinct physical environment of the forest when mixed 
with industrial profit motives and machinery, included integrated work teams, and 
created distinctly hazardous working conditions for all men in the camps. Men and 
animals suffered injuries from falling trees, fast, heavy logging trains, and sadistic 
bosses. They expressed their suffering through language that employed metaphors of 
men imprisoned by the wilderness and reduced to chattel. They viewed animals as 
workers, companions, and guards. And they likened bosses to the crude severity of the 
forest landscapes, whose inhumanity towards workers resembled the unpredictable 
instinctual violence of beasts, not men. Some workers escaped from the camps, often 
aided by the same dense forest foliage that they felt captive in, and eventually they 
notified federal authorities. The DOJ managed to convict the labor manager at 
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Lockhart, William S. Harlan, and several foremen for their crimes. However southern 
lumbermen convinced President Taft to commute Harlan’s sentence. Local law 
enforcement consistently aided foremen in remanding workers and federal officials often 
ignored workers complaints, and chose not to prosecute southern employers for political 
reasons.  
 Like the Florida Keys and Alabama lumber camps, the Langdale Company’s 
Georgia naval stores operations featured a system of peonage characterized by harsh 
labor, indebtedness, and violence. However, peonage in turpentine camps was more 
familiar to southern rural workers than the railroad and lumber camps were to 
immigrant labor. Both employers and law enforcement maintained that the turpentine 
industry must rely on peonage labor and ignored the conditions of indebtedness and 
violence. The federal programs of the New Deal and WWII commercial regulation 
fostered employer profits and left workers exposed to cyclical debt, poverty, and 
vagrancy.   
 Employers, foremen, and workers in the Langdale camps identified as part of a 
local “woodsmen” culture built on both informal and academic forest conservation. 
Turpentine workers, like their bosses, claimed they were also woodsmen, though many 
workers, and the Langdales themselves, acknowledged the extreme difficulty of 
turpentine labor and the system of peonage that plagued them. The tension between on 
the one hand, the pastoral notion of a labor force, personally drawn to the work of the 
pine drift, and on the other, the clear system of political and economic peonage designed 
to retain workers, constituted a central contradiction in the turpentine industry. The 
larger global market forces of speculative finance and foreign competition eventually led 
to the decline of the turpentine industry and the labor camps after the Second World 
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War; however, workers continued to suffer even greater economic and physical 
insecurity inside other commercial agriculture labor camps. 
 The Langdale turpentine camps and tomato growers in Immokalee, Florida both 
profited from commercial agriculture. Such large operations were was part of a volatile 
ecological system, and pressured by competition from foreign producers who had lower 
labor costs. Owners in both cases expressed the difficulty posed by a dynamic climate as 
well as their reliance on cheap labor that they considered a unique social group for their 
poverty and vulnerability. Unlike the families who often lived and worked in turpentine 
camps their whole life, vegetable workers migrated throughout the eastern region of the 
U.S., and suffered greater housing, food, and health insecurity. Like the naval stores 
industry, commercial vegetable growers benefited from a state government that 
maintained low taxes and possessed little regulatory power, as well as a indifferent 
federal government that did little to protect migrant farm workers. In the 1960s, 
television and print media, workers themselves, and civil rights activists exposed abuses 
in the migrant farm labor system. Economic changes and federal legislation rendered 
extinct the worst kinds of peonage labor; however, event today undocumented workers 
continue to suffer the abuses of peonage labor regimes.  
 Each individual case of peonage labor in this study is unique to its 
environmental, social, and political context. Yet, the profit motives of employers, the 
physical isolation of workers, the brutality of foremen, workers vulnerability to the 
environment, as well as their resilience, the acquiescence of law enforcement, and 
external market forces all shaped peonage labor regimes throughout the rural industrial 
South. The rise of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century brought enormous 
wealth and power to men who benefited from market speculation, lax federal oversight, 
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and a demographic dislocation. The profit motives of employers like Flagler, Jackson, 
and the Langdale family relied upon cheap labor. Industrialists benefited from 
immigration policies fueling enormous labor surpluses in the North. All southern rural 
and extractive employers benefited from land consolidation and an impoverished 
regional migrant labor force displaced from tenant farms by bankers, boll weevils, and 
bad federal farm policies. The shortage of capital throughout the South led industry 
titans to promote their operations as opportunities for individuals to earn a wage, for 
southern states to generate revenue and develop their industrial infrastructure, and for 
the national economy to expand more broadly.  
 Rural industrial employers saw themselves as Progressives in the sense that 
they were dedicated to the idea of efficient use of natural resources. Each of the 
employers who managed rural industrial labor systems believed that through scientific 
management of labor and utilization of new technology they could make production 
more efficient, and develop isolated natural resources for the improvement of the local 
and national economy and society. Some argued that increasing rail access to isolated 
areas improved commerce, while others promoted academic forestry principles of ‘wise 
use’ and sustainability. Most saw themselves as improving society through economic 
development and yet in the process their operations often relied on the violent 
exploitation of their workers. 
 Workers inside rural industrial labor systems suffered physical isolation from 
national political, social, and cultural institutions. Whether recently arrived ethnic 
European immigrants, unemployed urban Americans, or southern black workers, 
individuals fell subject to peonage labor abuses because they were vulnerable to 
exploitative employers, manipulative recruiters, and violent foremen, especially once 
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they were far from their families and unable to report companies’ abuses. On the tropical 
islands, inside forests, or on vast vegetable farms, workers had few comforts or 
protections. In each case the physical environment facilitated employers’ ability to 
exploit labor and cloaked the violence and suffering they experienced from the natural 
and constructed conditions inside the camps. Not until reformers ventured into the 
camps could the plight of workers be exposed. 
 The lack of infrastructure in the rural south and the great distance from cities 
meant that workers suffered from exposure to the elements and poor provisions inside 
peonage labor camps. Whether traveling days without food or water, being forced to 
sleep on rocky ground, or suffering terrible injuries from heavy timber and hot sun, 
workers’ relationship with the environment of the rural south can largely be 
characterized as one of misery. Poor and spoiled food, contaminated water, lack of 
medical care, and festering insects tormented men inside rural industrial labor spaces. 
Most workers interviewed stated these environmental troubles as their reason for 
resisting the work regimes and desiring to return home. 
 When workers resisted, bosses beat them, tied them to trees, or shot them. Some 
mostly suffered from hard labor exacerbated by extreme poverty and an inability to 
escape the cyclical debt that ensnared them. Nonetheless they expressed their 
oppression in language that emphasized their hardship and resilience within the swamps 
and forests of the rural South. 
 Many workers resisted their condition by protesting to foremen, trying to run 
away or simply taking what chance they could to escape from the torment they faced in 
the camps. In railroad camps and lumber operations workers demanded release and 
when denied they defied bosses and escaped anyway they could, steeling away on fishing 
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boats, or absconding in the night. In turpentine and vegetable farms workers often 
sought the most benevolent employer or the best wage offered by a crew boss. Many 
who faced debt peonage and violence in the camps looked for employment in 
neighboring farms or escaped in hopes of evading foremen and returning home to their 
families. Even for those workers who remained inside the camps for extended periods, 
the lack of more wholesome forms of entertainment replaced by the culture of drinking, 
gambling, and fighting manifested as self-destructive attempts to relieve suffering, gain 
financially, or exert personal power within a system that allowed them very little if any 
respite from hard labor. 
 Ultimately the collusion, indifference, or impotence of legal authorities to protect 
workers from peonage labor regimes reinforced employers’ designs to ensnare workers 
through debt and violence. When workers managed to escape and complain to 
authorities, many learned the hard way that local sheriffs were practically the security 
enforcement for the camp. Often, sheriffs deputized employers and foremen, handing 
over their legal authority to enforce the law to those who stood to profit from illegally 
exploiting workers. Even at the federal level, when officials within the Department of 
Justice or the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated peonage labor abuses or 
sought to prosecute violators, the broader political system often avoided confronting 
southern employers either because they lacked sufficient evidence for trial or because 
the employers held political power through their collective industrial organization. 
Even though the records indicate that workers continually escaped peonage labor camps 
and over time technology made the most extreme forms of repression more visible, 
marginalized groups continued to be vulnerable to peonage abuses. Thus the private-
public system of exploitation amounted to a revolving door for marginalized workers. 
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In the rural South, physical isolation or the lack of legal protection, facilitated peonage 
labor even as other forms of indebted coercive labor faded into history. 
  
  14 
 
Chapter One: 
 
Labor, Immigration, and Environmental Historiography 
 
 In the late 1980s, scholars of the “New Labor History” carried out a major turn 
in the substance of debates on working class culture. Moving away from the consensus 
school of the post-war era, Herbert Gutman, David Montgomery and many others on 
both sides of the Atlantic sought to understand the cultural values and intellectual 
debates that informed America’s working classes in the late nineteenth century. In the 
1990s, a distinctly younger though increasingly active group of environmental 
historians began debating how analyses of the role of nature in history could contribute 
to and expand the fields of social and labor history. In the last two decades a number of 
historians argued for merging environmental and labor history. Scholars such as 
Richard White, Gunther Peck, Karl Jacoby, and Mart A. Stewart are paving the way for 
new scholarship that addresses the role of class division and the relationship between 
human and non-human nature. Though early Labor and Environmental historians 
focused on the Northeast and Western United States, many argue that the U.S. South 
represents an important area of study in addressing the various ways in which 
employers and workers identified themselves and engaged one another within the 
context of rural-industrial labor spaces2 
 Building on the seminal work of British social historian E.P. Thompson, both 
Herbert Gutman and David Montgomery began to focus on the culture and experience 
                                                        
2 David Montgomery, “Trends in Working-Class History” Labour/Le Travail, Vol. 19, (Spring, 1987), 13-
22; Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-class 
and Social History (New York: Vintage 1977); David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The 
Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987); Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995); Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe,” 13-16. 
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of American workers in every day life. They challenged earlier binary class orientations 
of rich and poor, showing that divisions in ethnicity, intellectual debates, and political 
ideologies characterized the labor struggles of the Gilded Age in North America. New 
Labor historians largely focused on eastern United States industrial centers such as 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Patterson, New Jersey. Their emphasis on “structures of 
power” countered notions that industrial capital easily dominated the daily lives of poor, 
ethnic-migrant working class people. Montgomery worked to synthesize workers’ 
culture and the labor struggles they participated in. Gutman sought to parse out the 
role of the community and the impact of the working classes on larger society. The New 
Labor historians pushed boundaries of interpretation, illustrated new methodological 
approaches, and revealed previously hidden source material. They built what they 
argued was a more adept history of American workers, their cultures, lifestyles, and 
reactions to the industrial order.3  
 The shift in approaching labor history through cultural rather than political 
methods influenced scholars of the early twentieth century to highlight working class 
communities as their central focal point. This led to an expansion of literature dealing 
with ethnic diversity and the role of immigrant communities in the modern 
expansionist-industrial United States. Building on earlier works of John Higham and 
Barbara Miller Solomon dealing with immigration and Nativism, John Bodnar, Donna 
Gabaccia, and Ewa Marawska demonstrated the particular aspirations of Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants, as well as the social discrimination they encountered in 
industrial urban centers of the U.S. Scholars such as Elizabeth Ewen and Matthew Frye 
                                                        
3 David Montgomery, “Trends in Working-Class History” Labour/Le Travail, Vol. 19, (Spring, 1987), 13-
22; Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society (1977); Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (1987). 
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Jacobson expanded studies of immigration and racial and gender ideologies when they 
built upon Gutman’s interest in the everyday lives of workers and their impact on larger 
society. From different approaches, both Ewen and Jacobsen provided crucial insight 
into the character of immigration in the early 20th century United States. They 
highlighted the connection among industrial economic expansion, increased 
immigration, and the consequences of dynamic markets and hierarchies of ethnicity that 
they argued undergirded America’s social and economic order.4 
 Ewen’s intervention built upon the Gutman school by employing the method of 
gender studies, further complicating notions of monolithic economic classes and ethnic 
groups. She highlighted the experience of Jewish and Italian immigrant women and 
children, aiming to place them at the “center of the historical stage.” Ewen detailed 
women and children’s particular experience in moving from agrarian, preindustrial rural 
Europe to the industrial urban centers of the United States. She argued that the process 
of immigration involved both change and continuity in migrants’ cultural values and 
behaviors. Immigrant women maintained their traditions and institutions, even as they 
adapted to the dynamism of cash economies and fluctuating employment opportunities. 
Children growing up in the United States navigated the process of assimilation more 
easily than did their mothers. Ewen utilized oral histories and personal autobiographies 
to bring to life the women who served at the center of Americas’ modernization.                                                         
4 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1955); Barbara Miller Solomon’s Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Donna Gabaccia, From Sicily to Elizabeth Street (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1984); Ewa Morawska, For Bread with Butter: The Life-Worlds of East 
Central European Immigrants in Johnstown, Pennsylvania 1890-1940 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); John Bodnar, The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1985); Elizabeth Ewen, Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars: Life and Culture 
on the Lower East Side, 1890-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985); Matthew Frye Jacobson, 
Whiteness of a different color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999); also; Barbarian Virtues; The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 
1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). 
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Immigrant women struggled to overcome the ethnic discrimination and labor 
exploitation that characterized the industrial labor market of the early 20th century 
United States.5 
 Matthew Frye Jacobson’s crucial scholarship on race and empire in the United 
States connected Montgomery and Gutman’s work (which focused on local communities 
and labor movements) to broader transnational and global industrial systems.  Jacobson 
linked theories of race to immigration history by explaining the conflicted relationship 
Gilded Age Americans had with immigrants in a rapidly industrializing economy. 
Manufacturers relied on liberal immigration policy to secure large pools of cheap labor 
in order to drive down wages, increase production, expand exports, and ultimately 
improve profit margins. Thus business interests viewed immigrants as necessary for the 
security of the U.S. economy. However, many workers and middle class reformers 
viewed foreigners with cultural suspicion, arguing their ethnic difference represented a 
threat to the Anglo-Saxon, republican virtues that, along with open frontiers, created 
and sustained democratic institutions. Many Americans worried that Slavic and Polish 
people’s ethnicity and cultural baggage signified they cared only about America’s jobs, 
not its Protestant values or democratic principles. American workers’ fears about 
competition in saturated labor markets generated resentment toward immigrant 
workers; however, Jacobson argued racial conflict emerged out of more than simple 
anti-immigrant anger.6 
 Jacobson demonstrated that employers’ notions of racial difference influenced 
their designs to sustain large pools of diverse labor throughout the United States. After                                                         
5 Elizabeth Ewen, Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars: Life and Culture on the Lower East Side, 1890-
1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985).  
6 Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues; The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2000) 63-68. 
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the 1885 Alien Contract Labor Law forbidding importation of contract laborers, U.S. 
business relied on European ethnic padrones, living in the U.S. to direct their own 
countrymen into industrial jobs in America, often garnering tidy profits at the expense 
of workers’ safety. Employers promoted the idea of ethnic and racial differences for 
“engineering a workforce that was usefully divided against itself.” Jacobson also 
presented racial theories as influencing “discussions of immigrants’ place in the New 
World Industrial order.” Employers fretted over white workers’ inability to match 
Asian fruit picking skills in California’s orchards. Many attributed Italians’ and Jews’ 
adaptability to different jobs as a unique racial trait, which made them more suitable for 
America’s highly volatile labor market. Jacobson effectively related labor and 
immigration histories by demonstrating that immigrants contributed greatly to the 
rising U.S. industrial state abroad, and depending upon one’s perspective, either suffered 
or represented the “ugliest features of corporate capitalism amid rapid industrialization” 
in America. This transnational shift in perspectives of labor and immigration in America 
allowed an expansion of conceptual frameworks of histories of labor and immigration 
that incorporated the American west into Labor history.7  
 Gunther Peck, in his Reinventing Free Labor (2000) pushed histories of 
immigration, labor, and the environment to envision the transnational, and intra-ethnic 
class relations of padrones, immigrant laborers, and the geography of the North 
American West. Peck explored what he called the “unstable fiction” of free labor in the 
industrial northwestern United States. Padrones on both U.S. borders in Mexico and 
Canada, in connection with partners in Italy, Greece, and Mexico funneled immigrant 
workers from their own countries to the mines of the Rocky Mountains. Peck asserted                                                         
7 Ibid, 79-73. 
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that these padrones were “modern” capitalists in that they manipulated bureaucratic 
systems, western geography, and laborers of their own ethnicity in order to profit. Mine 
operators violently coerced workers in order to increase production. Peck emphasized 
workers’ resistance, picking up on earlier trends in immigration history by focusing on 
community formation, labor practices, and gender construction. Peck suggested that 
immigration and labor historians needed to shift focus spatially from settled immigrant 
communities to mobile transient migrant workers. Peck skillfully mingled 
methodologies to show areas where new interpretations exposed previously unseen 
patterns in labor, immigration, and environmental histories.8  
 In 2006, Peck wrote an essay that sought to identify key areas for mutual 
analysis between labor and environmental historians. Pointing out the Marxist 
underpinnings of William Cronon’s early work, Peck charged that assertions of humans’ 
“alienation” from nature skewed the reality that humans are part of nature. He posited 
that non-human nature and human work could be better synthesized to account for 
their interconnectivity. Peck saw that few labor historians were using methods that 
viewed the natural environment as central to their focus. Environmental historians on 
the other hand dealt with “class” only peripherally. He suggested that studies of place, 
such as the North Western United States, and processes such as forms of human labor 
might help historians of both fields move beyond the declension narratives of capitalist 
commodification of nature. Peck framed his vision in terms of  “geographies of labor,” 
which he believed would reveal connections between urban and rural landscapes, ethnic 
communities, and socio-economic classes. He argued that most environmental histories 
largely operated in a unidirectional fashion, focusing only on humans’ impact on nature,                                                         
8 Peck, Reinventing Free Labor (2000). 
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and he raised the plausibility of examining the inverse relationship of nonhuman 
nature’s impact on humans. Peck further suggested that: “connections between nature 
and labor remain conceptually imbedded in extractive mining and agricultural 
contexts.” Peck’s vision pulled from debates taking place within the field of 
environmental history itself, which sought to find new conceptual frameworks for 
further analysis.9  
 As two of the founders of environmental history, William Cronon and Donald 
Worster came to their vision of existing unsustainable ecological relationships within 
the context of wider social and political critiques of capitalist market economics. Their 
methodological trail blazing borrowed heavily from Marxist analysis of man’s alienation 
from land and natural resources. Cronon’s Changes in the Land (1976) marked the 
beginning of Environmental History, arguing that European market intervention in 
North America began a destabilization of ecological systems that continues to the 
present day and jeopardizes human livelihood. Cronon’s narrative followed the 
transformation whereby indigenous Americans’ interconnection with nature was 
interrupted and replaced by English settlers’ systematic maximizing of material 
resources for profits. The English cleared forests previously used by natives for hunting 
grounds; encouraged the fur trade that nearly extinguished beaver populations; and 
grew monocultures that exhausted the soil, perpetuating unending expansion. Though 
he looked at both native and settler systems of agriculture and hunting, labor was not a 
central component of Cronon’s thesis. Rather, it was the decline of pre-industrial 
sustainable ecological relationships under the expansionist, materialist colonial regime 
                                                        
9 Gunther Peck, “The Nature of Labor: Fault Lines and Common Ground in Environmental and Labor 
History,” Environmental History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April, 2006) 212-238. 
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that concerned him most. Cronon argued capitalism caused the irreversible changes of 
North American landscapes and ecologies.10  
 In Natue’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (1977), Donald Worster 
examined the complex relationship between ecology as a science and its cultural and 
conceptual underpinnings, Subsequently his Dust Bowl (1979) focused on the 
unsustainable agricultural practices and failed government intervention that 
contributed to the infamous drought and dust storms on the southwestern plains. 
Worster argued that a “capitalist ethos” led humans to destroy the grass and bison that 
sustained human life in the region. Though he described the poverty and hardship 
suffered by ‘Okies’ and elites who promoted the commercial “agribusiness” model of 
farming, Worster viewed all the southwest plains farmers as perpetuators of a “common 
economic culture” that destroyed the soil. He asserted that greed drove sod-busting 
settlers to plow up the soil until there was nothing left but dust. Worster did not seek 
to examine complexities of class divisions at length, asserting that only the original 
indigenous inhabitants had respect for the natural balance on which the plains 
ecosystem relied. Even the agricultural reforms of the 1930s did not change what 
Worster viewed as the fundamental problem of commercial agriculture. Worster 
employed an almost apocalyptic tone in his description of the impact of dust storms on 
people’s lives. And though he built on Cronon’s anti-capitalist thesis, his emphasis on 
materialist frameworks for explaining the crisis left some to question the sustainability 
of environmental history as a field.11 
                                                        
10 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1983). 
11  Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977). 
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 After more than a decade of discussion and exposition, by the 1990s 
Environmental historians established a substantial space for themselves in the scholarly 
community. Both Cronon and Worster began to look for ways to further expand 
environmental methods and to legitimize the field within the broader scholarly 
community. Cronon’s 1990 article “Modes of Prophecy and Production” argued for 
settling what he believed was Worster’s limited “agro-ecological” mode of production 
problem method. Worster suggested that Marx’s notion of “Modes of Production” 
which referred to physical methods of human work, or divisions of labor (particularly in 
agricultural food production) were the central unifying relationship between humans of 
all civilizations and societies since the Neolithic Revolution. He further argued that 
environmental historians’ greatest challenge was tracing the capitalist transformation of 
the fifteenth century that made land into a commodity, and how it changed ecological 
systems. Cronon argued Worster’s emphasis on “agro-ecological modes of production” 
was excessively materialist, and did not appropriately account for disparity in human 
belief regarding their relationship to the environment, or integrate ideology and 
political economy into environmental history. Cronon called for the establishment of a 
new, and more useable framework for viewing the role of nature in human life 
historically. Asserting that there was not enough “ideology” in environmental history, 
he suggested that “relationships” were a more flexible tool for viewing natural systems 
and the human cultures and political economies they existed within. In viewing 
capitalism’s commodification of land, he extended the question “who has gained and who 
has lost power as modes of production have changed?” Cronon and Worster’s mutual 
interest in expanding environmental history was based on further linking the field with 
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other fields of history to understand humans’ place on earth and the many ways people 
and nature have shaped each other.12  
 Cronon’s second book Nature’s Metropolis (1991) incorporated his evolving views 
of environmental history by linking economies and nature in a particular place. 
Focusing on Chicago in the late nineteenth century, Cronon viewed the development of 
the city as a result of its ecological hyperactivity. He emphasized the interconnectivity 
of humans and non-human nature in Chicago with those in the rural hinterlands of the 
mid-west farming region. Placing more emphasis on cultural ideology in his narrative, 
Cronon examined how humans re-envisioned economic relationships to create new 
market systems such as stock “futures,” which further economized the flow of corn, and 
grain from farms to market and back again. Chicago represented a hub, where both 
human conceptual and technological innovation relied on ecological landscapes to 
produce a level of material abundance previously unseen in human history. Cronon 
described “first nature” as the natural resources humans processed into commercial 
products such as timber cut and shipped from the northern forests of Michigan along 
rivers and sawed into boards inside lumber mills. Humans then cut and shipped lumber, 
Cronon’s “second nature,” to factories and farms by horse-powered wagons, and later by 
coal powered trains, where manufacturers made furniture, and farmers used lumber to 
build barns, grain silos and to furnish more comfortable domestic spaces. Linking 
consumption to conservation, Cronon argued that the wealth created in what he called 
                                                        
12 Donald Worster, “Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History,” 
Joural of American History, Vol. 76, No. 4 (March, 1990) 1087-1106; William Cronon, “Modes of Prophecy 
and Production: Placing Nature in History,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 76, No. 4 (March, 1990) 
1122-1131. 
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nature’s metropolis allowed modern humans the comfort and efficiency to re-envision 
their role in, and impact on, the environment.13 
 The 1990s was a decade of expansion and shifting perspectives for the field of 
environmental history. Building on Cronon and Worster’s debate over the future of the 
field, Richard White took a significant step forward, altering the narrative from one of 
declension to one of interconnectivity and adaptation. Moving beyond Marxist analyses, 
White posited that, not only should man be viewed as part of nature, but that energy, 
man, and industrial production could not be separated from the natural organic 
processes that supported them. As a historical study of the Columbia River, White’s 
Organic Machine (1995) incorporated environmental and intellectual history that 
followed the waterway from the days of indigenous salmon fishing through the damn 
building, and nuclear power facilities of the modern era. Accounting for the “cultural 
perceptions” of nature that shifted over time, White used the writings of Emerson and 
Kipling to reveal how the many uses of the river made it a social space. He pointed to 
the “geography of energy” whereby mountains, sun, salmon, Indians, canneries, and 
nuclear power plants all harnessed the organic energy of the river for one purpose or 
another. White viewed the environmental changes in the river not as man defeating 
nature, but as various organisms engaging and converting its energy while they could. 
His thesis integrated William Cronon’s notion of “first” and “second” nature by 
accepting nuclear power plants and hydroelectric dams as equally a part of “nature” as 
                                                        
13 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: Norton Press, 1991) 27-30, 
128-131, 152-153. 
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the salmon and river flows from which they developed. However, White’s central 
organizing theme is energy, which all organisms create and utilize in common.14  
 Employing Richard White’s model of the organic machine, Douglas Sackman 
incorporated labor into his picture of southern California’s citrus industry. Sackman 
viewed workers’ bodies as mediums between the organic landscapes of the groves and 
the artificial space of the market. He also emphasized tropes of culture and nature, 
whereby racial stereotypes played into which ethnic groups growers wanted to pick 
their crops and why. Chinese pickers had cultural expertise from their labor in fruit 
plantations throughout the Pacific Rim. However, after the 1892 Exclusion Act, Euro-
American pickers took over, and the delicate care Chinese workers showed for the 
fragile orange skins diminished and employers need to increase quality and production 
led to the employment of scientific management in the orange groves, which trained 
workers to handle the fruit to maximize profits. But new labor management regimes 
eroded the physical and psychological health of workers, by subjecting them to 
fumigation chemicals and increasing the power of foremen over their work routine. This 
transformation of nature—in the form of oranges and workers’ bodies—emphasized 
Worster’s “agro-ecological” mode of production analysis and borrowed from White’s 
notion of organic machines. Sackman emphasized human labor in his narrative and 
exposed how both the use of technology and human hands contributed to increased 
commercial profits in the citrus industry.15 
 Further shifts in Environmental historical methods adapted to Cronon’s 
question of who benefited from changes in human relationships with the environment.                                                         
14 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1995). 
15 Douglas C. Sackman, “‘Natures’ Workshop’: The Environment and Workers’ Bodies in California’s 
Citrus Industry 1900-1940,” Environmental History, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 2000) 27-53. 
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In his 1997 article “Class and Environmental History,” Karl Jacoby provided a coherent 
vision of working class environmental history by complicating overly simplistic 
groupings of working class and environmental social movements. Jacoby showed that 
working class folks were not always allied with environmental conservation. Urban 
elites’ plans for conservation often conflicted with rural local “moral ecologies” that 
viewed open use of nature as a means of subsistence. The “atmosphere of class hatred” 
that Jacoby saw in conflicts between backwoodsmen and game officials moved beyond 
previous trends in Environmental history. Accepting Gunther Peck’s analysis, Jacoby 
argued that environmental history largely avoided class and he further asserted that 
labor historians led by Gutman and Montgomery overcame inaccurate homogenizations 
of working class humans but did not account for environmental relationships. 
Environmental historians such as Andrew Hurley and Robert Gotlieb accepted the 
“class assumptions of conservationists” when they emphasized the links between 
industrial labor movements and the environmental movement. Shifting to wilderness 
spaces in an earlier period, Jacoby focused on laboring classes that challenged 
environmental ideologies of nature conservation.16 
 Jacoby’s 2001 monograph, Crimes Against Nature, deftly comingled issues of class 
and culture into his examination of 20th century conservation movements and the 
attempt to regulate hunting, fishing, and timber use in New York’s Adirondack 
Mountains, California’s Yellowstone National Park, and Arizona’s Grand Canyon. 
Jacoby moved beyond the work of Mark David Spence and Louis Warren, which largely                                                         
16 Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary Indianna, 1945-
1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing The Spring: The 
Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washinton D.C.: Island Press, 1993); Karl Jacoby, 
“Class and Environmental History: Lessons from ‘The War in the Adirondacks,’” Environmental History, 
Vol. 2, No. 3 (July, 1997) 324-342. 
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focused on race and ethnicity as cultural divisions between conservationists and 
indigenous populations. Using class as his central organizing theme, Jacoby viewed 
conservation efforts as “resource allocation” whereby urban elites imposed their 
ideologies of land use on a local rural folks living off of the land. Local people’s “moral 
ecology” included the notion of “common rights” to land use. Pivoting from earlier 
overly simplistic tropes of Marxism in environmental history, Jacoby showed how 
notions of “environmental banditry,” when viewed though a more nuanced conceptual 
framework, can challenge assumptions about how class, labor, and the environment 
interconnect. Through his three case studies of local residents vs. government officials, 
Jacoby offered a fresh and nuanced vision of how social conflict between working class 
and urban elites developed out of evolving environmental ideologies.17  
 Following Jacoby, Gunther Peck famously proposed new interventions in 
environmental history that appropriately dealt with class, labor, physical spaces, and 
relationships between human work and non-human nature throughout history. It is odd 
that Peck suggested there could be room for “class analysis” in Environmental history 
nearly a decade after Jacoby first offered a clear example of how such an analysis might 
look. Equally odd is Peck’s call for scholars to focus on questions of “place” and 
“process” fifteen years after Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis. But Peck’s insistence on the 
need for work that examines how class is spatially organized remains both a truly 
insightful proposition and an underdeveloped area of research. Peck pointed out that 
there was a need for historical research that shows the specific relationships among                                                         
17 Mark David Spence, Dispossessing The Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Louis S. Warren, The Hunter’s Game: Poachers and 
Conservationists in Twentieth Century America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Karl Jacoby, 
Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation 
(Berkeley: University of California press, 2001). 
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markets, nature, and class interests. Jacoby’s examination of how social groups of people 
divided themselves over evolving ideologies of land use leaves room for further studies 
that incorporate these relationships.18  
 Both Jacoby and Peck have called for examinations of the South, particularly the 
connections among agriculture, land enclosure, and labor markets. Gunther Peck 
pointed out in his article, “The Nature of Labor,” that the rural South provides common 
ground for studies of labor and environment that incorporate class conflict around the 
rural agricultural and industrial sectors. Room remains for studies that attempt to 
unwind the relationships among social, racial, and environmental ideologies to identify 
how human consumption of nature contributed to class divisions within southern 
society. Further study of rural industrial labor spaces offers one potential pathway 
toward what Gunther Peck and William Cronon called for in their groundbreaking 
historiographic essays: histories that deal with the role of the environment in class 
divisions. Merging labor and environmental history through analysis of southern rural-
industrial labor spaces allows the possibility to move beyond the dominating trope of 
conservationist and Marxist declension narratives that dominate environmental history 
to a study that examines human/non-human relationships and the evolving racial and 
class divisions of the modern South.  
 The overwhelming majority of industrial labor in the post-bellum South went 
toward extracting natural resources in isolated rural spaces. Employers faced the 
imperative of finding, transporting, and maintaining pools of labor to carry out the 
brutal and dangerous work of building railroads, chopping trees, mining coal and 
phosphates, and picking crops. Often, labor recruiters and employers manipulated and                                                         
18 Gunther Peck, “The Nature of Labor,” 212-238. 
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extorted workers in order to attract them to and retain them in such difficult jobs. The 
rural South offers unique context for examining the role of human consumption of non-
human nature in cultural ideologies and class divisions.19   
Coercive and Indebted Labor and Extractive Industries in the New South 
 
 In the post-bellum South, both conservatives who sought the “redemption” of 
the South from Radical Republicans, and reformers who hoped to modernize southern 
economic and social systems agreed; In order to build a new economy, state government 
and private capital needed to command labor for agricultural and extractive industrial 
production. Converting the immense and diverse array of natural resources contained 
within the eleven former Confederate states into marketable commodities required an 
enormous amount of labor. Cotton lands needed cultivation and harvesting. Coal, iron 
ore, and phosphate required extraction. Forests had to be cleared, and farms, towns, and 
railroad tracks put in their place. The combination of industrialization, economic 
expansion, and southern cultural legacies of white supremist racial ideology contributed 
to the creation of what some scholars identify as a new hybrid form of forced labor 
throughout the post-bellum South referred to as peonage. Indebted or coercive labor 
systems ensnared poor southerners, both black and white, as well as newly arrived 
European, Asian, and eventually Mexican immigrants. In the new South, farming on a 
“crop lien” system, laboring on chain gangs, and borrowing from the company store 
became central aspects of relations between workers, landowners, and employers. The 
development of peonage labor regimes was rooted in both old and new social, economic,                                                         
19 Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972) 105-110; Jones, 
Dispossessed: America’s Underclasses from the Civil War to the Present, (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Daniel 
Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name, The Re-enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War 
II (New York: Double Day, 2008).  
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and political mechanisms at work in the modern South and it varied across space and 
time. However, the wider undercapitalization of the South, ethnic and racial ideologies 
of white supremacy, and environmental ideologies of conservation, as well as personal 
sadistic impulses and immediate financial profit motives underpinned peonage labor 
regimes across the South.20  
 Scholarly attention to peonage, as a subset of the wider occurrence of coerced 
labor systems in the post-bellum South, remain underdeveloped compared with the 
historical literature on sharecropping, convict labor, and company towns. Roughly one 
in three farm laborers in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi in the post-bellum era 
found themselves subject to peonage labor practices. Peonage predominantly occurred 
in railroad construction camps, the naval stores industry, and commercial vegetable 
farms. Both federal investigators looking into complaints of this new form of slavery, 
and employers who utilized physical force to retain workers used the term peonage to 
describe the status of workers coerced through debt or violence to remain working 
against their will. Federal investigators in the early 20th century struggled to prove the 
involuntary status of workers in the isolated rural South. Peonage labor develop among 
other debt labor regimes such as convict labor, company town “paternalism,” and 
sharecropping, though it differed from each of these. Historians should distinguish the 
status of peons from consenting tenants or reluctant underpaid farm laborers. The 
dynamic physical environments where coerced labor systems operated offer important 
information about the phenomenon of peonage labor in the South. An attention to 
                                                        
20 See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1951); also Gavin Wright, Old South New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sate University Press, 1986); 
Robert Outland, Tapping the Pines: The Naval Stores Industry in the American South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2004). 
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relationships among employers, laborers and the physical environment will add to a 
better understanding of southern peonage labor systems.21 
 C. Vann Woodward, the preeminent historian of the post-reconstruction South, 
famously argued that the alliance of elite conservative Democrats such as General 
William Mahone, media boosters such as Henry Waterson, and northern capital 
investors such as J.P. Morgan created a “tributary economy” in the South. Woodward 
points to undercapitalization as the dominant economic characteristic throughout the 
region, arguing that most southern states possessed significant natural resources but 
lacked the capital, and often the labor, to transform them into financial wealth. Southern 
boosters and northern industry magnates carried out the expansion of railroads by 
employing “blacks and whites who cut and graded and bridged their way across the 
Appalachians and the Piedmont, through the steaming delta and swamp of the Gulf 
region, the arid Texas plains, and the scrub and hammock of Florida to link the 
subtropics with the temperate zone.” Railroads allowed for the subsequent increase in 
extractive industries such as lumber, which between 1880 and 1900 increased in 
production value from 1.7 to 17.4 million dollars. This extractive economy relied 
heavily on “low wage, low value industries” and often employed coerced laborers such as 
convicts and peons to do the initial rough processing of material before it was 
transported to the Northern factories for finishing. 22 
 In 1986, Gavin Wright countered Woodward’s thesis of change after 
Reconstruction, using economic history to show that the South had always been cash 
poor, resource rich, and distinct from the North in its low wage economy for black and                                                         
21 Jones, Dispossessed (1992); Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South 1901-1969 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1972). 
22 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951) 
112-121. 
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white workers. Though Wright agreed with Woodward that the post-bellum South had 
a “colonial economy,” he argued that scholars overemphasized the idea of post-
Reconstruction change. Wright asserted that both finance and labor systems always 
relied heavily on poorly paid and coerced labor in order to profit. Southern elites 
preferred coercive labor systems to the development of large populations of working 
poor laborers with discretionary money because it reinforced a racial caste system they 
they believed their social order depended upon. The isolation of the South’s labor force, 
both under the slave regime and after the war, facilitated the low wage economy and 
coercive labor regimes. Wright argued that distance and isolation from markets 
characterized both old and new southern economies; in his view, local and regional labor 
migration patterns always distinguished the South from the rest of the United States. 
 Jacqueline Jones’ Disspossessed: America’s Underclasses From the Civil War to the 
Present (1992), contributed mightily to histories of labor and class in the postbellum 
South. Employing extensive research and an expansive critique of race and poverty in 
the U.S., Jones argued that post-industrial American cultural portrayals of the 
“underclass” as primarily urban and African-American misconstrue the actual history of 
poverty. Comparing emancipated black southerners after the Civil War and poor white 
southerners she posited that rural southerners of both races were not lazy or shiftless, a 
charge leveled at them by employers and landlords who resented high labor turnover, 
but rather they shared values of hard work and resilience. Jones deftly examined many 
central themes in southern labor histories, chiefly: the overwhelming existence of class 
division based on land ownership; the relegation of rural workers to sharecropping, 
extractive industries, and migrant labor; the exploitation of workers through 
indebtedness and coercive labor; the resilience and mobility or “shifting” workers 
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embodied in their attempts to avoid exploitation; and the systematic political oppression 
of the working poor. Unlike earlier works on political economy and labor in the South, 
Jones was one of the first to focus on the daily lives of poor rural workers bringing 
scholars closer to the reality of her historical actors.23  
 Jones’ careful attention to and poignant description of workers’ experience in the 
cotton fields, phosphate mines, and vegetable farms provides an invaluable narrative of 
life and labor in southern rural-industrial labor spaces. Her argument that “place” has a 
role in the history of poverty is most important. Not only was the lack of land 
ownership or a ‘home place’ a major factor in the poverty and disfranchisement of rural 
workers, “wage earning was contingent on the forces of nature, always variable and 
unpredictable.” Along the roads from the countryside to the cities, poor Americans 
performed “hard work in the fields” and “hard living in town.”  Whether the 
“backbreaking rigors of stoop labor” or the exorbitant rents paid to greedy slumlords in 
the ghetto, isolation of marginalized peoples has always reinforced their suffering. 
Jones’ monograph represents one of most influential analyses of southern rural labor in 
the industrial U.S. South.24 
 Nan Woodruff argued in American Congo (2003), that modern southern 
economies were bound to external forces through global cotton, iron, and rice markets. 
Northern states’ and European nations’ capital investment drew immigrant labor to 
southern agriculture and industry as well. Woodruff, like Wright and Woodward, 
likened the brutality of coerced labor in the “alluvial empire” of the Mississippi Delta to 
a bureaucratic “colonial” regime. Though she employed a more transnational conceptual 
                                                        
23 Jones, Dispossessed. 167-178. 
24 Ibid. 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framework, she argued that this regime, which exploited black southerners and 
immigrant laborers in order to profit in a global market system, bore similarities to that 
of the Belgian Congo. Global market imperatives and southern white supremist legal 
customs reinforced convict and peonage labor systems in order to underwrite much of 
the economic expansion in the modern South.25 
 The most pervasive form of indebted labor in the post-bellum South was 
sharecropping. Building on the Progressive school in American history and the 
Materialist approach of Charles Beard, in 1939, Roger W. Shugg published his Origins 
of Class Struggle in Louisianna. The book outlined the phenomena of the “crop lien” 
system as the primary mechanism through which landed elites maintained the 
plantation system, binding black and white farmers to the land through debt and threat 
of violence. The loss of slave property and the destruction of yeoman homesteads during 
the Civil War meant that in order to maintain ownership of land after the war planters 
and small farmers had to borrow on credit to cultivate cotton and sugar. Nearly four out 
of five cotton farmers took out a lien on their crop for seed and supplies after the crop 
failures of 1867. Plantation owners held onto their property only by borrowing from 
merchants and subdividing and renting out their estates. Most small white farmers did 
not want to work for landlords, but “the multitude who wanted small tracts had no 
money to pay for them.” Thus most farmers took to tenancy and farming “on halves” in 
an effort to survive and hopefully move up the agricultural ladder from sharecropping 
to renting, and eventually owning their own farms. Shugg asserted that: “the crop lien 
became universal” and the “extortion and risk of this system of credit…plunged a                                                         
25 Gavin Wright, Old South New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Sate University Press, 1986) 11-13; 53-
56; 159; Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, American Congo: The African American Freedom Struggle in the Delta 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 2003) 32-33. 
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majority of the rural population into debt from which there was little hope of escape.” 
Shugg largely left out southern blacks’ crucial role in the development of the 
sharecropping system, assuming that blacks lacked social and economic power because 
they were merely a “racial caste, not a social group.” Shugg himself later admitted the 
fallacy of his assertion and suggested that future scholars would correct this mistake.26 
 Though the overwhelming majority of sharecroppers and tenant farmers across 
the South were white, proportionally more blacks than whites were relegated to this 
form of debt peonage. In Good and Faithful Labor: From Slavery to Sharecropping in the 
Natchez District 1860-1890, (1977) Ronald L.F. Davis made the case that freedmen in the 
post-emancipation Louisiana delta contributed to the development of the sharecropping 
system. Union officials and northern capitalists recognized the need to jumpstart 
agricultural production after the Civil War, and, as a result, Union military and 
Republican legislators dashed freedmen’s hopes of massive land redistribution and 
private land grants. However, southern blacks rejected the notion of “wage” or gang 
labor because it resembled the slave labor regime. Davis argues that freedmen 
negotiated for tenancy and farming on shares, as this system granted them some 
nominal independence from white landlords and overseers. In the same year, 
cliometricians Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch characterized sharecropping as a 
“compromise” between freedmen and planters. Landlords employed tenants in order to 
maintain their family estates, and along with merchants, designed the crop lien system 
to favor their need for profits. Julie Saville used Davis’s method to analyze blacks’ 
transition from slave to wage labor in South Carolina. As part of the resistance school of                                                         
26 Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1939), 235-239; 264-266. See also Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the 
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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African-American studies in the 1990s, Saville posited that low-country freedmen 
asserted demands for their own land and control of their time and labor away from 
white oversight. The regional characteristics of the low-country—namely large black 
majorities and sizeable tracts of land with exhausted soil—allowed some freedmen to 
purchase small plots of inferior land along the South Carolina and Georgia coast. 
Reconstituted black families fought removal from their personal land tracts and 
defended their family units, allowing women to primarily govern domestic labor. Post-
Reconstruction reversals in black political rights ultimately meant that much of blacks’ 
independence and resistance gave way under the forces of social violence and indebted 
labor.27  
 The exorbitant interest and outright trickery that planters and merchants 
employed in their contracts kept freedmen—along with many white sharecroppers—in 
a long-term spiral of debt. Thus Jonathan Weiner argued in his Social Origins of the New 
South  (1978), that planters maintained their status after the Civil War through political 
power and physical violence. Tenancy and sharecropping were not the systems of free 
labor that many northern capitalists idealized, nor did they allow southern farmers the 
independence to which they aspired. Landlords’ oversight and merchants’ usury system 
exploited poor farm laborers. However, Ronald L. F. Davis showed that continual, close 
supervision of labor was the exception, not the rule. He asserted that: “sharecropping 
was not the same as slavery…Freedmen lived and worked in families, were relatively 
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Consequences of Emancipation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). See also Charles 
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unsupervised, and were generally free to move.” Many black southerners did manage to 
climb the agricultural ladder, particularly through the 1870s. Yet, as Roger Shugg 
established in 1936, most poor black and white farmers fell victim to predatory credit 
systems in the late 19th-century.28 
 Davis agreed with the popular narrative that the emergence of debt peonage in 
the form of the crop lien system was part of the post-war ‘compromise’ whereby the 
federal government remanded civil and political power to local southern institutions. 
Davis correctly asserted that both local, state, and national governments were complicit 
in the widespread use of coerced labor throughout the South. Union military policies of 
“non-intervention” and later day political compromises between Republicans and 
Democrats left freedmen and poor whites to negotiate with planter and bureaucratic 
elites’ demands for cheap labor. In spite of freedmen’s role in resisting gang labor, in the 
aftermath of slavery, most blacks and poor whites fell into a permanent indebted labor 
force. Tenancy and the crop lien system bound laborers to the land, as well as to 
merchants and landowners. This form of agricultural debt peonage is the earliest 
identified and most common form of peonage that appears in the historiography on 
labor in the South. However sharecropping was not typically the most brutal or 
extreme form of peonage labor.29  
 The black codes that replaced slave codes following the Civil War provided 
southern states the power to command black labor for agricultural and industrial 
production through the convict lease system. Following Woodward’s thesis of new 
economic and social patterns, Ed Ayers concurred that ‘undercapitalization’                                                         
28 Jonathan Wiener, Social Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1978); Davis, Good and Faithful Labor (1977), 169-181. 
29 Davis, Good and Faithful Labor (1977), 79. 
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characterized southern economics after the war.  He asserted that the origins of the 
convict lease system developed out of the custom of racial ideologies of black indolence 
and the new imperative of industrial capitalism. The need to control free black labor was 
part of the South’s “nascent capitalism” whereby states were short on revenue and labor. 
The convict lease system, born out of this need, was supported by the southern states’ 
centralized penal systems. Thus state prisons operated as law enforcement mechanisms 
of the larger white Democratic agenda to enforce social order through the convict lease 
system. Prisons leased out black convicts for labor in the most difficult and dangerous 
work. Convicts built railroads, mined coal, steel, and phosphate, and later laid roads and 
highways. Ayers determined that states sought to maximize convicts’ labor, leading to 
abusive and violent working conditions. Capitalist profit motives and racial ideologies 
devalued the individual health and safety of black convicts. Both black and white 
southerners saw the convict lease system as tainted by cronyism and backroom political 
deals. However, due to race bating, opposing the lease system remained politically 
unpopular.30  
 Building on Ayers’s work, David Oshinsky agreed that after the Civil War 
conservative ideologues and wealthy industrialists conspired to detain and direct black 
male labor toward corporate agriculture and extractive industries. Oshinsky’s 
examination of Mississippi State Prison known as Parchman Farm emphasized the 
racially charged rhetoric and corrupt political dealings of men such as Governor James 
K. Vardaman. Governor Vardaman promoted racial regression theories, which assumed 
that without proper oversight and subjection to hard labor, blacks would revert to 
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indolence and violence. Such racial ideologies exploited white fears of independent 
blacks and reinforced white public support for the convict lease system. Oshinksy, like 
Ayers, emphasized the customary practices of slavery as the context from which the 
brutal convict lease system arose. Calling it the “new legal slavery,” he pointed to 
cotton-picking “quotas” or “tasks” as well as whippings forced on inmates at Parchman 
to draw his comparison. He likened the black inmates who guarded convict laborers to 
the black drivers of the slave plantation. Oshinsky highlighted the injustice of the 
convict lease, stating: “Convict leasing was about profits, brutality, and racist ideas.” 
Oshinsky exposed the racial discrimination and human torture that persisted at 
Parchman Farm, even as states’ infrastructures and economies improved in the 20th 
century.31  
 Along with Oshinsky, Alex Litchenstein pointed to the sad irony that 
modernization of penal codes and southern economies led to increased use of convict 
labor.  Litchenstein’s Twice The Work of Free Labor (1996) added nuance to Woodward, 
Ayers, and Oshinsky’s contention that undercapitalization of southern state 
governments and racism led to the impetus for convict labor, showing that 
“Progressive” improvements to transportation infrastructure, which benefited farmers 
and factory owners throughout the South, relied on the brutal archaic labor regime of 
the convict lease. Many southern social reformers believed employing convicts on public 
works aided inmates and society more than simply locking them in cells, which was 
relatively expensive and thought to perpetuate indolence among black southerners. 
Southern social elites viewed putting convicts to work on public roads and industrial 
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production as providing both a hard consequence for criminals and a practical, necessary 
value to the state. Thus convict labor underwrote the construction of better roads, 
bridges, and dams. Litchenstein shows that throughout the early 20th century states 
increasingly leased white convicts; this brought more attention to the lease, eventually 
leading to reforms in the system.32  
 Along with Litchenstein, Douglas A. Blackmon, in his Slavery by Another Name 
(2008), accepted the so-called progressive underpinnings of convict labor and debt 
peonage systems in corporate industrial and agricultural sectors of the South. As 
William A. Link showed in The Paradox of Southern Progressivism (1992), southern 
Progressivism often employed state intervention to achieve political and social reforms 
that contradicted democratic principles. Reformers’ sense of a new, more hygienic social 
order included institutionalizing racial segregation, the political disfranchisement of 
black southerners, and penal reforms such as convict labor laws. Like Oshinsky, 
Blackmon’s narrative expressed moral criticisms of this “new slavery,” which he argued 
was widespread, and more violent and inhumane than antebellum slavery. He argued 
convicts and peons were more expendable than slaves. But black convicts were not 
solely victims of white opportunism and sadism; they often actively sought release from 
prison and reform of labor conditions.33 
 Unlike tenants, sharecroppers, and peons, roughly 90% of convict laborers were 
black. As Oshinsky and Blackmon point out, convicts carried out the most brutal work 
of constructing the transportation infrastructure of the modern South. Marry Ellen 
Curtin argued that blacks were both victims in the development of, and agents in the                                                         
32 Alexander C. Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the 
New South (London; New York: Verso, 1996). 
33 Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name (2008) 218; William A. Link, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism 
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deconstruction of the convict lease system. Like her predecessor, Eugene D. Genovese, 
and other scholars such as Julie Saville, Curtin’s work presented the perspective of black 
prisoners and the larger black community toward the convict lease system. She 
highlighted women who worked as convicts, as well as the role of the black political and 
religious organizations that opposed the lease. Curtin argued that post-emancipation 
blacks, even those in bondage, challenged state penal systems. Pointing to the strikes in 
the Pratt mines in Alabama, she showed how prisoners struck, slowed production, and 
with the help of their families, used the court system to fight their convictions. 
Additionally, she examined how convicts used the labor skills they developed in the 
Pratt coalmines to obtain employment opportunities for themselves once they were 
released. Curtin did not minimize the oppression convicts endured—the coal mines of 
Alabama were among the most brutal in the United States—but she reminds us not to 
ignore the culture of defiance that black convicts acted out while imprisoned and the 
resilience they embodied once released. The convict lease system, in all its debauched 
legality, ultimately remained visible to the public eye. This allowed for public oversight 
and eventually reform. In addition to using convict labor, coal mines also attracted free 
laborers to relocate from their farms to company towns in hopes of finding economic 
opportunity. Free laborers often fell into exploitative patterns of debt peonage in 
coalmines and lumber towns.34  
 Company towns have long been a focal point of interest for southern labor 
historians. In 1931, Anna Rochester published the seminal leftist pro-labor history of 
the coal industry in the United States. In attempting to offer a factual description of the 
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state of coal mines, working conditions and wages, Rochester utilized the reports of 
government investigations from the 1922 U.S. Coal Commission. Rochester found that 
a combination of industrial mechanization in the 1920s, along with company designs to 
increase production and profits, drastically decreased wages and endangered the safety 
of workers in the coal mines of Pennsylvania and Illinois. Rochester argued that the 
company-owned stores, police, and housing in coal towns contributed to an outright 
monopoly, which exploited every aspect of workers’ daily lives. From her Marxist 
approach, Rochester asserted that workers were completely dominated by the coal 
owners, who maintained pools of labor and generated great profits by keeping workers 
in a perpetual state of debt. In the post-World War Two era, the field of labor history 
expanded beyond Marxist interpretations, but questions of class-consciousness and 
conflict still influence historical debates over labor and environment in the South.35  
 The Materialist, Progressive school of historians, which included controversial 
works by Charles Beard, Robert Shugg, and Anna Rochester, gave way in the post-war 
era to the consensus school. Led by Richard Hofstadter, consensus historians 
downplayed the socio-economic divisions among Americans. But by the 1970s, the work 
of “New Labor” historians, influenced by Herbert Gutman and David Montgomery, 
used new approaches of method to argue that culture, class, and labor conflict occupied 
a prominent place in the history of the United States. As the perfect example of a later 
day “New labor” historian, David Corbin not only argued that a uniquely diverse, 
American class-consciousness existed in company towns, he moved his focal point to the 
coal fields of southern West Virginia. Picking up on Rochester’s leftism, and utilizing 
E.P. Thompson’s British social history, Corbin argued that the exploitation by company  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towns and their “guard system” left workers no choice but to identify as a unified group 
and unionize under the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). Emphasizing class 
conflict, Corbin contributed a detailed picture of life in southern mining towns. He 
portrayed the history of the mining towns as progressing from highly exploitative 
capitalist industries to liberalized “paternalistic” communities of families based around 
churches and schools.36 
 Countering notions of monolithic social class-consciousness posed by Corbin, 
Ronald L. Lewis connected the legacy of slavery in Virginia coal mining to the racial 
discrimination, convict labor, and failure of bi-racial unions in the post-bellum period. 
Lewis’s regional comparative study proved the distinct historical evolutions of racial 
discriminatory patterns in southern coalmines. Joe W. Trotter provided a detailed 
picture of the development of black working class culture in the coal towns of West 
Virginia. Both rural and semi-rural blacks migrated to coal mines for the economic 
opportunities available there. Yet racial discrimination in job allocation, segregation in 
company towns, and cultural divisions between working class blacks and professional 
class of blacks who served them remained prevalent. Though Trotter downplayed class 
divisions within the black community, he successfully argued that racial divisions 
remained a major obstacle to bi-racial unionism throughout the early 20th century. The 
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study of racial ideologies in southern extractive labor has a substantial foundation but 
deserves further research and renewed attention.37  
 Recent scholars continue to recalibrate approaches to histories of coal industries 
and other company mining town operations, challenging the traditional Marxist 
paradigm and going beyond the class conflicted leftist narratives of the 1930s and New 
Labor histories. Like Corbin, Curtis Seltzer’s Fire in the Hole: Miners and Managers in the 
American Coal Industry (1985) took a chronological view of the coal industry. However, 
as a standard social science case study, Seltzer argued that the problems of the coal 
industry were far more complex than previously accepted. He asserted that UMWA 
attempts to control supply, stabilize labor relations, and improve living standards 
created only mildly better conditions than the undercapitalization, instability, and labor 
conflict of the laissez-faire era. Seltzer’s approach was unique in that he appeared 
sympathetic to workers, while at the same time he argued for private ownership of 
coalfields and the establishment of useful government regulations. Setlzer portrayed 
coal miners far less romantically than most scholarly historians have; however, he 
offered a calculated historical assessment of labor relations in the American coal 
industry.38  
 Like Seltzer, Crandall A. Shiflett argued against the leftist monopoly thesis put 
forth by Rochester and for a more dynamic and diverse relationship between workers’ 
culture and company paternalism, a relationship he saw as crucial to understanding coal 
towns. Countering the argument that Appalachia was a timeless, self-sufficient, idyllic  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region exploited by imperialist coal companies, Shiflett posited that Appalachia had 
always been connected to global markets, while at the same time it remained burdened 
by labor surpluses and land scarcity resulting in economic hardship for working class 
Appalachians. Continuing the New Labor approach examining communities of workers, 
he argued that moving to coal towns represented a practical family decision for poor 
whites, blacks, and European immigrants in the South. The farm-to-mine transition did 
not cause culture shock for most workers, nor were ethnic differences entirely 
threatening to workers’ identity. Shiflett asserted that most ethnic groups shared 
cultural tropes such as family, faith, and recreation, though the expressions of these 
values may have taken distinct forms.  
 Like Shiflett, Price V. Fishback argued that the “contentment sociology” 
practiced by companies in the early 1900s meant that relatively few miners actually 
“owed their souls to the company store.”  Nor were miners generally paid in “scrip” or 
forced to pay outrageously high prices for food and supplies compared with urban 
workers. Taking on Corbin, Fishback asserted that both competition between 
companies and worker mobility allowed miners to choose the company for whom they 
worked. Fishback accepted the findings of the 1922 U.S. Coal Commission investigation, 
which stated that transportation costs may have caused higher prices in remote, isolated 
company stores, but that higher wages offset those prices. The character of coal town 
labor conditions improved for many workers throughout the 20th century. Though the 
credit systems used in family and community-centered often meant workers borrowed 
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to get by, indebted peons in rural isolated labor spaces carried out distinctly more brutal 
jobs than miners in company towns.39  
 Historians of company towns in other extractive industries have followed the 
dominant theme of company monopoly versus workers’ autonomy. Gordon Bachus 
detailed the evolution of Bauxite, Arkansas, as it grew from a backwoods, primitive 
operation to a paternalistic community. Early on, all male work crews used pick and 
shovel to extract the minerals, drying extracted ore by log fires. After 1901, the 
extension of the railroad to Bauxite meant an influx of workers and their families. The 
work of English economist James Anthony Froude convinced owners that providing for 
the welfare of workers—i.e., housing, health care, etc.—was in the best interest of the 
company. By 1912, Bauxite became a “self-sufficient community” with schools, churches, 
stores, roads, a water supply, and medical facilities. Though malaria was common 
amongst workers, not a single death occurred in Bauxite during the influenza epidemic 
of 1920. Child labor existed in Buaxite; however, a minimum wage was maintained—14 
year-olds were paid $1.50 for a ten-hour workday. In the 1970s and 1980s historians of 
environment and the West developed research on forestry and timbering industries. But 
only recently have scholars begun to look at sawmill and lumber company towns with 
the same social and cultural analyses their predecessors applied to other southern 
extractive industrial labor operations.40                                                         
39 Crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in Company Towns of  
  Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991); For a comparative 
study of coal see Roger Fagge, Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields: West Virginia and South Whiles, 
1900-1922 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); Price V. Fishback, “Did Coal Miners ‘Owe 
Their Souls to the Company Store?’ Theory and Evidence from the Early 1900s.” Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December, 1986) 1011-1029. 
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 Timbering, one of the largest industries in the post-bellum South, was both 
highly lucrative for owners and extremely dangerous for workers. Consistent with C. 
Vann Woodward’s “Colonial Economy” thesis, Michael Curtis showed that the 
development of the Great Southern Lumber Company (GSLC) in Bogalusa, Louisiana in 
the 20th century stemmed from the expansionist agenda of New York Lumber 
Company’s Frank H. Goodyear. With an eye toward profits from harvesting the South’s 
expansive forests, Goodyear sought southern lumber to sell for railroad ties, cordwood 
for fuel, and wood for construction projects throughout the world. By the 1880s, 
Goodyear’s speculators bought enormous tracts of Louisiana long leaf pine forest for 
$1.25 an acre. Briefly discussing the ecological and immigrant labor aspects of the 
industry, Curtis explained that Goodyear brought ox teams of Italians, Hungarians, 
Polish, Mexican, and black laborers into the forests of Bogalusa in 1906 to cut down and 
process the durable and dense species of pine found there. Paid 12 cents a day, the men 
slept on split logs with pine needles for cushions. Emphasizing industrial development 
in the region, Curtis noted that by 1908, a lumber mill was in full operation and GSLC 
workers experienced higher wages and better living conditions than those in any 
comparable industry. By 1920, the drastic deforestation caused by GSLC clearing of 
over 100 acres per day led Goodyear’s managers to begin a “reforestation” program. 
GSLC workers fenced off young pine seedlings to protect them from hogs and other 
livestock, plowed fire lines, erected fire towers, and allowed state foresters to engineer 
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these private forests. Lumber mill communities have largely been viewed mostly in 
terms of the industrial and economic promises they held for southerners, but social and 
cultural studies scholars are beginning to develop more nuanced perspectives of the 
lumber communities of the South.41 
 Will Jones built on the cultural and race studies methods of African-American 
historians in his analysis of black lumber workers in the 20th century South. The Tribe of 
Black Ulysses (2004) followed the emphasis on black community studies led by slavery 
scholars Eugene D. Genovese and Herbert Gutman, and the ‘resistance’ model 
articulated by James C. Scott and Robin D.G. Kelley. Jones examined the cultural 
practices of southern black lumbermen in the context of the mill towns they helped 
develop. Overturning Howard Odum and E. Franklin Frazier’s descriptions of 
dysfunctional, anti-modern black male laborers, Jones argued that black men 
contributed to the development of lumber towns, challenged Jim Crow laws, and shaped 
the rural South of the early 20th century. Black workers played a key role by “moving 
families into sawmill villages and compelling their employers to adapt workplace and 
social policies to conform to their evolving social and cultural standards.” As the largely 
male work camps became populated by families black workers built homes, established 
churches, and organized baseball teams that traveled to compete in other black 
communities throughout the South. Jones’s emphasis on the agency of black lumber 
workers shows that in this semi-skilled trade, some blacks gained economic and social 
advantages from the development of extractive industries in the South.42                                                         
41 Michael Curtis, “Early Development and Operations of the Great Southern Lumber Company.” 
Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn, 1973) 347-
368. 
42 Robin D.G. Kelley, “We Are Not What We Seem: Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the 
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 Peonage labor, as a subset of the wider debt labor systems throughout the 
modern South, remains a much more illusive and slippery subject. Pete Daniel’s 
groundbreaking monograph on the legal history of workers and federal officials who 
sought to expose peonage labor practices in the South stands as the only substantial 
monograph to date focusing solely on peonage labor. Daniel’s work exposed the reality 
that outside of the highly visible systems of convict labor and company towns, a darker, 
less visible form of coercive labor existed throughout the South. On isolated plantations, 
in railroad construction camps tucked deep in forests, and on turpentine farms hidden in 
the swamps of the South, southern blacks, some northern whites, and European 
immigrants fell victim to a brutal form of coerced labor at least comparable to any 
experienced by the convicts in Alabama’s Pratt mines. Daniel’s research into the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) files related to peonage investigations revealed the 
coercion and murder of farm laborers, railroad workers, and turpentine men. Daniel’s 
work also revealed the difficulty federal agents had exposing the exploitation of peons 
who lived and labored in the rural corners of the American South.43  
 Both Pete Daniel and the federal investigators he studied suggested the ethnic 
status of southern blacks and southeastern European immigrants, as well as their 
isolation in the unfriendly rural South, made them uniquely vulnerable to exploitation. 
DOJ documents reveal the intersection between peonage and convict labor laws. 
Employers often conspired with local police to restrain laborers and remand them either 
to harsh labor on chain gangs, or to lease them to the same local employers from whom  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they had fled before being arrested. For the most part, the peonage Daniel identified 
differed from convict labor, sharecropping, and company mine labor in that peons often 
stated they were hired by farmers or directed to construction jobs through employment 
agents. Once inside isolated rural labor camps, employers and foremen coerced workers 
through charging outrageous transportation and supply costs or using violent force, or 
both. Employers then forcefully prevented workers from leaving the work camps, 
threatening them with arrest for vagrancy, assault, or even death if they tried. The 
outright corruption of local and state officials along with the bureaucratic limitations of 
the Justice Department formed a series of obstacles that peons often found impossible to 
escape.44  
 Ronald L. F. Davis pointed to the ‘compromises’—first between the Union 
military and southern elites after the Civil War, then between the federal and state 
governments under Reconstruction—that remanded freedmen and poor farmers to the 
political and legal power of planters and merchants. By the early 20th century, the 
federal investigators at the center of peonage cases sought to expose indebted and 
coercive labor practices and prove them unconstitutional. Yet they found, as Daniel 
showed, that federal and state judges often sympathized with or owed their 
appointments to southern employers, dismissing suits against them or letting them off 
with minimal fines when they were found guilty. The Department of Justice files on 
peonage reveal that Federal Bureau of Investigation and Justice Department officials 
ignored many complaints of peonage, referring them to state governments instead. This 
pattern revealed that though some DOJ officials hoped to expose peonage and prosecute 
violators, the “old boy” network in Washington lacked the political will, and perhaps the                                                         
44 Ibid, 59-64; 101-107. 
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resources and organization, to challenge southern “home rule” or monitor the isolated 
rural-industrial labor spaces. Peonage was not technically or formally outlawed until 
the 1911 Alonzo Bailey case. Daniel articulated the role of New South politics in the 
accommodation of southern employers, but he left unexplored the roles of non-human 
physical environments in peonage labor systems.45  
  The underdeveloped body of literature on peonage labor has largely taken a 
legal and political approach to viewing coerced labor in the South. Much like historians 
of convict labor, both Daniel and Douglas Blackmon accept that the legacies of white 
supremacist racial ideologies, more than two centuries of slavery, and the 
undercapitalization of the southern economy created the context under which peonage 
labor developed. Blackmon refers to southern elites such as Georgia Federal Judge 
Emory Speer, who took an interest in peonage cases, but failed to recognize what 
Blackmon called a “venomous contempt for black life” at the heart of southern society. 
The notion that blacks would not work unless coerced, which elites such as Mississippi 
Governor James K. Vardaman spouted in order to reinforce support for the convict lease 
system, contributed to an almost unspoken code of laws among southern agricultural 
and extractive industry employers. But not all peons were black; southern and eastern 
European immigrants suffered similar abuses as they migrated throughout the South 
seeking economic opportunity in extractive industry jobs. Scholars contend that racial 
ideologies of ‘whiteness’—particularly of Anglo-American heritage—contributed to 
employers’ manipulation of southern blacks and foreign immigrants well into the 20th 
century.46 
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 Douglas Blackmon and Pete Daniel argue that the vulnerability of black and 
eastern European workers made them attractive to employers, not their race. In their 
studies they mention the remote and difficult character of peonage workspaces. 
Blackmon writes, “especially on the backcountry roads and rural rail lines of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, no black person living 
outside the explicit protection of whites could again feel fully secure.” Daniel argued 
that like lynching, “peonage represented but one aspect of the violent South” which “had 
not moved very far from the frontier in either appearance or custom,” The political 
reality that federal government lacked the will or the ability to monitor the enormous 
isolated rural areas of the South left Progressive reformers such as Fred Cubberly 
scrambling to expose in courts the fraud and brutality perpetrated on peons. But those 
same courts would hardly convict a white man on the word of a black witness. Daniel 
referred to “The dark side of the moon” as a metaphor for the South, where rural 
customs of racism, peonage, and lynch law still ruled the day. C. Vann Woodward’s 
assertion that the surplus of unemployed labor and the lack of capital in state economies 
created new hybrid patterns of poverty amongst the smokestacks and railways of the 
rural South should be further explored. Room remains for an examination of 
relationships between laborers and the physical environment of the rural South, 
particularly as they related to peonage labor.47 
 Karl Jacoby’s work, Crimes Against Nature, brilliantly complicated problematic 
paradigms that conjoined working class labor and environmental conservation 
movements. His narrative of urban elite conservationists’ infringement upon the “moral 
ecologies” of rural local working classes provided a brilliant window into the potential                                                         
47 Ibid, 234; Daniel, Shadow of Slavery (1972), 10. 
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for understanding the role of non-human nature in class divisions within various 
geographic regions where environmental transformation took place. Yet, as Theodore 
Catton pointed out in his review of Crimes Against Nature, Jacoby “exaggerates the 
power of the state” and “romanticizes the collective actions of local populace.” My 
examination of peonage workspaces will build on Labor, Environmental, and Southern 
historians call for more work that exposes relationships among class divisions, human 
and non-human phenomena, and political, social, and cultural forces. Building on the 
work of Herbert Gutman, Richard White, Jacqueline Jones, and Karl Jacoby, My work 
attempts to complicate several binaries, specifically notions of Labor vs. Capital, 
progressives vs. conservative, human dominance over non-human nature, and 
conservationist vs. local ecology.48   
 Mart A. Stewart has pointed out that “Landscapes occupy the nexus of 
interactions between humans and the environment.” The foundation of peonage labor 
systems was the need for what Stewart called “labor on the land,” and the physical 
environment of the South deeply impacted the social relationships that characterized 
peonage labor systems. Using the Department of Justice Peonage files, FBI files, and 
oral histories of southern woodsmen entrepreneurs, I expand the relatively 
underdeveloped body of literature on the relationship between peonage labor and the 
physical environment in the South.49   
 Workers and employers clashed over the difficulty of the physical environment 
in the rural-industrial economies of the South. The boosterism that drew companies to 
transform an untapped southern wilderness into an economically productive region                                                         
48 Environmetal History, (January 2002). 
49 Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life, Labor, and Landscape on the Georgia Coast, 1680-
1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996) 12. 
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relied heavily on environmental ideologies of progressive conservation or what Gifford 
Pinchot called “wise use.” When padrones recruited Italian and Greek immigrants for 
labor in the Florida swamps and the forests of Alabama they employed environmental 
rhetoric to attract workers. Notions of easy work in warm climates often drew the 
recent Mediterranean migrants from the northeastern urban industrial centers to the 
jobs in the rural South. But in the railroad camps and the turpentine farms, sustainable 
land use was not the issue of dispute between workers and bosses. Rather, workers’ 
subjection to harsh physical environments, isolation from their families, and inability to 
access legal protection from the brutality of managers, dominated the daily interactions 
of these different classes in the work camps of the South. Inside peonage work camps, 
deplorable labor and environmental conditions converged creating the context for 
dangerous tensions between human and non-human nature. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
“If I had known it  was an Island, I would not have gone.”  Life and Labor in the 
Florida Keys Railway Work Camps: 1905/1906. 
 
 On a fall day in 1906, Giulio Giammella, a 36 year-old recent Italian immigrant 
to New York City, answered an employment advertisement in the Italian-American 
newspaper, the Progress Italo Americano directing him to the Sabia Company at 61 Prince 
Street. The ad reported Sabia sought laborers for construction of the Florida East Coast 
Rail Road. Giammella listened to Francesco Sabia address a group of men, all curious 
about fliers they saw around town that read, “1,000 men wanted in Florida, the land 
where it never snows.” Sabia promised the men jobs in a warm climate that winter. He 
told them that they could go to a great place where “oranges, bananas, and apples” grew 
in abundance and that they could “eat them for breakfast every day.” Convinced by 
Sabia’s promise of Florida’s abundance, Giammella accepted a position and within a few 
days boarded a train heading south. On the train, the labor foreman, Mr. Gallat, 
comforted the men nervous about traveling so far from home, telling them “to keep a 
brave heart” because they were going to “a very good place where they would find 
everything they needed.” Giammella and the thousands of other men who followed a 
similar path from New York to Florida instead found brutal working conditions in an 
extremely harsh archipelago island environment.50  
 Henry Flagler, an executive at Standard Oil, envisioned the Florida East Coast 
Railway as a major triumph of industrial engineering over nature. His goal was to 
develop the southernmost settled outpost of the United States for tourism and                                                         
50Giulio Giammella Affidavit, Classified Subject Files of the Department of Justice, National Archives, 
Washington D.C., Record Group 60. (Hereafter cited according to file and box number, DOJ Files NA, 
RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, File 50-162-1). 
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transportation of industrial products from Key West, the closest U.S. deep-sea port to 
the planned Panama Canal. The FECR initially connected Jacksonville and Miami, and 
underwent extension in 1905 in order to join Miami to Key West, a distance of about 
156 miles. The planned route involved constructing roughly 49 miles of the railroad 
over land and an additional 107 miles across water and the islands of the Florida Keys; 
Flagler proudly called it the “Over Sea Railroad.” Construction began in May 1905. 
Between October 29, 1905, and January 23, 1906, the company shipped nearly 4,700 
men from New York and Philadelphia to Florida. As a Gilded Age industrialist, Flagler 
whole-heartedly believed in humanity’s ability to harness natural resources for human 
consumption and to fundamentally reorder the physical world for human use. However, 
the men who carried out the construction of the FECR fell subject to terrible 
environmental conditions and violent labor foremen inside the poorly provisioned island 
labor camps.51 
 Early in 1906, a number of men returned to New York charging that the Sabia 
Company induced them to go south through misrepresentation of working conditions. 
The men claimed FECR foremen worked them under armed guard, and prevented them 
from leaving the work camps. Official Department of Justice reports indicate that 
sleeping quarters largely consisted of tents pitched on the rocky ground. The men 
suffered clouds of mosquitoes, worked in knee-deep water, and faced violent bosses who 
refused to let them leave until they paid off their transportation costs. Due to the island 
geography, no obvious physical path for escape existed. However, many of the men did  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manage to leave, either escaping by boat, or by negotiating with the foreman for their 
early release. Eventually, most of the men made it back to New York where many 
decried the terrible working conditions and violence in the camps. Several men testified 
to federal investigators in the Department of Justice who worked to expose peonage 
labor throughout the South.52  
 Social-justice progressives in the Department of Justice used the investigation 
into the Florida East Coast Rail Road Company’s Florida Keys construction camps to 
bring a suit against Frank Sabia for violation of the 1866 slave kidnapping law. Though 
the Department of Justice failed to establish that “slavery” officially existed in the Keys 
work camps, DOJ files reveal that the physical environment of the Keys facilitated and 
sustained the peonage labor system there. The immense isolated spaces, volatile climate, 
and difficult topography of the Keys made acquiring and provisioning labor particularly 
problematic. The harsh physical environment made workers’ daily lives miserable, 
prompting them to attempt escapes. Foremen tried to restrain workers’ mobility once 
inside the island labor camps and as a result hundreds of marginalized European ethnic 
immigrant, as well as black and white workers fell victim to peonage labor regimes 
inside the FECR camps.53 
 Labor recruiters for the Florida East Coast Railway camps manipulated workers 
by misrepresenting the character of the physical environment in the Keys. Frank Sabia 
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and his employees received three dollars from the FECR for each man they signed up 
and shipped to the Keys and they used advertisements in European ethnic newspapers, 
circulars posted in immigrant neighborhoods, and word of mouth to draw unemployed 
immigrants to his office. Sabia’s recruitment strategy targeted Italian and Greek 
laborers, who, after suffering through a few frigid New York winters, responded 
hopefully to the promises of easy work in a warm climate. Sabia encouraged his agents 
to recruit within their own ethnic communities, intentionally seeking men from 
southern Europe because of their acclimation to, and preference for, warm weather. One 
G. Lapiporo had an agreement with Sabia, which gave him exclusive rights to half of the 
profits of all Italian men he recruited, and another recruiter, Max Lipetz, testified that 
Sabia would not pay him for Italians.54  
 Recruiters used idealized descriptions of working and living conditions to 
convince men to make the long journey to the Florida railroad camps. Lipetz testified 
that he and another recruiter, a Mr. Triay, heard Sabia continually make false 
representations to the men and encouraged his recruiters to do the same. In October 
and November of 1905 Sabia “made a specialty of boys to whom he promised ‘good 
work, lots of wages, work near city, chance to advance to be a plumber’s helper or a 
tinsmith or a water boy, good hotels where you can board.” Men like Giulio Giammella 
were desperate enough for work to be lured by the promise of jobs as far away as  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Florida. Recruiters’ misrepresentation of environmental and working conditions in the 
Florida Keys persuaded Giammella and hundreds of others to sign up for work on the 
railroad.55 
 Word of mouth among friends and neighbors in immigrant communities also 
piqued workers’ interest in the Florida railroad jobs. Many men testified they heard of 
the project in Florida from friends and acquaintances. George Morris and Frank Meany 
lived in Brooklyn where they met Albert Grant who showed them a ticket to Florida 
and told them he was going to work there. Intrigued by Grant’s description of the work 
and Florida’s abundant landscape, Morris and Meany went together the next day to 
Sabia’s office to inquire about jobs in Florida. Sabia told them he indeed needed more 
men, and that “the name of the place is Miami, a nice place to work for a railroad.” 
Convinced by Sabia’s descriptions, Morris and Meany boarded the Pennsylvania train 
for Florida at Jersey City that very evening.56  
 Sabia’s misleading descriptions of the Keys ignored the extreme conditions of 
the island archipelago. E.T. Clyatt of Jacksonville Florida worked as a foremen at Key 
Largo Camp from January 1905 to December 1905, stated that labor agents told 
workers “they were to work at Cocoanut Grove, 5 miles from Miami, Fla.,” and that if 
they had known what the true conditions were in the camps, “not a single one would 
have left N.Y.C. for such a wretched place.” Percy White applied in person, requesting 
to know all about the work and climate. Sabia reportedly told him that “the climate was 
simply grand; no snow in winter, etc., and that the work consisted of railroad work with 
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pick and shovel but that the work was not hard.” Harry Hermanson, a19 year-old from 
Brooklyn testified that:  
[I] met a man who was distributing circulars. He came up and said ‘Do you want to go south?’ I 
answered ‘No.’ [the man] then said ‘You had better go; lots of boys are going and it is a lovely 
place. You will have all the fruit and oranges you want and easy work. I asked him ‘What kind 
of work is it’ and he said ‘ We want 10,000 men to go to the land where it never snows. It is a 
fine place; you could not live any better. Young fellows have a better time there than they do up 
here.’ He then took us into a saloon and gave us 3 or 4 drinks and jollied us up all the while. 
 
Drunk, the boy followed the recruiter to the Sabia Co. office on Prince Street where 
labor agents took his name and put him on the ferry to the train station. Hermanson 
later testified: “We had no idea we were going to be taken to an island.” In testimony to 
investigators, most men consistently denied knowing the specifics of Florida’s physical 
environment. However, as they made their way south, the men began to hear of the 
harsh landscapes and brutal working conditions of the camps from other men returning 
north.57  
 Giacomo Lapipero, hired by the Sabia Co. to recruit workers, accompanied the 
first shipment of about 90 laborers from New York in late October 1905. He took them 
to the Pennsylvania Railroad at the Canal St. pier, where he and Mr. Triay boarded the 
men on trains. Giammella, who may have been in the same group, left New York City 
on October 31st, taking the ferry to the Jersey side where he and a hundred or so men 
boarded the Pennsylvania railroad. Later that night, after passing Richmond, Va., the 
train clattering upon the tracks, Giamella witnessed a young man of about 25, whom he 
described as “tall, smooth shaven, blond with gray eyes” ask the foreman, Mr. Gallat, for 
some food. Gallat told him to wait until they reached Jacksonville, but the young man 
insisted Gallat provide something to eat. Gallat responded by ordering another worker  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named Hillmuller to strike the young man. “Hillmuller obeyed, giving the said fellow 
two blows on the nose.” At Jacksonville, Giammella witnessed several men getting off 
the train, so he and another man, Carl Fisher, “tried to get out and go into the town,” 
but policemen threatened them and forced them back onto the train. The train then 
carried them another 300 miles south. Upon arriving in Miami, the men were kept 
locked on boat docks for an entire day. That night they slept on the hard wooden docks 
with no blankets while a guard, club in hand, walked back and forth on the other side of 
the gate.58  
 The next day the foremen boarded them on the boat Biscayne, which left at 11 
a.m. Around 10 p.m. the laborers demanded food, but the foremen gave them none. The 
men arrived at Key Largo on or about Saturday November 4, 1905 after traveling over 
1,300 miles from their homes. Like Giammella, nearly all the men went south by rail 
either on the Pennsylvania, Seaboard, or Atlantic Coast Line. Two company men 
guarded each train car and these foremen selected three workmen from each group to 
help them “take care of the party.” Many men, alerted by this obvious attempt at 
coercion, escaped during the train ride south. E.T. Clyatt, the foreman at Key Largo 
stated that: “In the early shipments…desertions occurred largely at Jacksonville, but in 
the later shipments the men deserted at various places along the line from Washington 
[D.C.] to Jacksonville.” Workers testified to being locked in the train cars but 
employers claimed that they never locked workers on the trains, nor forced them to go 
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to Florida at all. According to the employers, many of the men appeared to be of the 
“professional tramp class.” Thus, they argued, the men “desired to come south for the 
winter,” but they were shiftless and vagrant and thus foremen struggled to keep the 
men on the trains.59  
 Many of the workers first heard about horrendous conditions in the camps from 
other workers while in route to Florida. Intercommunication among workers led to the 
large exodus of men who feared they were being coerced. It also created a significant 
dilemma for the recruiting agents in New York, as well as the foremen on the 
southbound trains and at the docks in Miami. Harry Hermanson described his and other 
workers’ reaction upon learning that they were to be taken to work on an island: “Some 
of us jumped on the F.E.C. train [going] back to Jacksonville but we were driven off by 
the sheriffs and Co’s men. I saw one Greek thrown off the train on his face and his 
baggage thrown after him.” Workers also complained via written letters to family and 
friends and even to the company itself. Giacomo Lappipero, the labor recruiter working 
for Sabia Co. reported: “That each and every day he heard of many such complaints” and 
that he referred them to Sabia. Max Lipetz stated: “After I had been there [at Sabia Co.] 
about a month, [I] heard so many complaints, that men were running away and having 
heard that a gang of Greeks and Italians that we had shipped had refused to go to the 
island.”60  
 The mass escapes and subsequent attempts to restrain workers clearly caused a 
problem for the foremen on the trains. Albert Grant, hired by Sabia to work in the Keys, 
left New York for Florida in October 1905 via the Pennsylvania Railroad. He reported  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that “Between New York and Jacksonville several men jumped on the train telling us 
not to go as it was a bad place. Several jumped off the train at Philadelphia but were 
stopped by the old man in charge.” Some men managed successful escapes at 
Jacksonville, but Grant was not so lucky. When he tried to slip off the train with several 
other men, guards thwarted their attempt. J.C. Meredith, the construction engineer at 
the Keys work camps stated “A large portion of the desertions at Miami were instigated 
by discharged employees making misrepresentations as to the conditions on the keys.”  
The multiple reports coming from the camps to both workers and their relatives clearly 
contradicted the information given them in New York by Sabia and his recruiters. Max 
Lipetz stated “At one time we had some trouble in getting men to go as there had been 
so many complaints about the treatment in Fla.” The reports of terrible environmental 
and working conditions in the FECR camps caused many to flee the trains even before 
arriving on the Keys; however, most men were not so fortunate.61  
 The distance between islands determined the difficulty of constructing the 
FECR. Moreover, official reports indicate both the physical division, as well as the racial 
division, among laborers in the Keys. According to the special agent of the Department 
of Justice who visited the Keys in March of 1906, men labored at 13 construction camps 
between Homestead camp on the mainland and the camp at Key West. The Department 
of Justice did not inspect every camp where construction occurred. However, 
investigators visit camps at Key Largo, Windley’s Island off Umbrella Key, Matecumbe 
Key, Long Key, Key Vaca, Summerland Key, Ramfod Key, Cudjoe Key, and Key west. 
The report included the comment that at least two of these were exclusively “negro 
camps,” and in other camps whites and blacks worked together but slept in separate  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tents. All of the other camps were composed exclusively of white workers. Its clear that 
workers were separated by race in their official location and housing; however, workers 
of all colors and backgrounds shared the experience of terrible labor and environmental 
conditions.62 
 By the time workers arrived in Miami, most had experienced some form of poor 
treatment, and many had traveled for days without food, suffered beatings, and 
encountered resistance from foremen and police when they tried to leave. But upon 
discovering that they were being transported beyond the shore of the mainland, many 
expressed far greater fear. Vincent Paradise stated the foremen sent him to camp 
number 5 on lower Matecumbe Key, “Had I known that I was to go on any of the 
Florida Keys, I would not have gone.” Workers feared leaving the mainland because 
once on the islands they could not leave of their own volition. The possibility of 
returning to New York amounted to the only true sense of security many workers felt 
they had as they ventured further and further from home. The lack of access to town 
life, news from home, or alternate employment made the thought of working on the 
Florida Keys unbearable to many of the workers. Many men took drastic measures to 
escape while others simply committed themselves to working only long enough to pay 
their way back to the mainland and on to other jobs, or home to New York City.63  
 The barrier of the ocean literally surrounded the men, physically reinforcing 
their entrapment and visually conveying their isolation and the danger they faced in the 
Keys. However, workers took drastic measures to evade the armed guards who 
attempted to transport them from Miami to the Keys. George Morris reported his 
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experience in Florida this way. “We were shut in at the Miami dock, we could not get 
away. As the sheriffs drove us on the boat, I heard, for the first time that we were to go 
to an island. The Captain in charge gave a negro a gun and told him that if anyone tried 
to escape to shoot him.” Several of the men did not heed the warning from foremen that 
if they didn’t get on the boat they would “blow [their] head off,” leaping from the side 
of the boat into the water. Men who remained on the boat soon found they may have 
wished they had jumped ship as well.64  
 The geography, flora and fauna of the Florida Keys directly contributed to 
workers’ fear about working conditions. The enormous sky and endless ocean horizon, 
filled only with sparse clouds and the occasional flock of sea gulls, stood in stark 
contrast to New York’s crowded urban streets. Men huddled under armed guards on 
the decks of the tiny boats bouncing upon the tumultuous sea. Robert Murray witnessed 
several men falling overboard and saw that “no attempt was made to rescue them.” 
Unlike the trains which made frequent stops near city centers, the boats offered no 
opportunity for easy escape other than the desperate attempt to swim several miles to 
safety. As the boats approached the tiny islands, the men saw their first glimpse of the 
real Florida Keys in all its alien nature.65  
 The ecology of the Florida Keys could not have been more foreign to men used 
to the heavily populated urban landscapes of New York and Philadelphia. The Keys are 
an archipelago of 1,700 islands extending fifteen miles from the Florida peninsula 
southwest to Key West. The islands themselves, formed of fossilized coral rocks, 
appeared jagged and amorphous. Seeing the dense hardwood forest hammocks, the men 
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probably feared what awaited them in the interior of the islands. Enormous white 
herons swooped overhead, dove into the water for fish, and stood eerily on stilted legs 
in the shallow surf. Crocodiles and indigo snakes lurked among the mangroves, perhaps 
avoiding being seen and noted in the records, but not escaping the fearful imagination of 
men landing on such exotic islands. Loggerhead turtles glided along the surf and 
perched on the coral rocks to bask in the sun. The vision of such a foreign landscape 
confirmed the men’s fears of isolation, but could not have conveyed the level of hardship 
they would experience there.66 
 Once inside the Keys work camps, even those who had suffered little on the 
journey south discovered they were now subject to vicious foremen and dreadful terrain. 
Men immediately witnessed the types of physical violence and severe environmental 
conditions that came to characterize their experiences in the work camps. Robert 
Murray stated that when he arrived at a camp at Key Largo in November 1905 he had 
to sleep on the rocks, and saw a “foremen kick a water boy and knock him down.” 
Ronald Winifield arrived at camp number 5 at Key Largo in early November as well 
and immediately “saw the foreman shoot a man” and not long afterward, the chief 
engineer “kicked a boy of 15 who was sick.” Giulio Giammella’s acquaintance, a Mr. 
Scironi, had a letter from Sabia stating that he was to work as an Italian interpreter in 
the camp. Scironi was nevertheless put to work at hard labor alongside the others, 
including, according to Giammella, “boys of not more than 15 years, and one of 11.” 
After two days of grueling labor in that hot, muggy climate without proper water and 
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food, Giammella, Scironi, and about eight others decided to leave the place. But the 
natural physical barriers of the island landscape obstructed their escape.67  
 The Keys’ island geography constrained workers’ mobility and facilitated 
foremen’s peonage schemes in the FECR work camps. Employers asserted that workers 
could leave the camps and find other work whenever they chose, even as they used 
transportation and commissary costs to ensnare men in debt. However, leaving the 
FECR camps proved impossible for workers trapped on an island. Recruiters knew that 
while idealized descriptions of the physical environment allowed them to sell the men 
on going south to work, the actual landscape enabled foremen to retain workers who 
might attempt to leave the worksite. E.T. Clyatt, the foreman at the Key Largo camp 
stated that: “[the workers] were slaves whether they owed the company money or not, 
for the reason that it was impossible for them to leave the island without a pass, upon 
the company’s boats.” The combination of coercion and the imperatives of the physical 
environment added to the misery of workers there. 68  
 In addition to the isolated islands, the menacing aspects of the tropical 
landscape, hot climate, heavy rain, wild animals, and deadly insects appear throughout 
FECR workers’ affidavits. The federal investigators who visited the camps used the 
language of ‘wilderness’ to underscore the severity of the workers’ situation and the 
insensitivity of company foremen. Poor provisions, excruciating work regiments, illness, 
and conflicts with foremen, all characterize the experience of life in the camps. 
Investigators detailed these hardships in their reports in an attempt to expose the 
practice of peonage in the larger rural-industrial labor system. Frank Meany told 
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investigators that the island “was densely covered with underbrush and trees. It did not 
look like a civilized place.” He and the other workers were put to work “chopping trees” 
and carrying timber so as to carve out a space for the camps among the tropical island 
vegetation.69  
 The Florida Keys work camps consisted primarily of spaces within the hardwood 
forests for tents, trails leading to the railway site, and minimal if any amenities. The 
federal agent reported the camps were all situated near tidewater, the furthest being no 
more than a few hundred yards from the ocean. They sat at roughly three to nine feet 
above sea level to provide for the accessibility of company supply boats. The camps’ 
close proximity to water made the company’s enterprise more efficient but added to 
workers’ suffering. Workers reported the cold of wind and rainstorms, the destruction 
of camp structures from surging tides, and the multiple hurricanes that hit the Florida 
Keys in 1906.70 
 One function of the temporary nature of the Florida Keys worksites was the 
woefully inadequate “housing” provided in the camps. In each camp there were one or 
two framed houses for the engineers and foremen, and one framed house for the 
commissary. The only exception was the camp at Upper Matecumbe Key, which had no 
frame buildings and consisted only of tent structures because all the lumber had to be 
imported to the islands. In each of the camps all of the workers lived in tents. These 
tents had no floors, and though the agent reported that he saw no evidence of dampness 
underneath the tents, he stated that: “The floor of the tents is really the coral rock of 
which all of the keys are formed.” The tents consisted of two sizes, one being 14 feet by  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14 feet, the other seven feet by nine feet. As many as eight men slept crowded together 
in the larger tents. If the men worked less than five days a week, the company charged 
them 25 cents a day for the use of the tents.71  
 Bedding was also scarce inside the FECR camps. The company claimed it 
furnished “free to each laborer what is called a slat bunk, which is made of planned pine 
slats” three feet by six feet. However, the commissary did not sell mattresses and it was 
impossible for men to obtain them in the camps. The company admitted it did not 
provide any sort of bedding or clothing, but at the commissary men could purchase 
“quilts” for $1.25 or “cotton blankets” for $1.50. The federal agent reported that he saw 
very little bedding in any of the tents in the various camps. Some of the men reportedly 
used the natural surroundings to improve their lot, covering their slat bunks with 
palmetto leaves in order to make them somewhat more comfortable. The agent noted: 
“There are plenty of palmetto leaves to be obtained near each camp, but most of the men 
have not taken the trouble to procure them.” The company did provide lumber to raise 
the bunks off the ground but this work was left to the laborers. The agent reported 
“Many have not done this, but rest their bunks only on the coral surface or prop them 
up with rocks or sticks.” After toiling in the burning sun all day, the men found 
themselves too exhausted to construct legs for their bunks, nor would it have improved 
their situation much to do so.72  
 The workers’ lack of personal amenities and adequate attire made working and 
living on the islands even more difficult. One federal agent saw very little clothing and 
felt obliged to state that: “It was evident that the only clothes, except underwear, which  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most of the laborers possessed was that which they wore daily.” Most of the men slept 
in their clothing, as they did not have any blankets, and most slept in their shoes all 
night to keep out the cold air and pests. They explained “although it was warm during 
the days, the nights were quite chilly, and [we] could not take off [our] clothes and 
sleep in comfort.” In certain tents the agent saw one blanket for the entire group of 
eight men; in one he noted three or four potato sacks that the men reported the camp 
cook gave them for covers. One group of men used the fly from their tent as a blanket, 
leaving them exposed to the rain.73 
 Workers struggled to endure what they described as the Keys’ extreme climate. 
Reports from the U.S. Weather Bureau at Key West provide documentation that 
weather conditions made living in the Keys particularly difficult for the men there. 
Temperatures regularly reached 91 degrees Fahrenheit, and with the humidity and 
sunlight caused dehydration, sunburn, and heat stroke. Temperatures at night reached 
as low as 55 degrees and rainfall during the winter of 1905-1906 was unusually high.  
The Weather Bureau reported that in December 1905, 10.03 inches of rainfall occurred, 
while the average for the previous 35-year period was only 1.63 inches. The 
construction engineer J.C. Meredith confirmed this saying, “the weather conditions have 
not been as good as might naturally have been expected on account of the excessive 
rainfall during December…[this] made the conditions around the camp worse than 
they would have been otherwise.” Meredith claimed that the rainfall did not seriously 
impede the work, as most of it fell at night, and that men did not lose more than six 
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hours of work a week on account of the rain; however, nightly rain storms tortured 
workers exhausted from working all day in the burning sun.74  
 The unusually wet weather exacerbated the recurring problem of pests inside 
the camps. With rain came bugs and vermin. In a report entitled “Pests On the Keys” 
federal agents detailed the abundance of insects and other organisms that tormented the 
men in the camps. The men complained of “fleas” they found around the camps in the 
coral and sand. Infestations of fleas grew worse in December due to the great rainfall, 
which drove the pests into the tents, where “they annoyed the men at night.” Ironically, 
the foremen argued that tents were better for the laborers because “…a house which 
they might occupy would be infested with vermin.” However, the lack of proper housing 
failed to deter vermin, which infested much of the camps. Most notable in the records 
are the reports of chiggers and mosquitoes, which harassed the men day and night. 
Chiggers or “red bugs” bit the men, producing sores and what the federal agent called: 
“an almost irresistible inclination to scratch.” The salty water and air made these sores 
even more excruciating than they would have been otherwise. The men in camp number 
81 complained about centipedes and scorpions and the special agent reported that he 
was shown bottles containing a live centipede and one containing a live scorpion, both 
of which the men said they captured inside their tents. The federal agents also reported 
that in a few of the camps, workers came across rattlesnakes. In camp number 80 at Key 
West, one agent reported seeing rattlesnake skins tacked to the side of the commissary. 
Such frightful and potentially deadly reptiles literally surrounded the men in the Keys 
work camps.75  
                                                        
74J.C. Meredith Affidavit, U.S. Weather Bureau at Key West, ibid.  
75Department of Justice Special Agent Report: “PESTS ON THE KEYS” ibid. 
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 None of the pests created as much trepidation, suffering, and even death, as the 
mosquitoes that plagued the men on the islands. During the months of June through 
October, the mosquitoes reportedly became “very bad.” Accounts stated that due to the 
high levels of rainfall, mosquitoes were more numerous in 1905-1906 than in several 
preceding years. One federal agent noted “clouds of mosquitoes” around the men’s tents 
in the evenings. These mosquitoes bit the men, causing itching and sores all over their 
bodies, but they also carried malaria, which led to deaths. E.T. Clyatt, the foremen, 
testified that a black worker named Dawson was in “…a dying condition for two weeks, 
and begged most piteously to be taken to a hospital or somewhere he might receive 
treatment and get away from the mosquitoes that were literally eating him up alive.” 
Dawson died in his tent and Clyatt took the body, blasted a hole in the rocks with 
dynamite and buried him. Clyatt also testified that the mosquitoes became so pervasive 
they stung a mule to death overnight. The men discovered that fires and smoke kept the 
mosquitoes away and thus they burned black mango wood inside their tents. Mango 
wood produced a smoke so dense that workers reported one could not distinguish an 
object six inches away. Furthermore, smoke harmed workers lungs, leading to 
pulmonary diseases. Medical reports confirm that Dengue fever and malaria were 
among the most prevalent illnesses in the camps and thus many of the men cited them 
as the reason they wanted to leave the camps.76 
 In addition to complaints about inadequate amenities and extreme weather, the 
men also expressed grievances related to food in the camps. One federal agent reported 
that lists of provisions provided by the company included pickled pork, beef, salt pork,                                                         
76Ibid. The claims that mosquitoes killed men are vague and numbers of deaths are unsubstantiated by 
medical doctors, but the lack of medical attention and the prevalence of the reports on the suffering 
caused by mosquitoes makes it appear likely that they were cause of the worst of the suffering in the 
camps. 
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navy beans, lima beans, rice, grits, oatmeal and “plenty of fresh vegetables cabbages, 
potatoes, and turnips.”  Though bosses showed evidence that hearty foods were brought 
to the camps, workers’ reports confirm that many men often did not receive enough, if 
any, healthy foods. The great distance from Miami to the camps made providing fresh 
food difficult and workers consistently testified that the company gave them insufficient 
food and even withheld food from men who could not work. Percy White stated that the 
food in camp “consisted of stale fish and rolls not fit to eat…even the walking boss, Mr. 
Johns said he would not give it to his dogs.” Other workers claimed that the only food 
given them were rotten potatoes. The federal reports also stated that it was “…difficult 
to get fresh meat to the camps” and even though some camps may have received 
shipments of meat as much as once per week, but because it was so hot and the islands 
had no refrigeration the supply generally lasted only two or three meals before it went 
bad. J.C. Meredith, the construction engineer, confirmed that: “the camps were stretched 
out to such an extent that some of those most distant would receive tainted meat when 
delivered.” He guessed that one-sixth of the shipped meat was tainted by the time it 
reached the workmen.77  
 Mr. W.C. Wilson, the resident engineer at camp number 8, on the lower end of 
Windley’s Island of Umbrella Key, provided the special agent with copies of requisition 
orders he supposedly placed on March 16, 17, and 23 of 1906, which included: one can of 
baking powder, eight crates of cabbage, eight sacks of Irish potatoes, three sacks of 
onions, three sacks of turnips, four crates of bread, two cases of tomatoes, four boxes of 
macaroni, and one box of cheese. The agents also reported that the company sent 
barrels of oatmeal, sugar, and coffee to the camps. The engineers confirmed that most of                                                         
77Percy White Affidavit, ibid. 
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the meals consisted of boiled stews, that the cooks baked cornbread and biscuits in 
ranges, and that the workers preferred but did not always receive gravy. They 
documented that at least one meal per week consisted of fish provided by local 
fishermen. However, the workers asserted the poor quality of the fish in their affidavits. 
J.C. Meredith contended that: “Of course there have been some complaints about the 
food, but that is only what can be expected from the workmen.” Provisioning for such a 
large construction project so far from commercial centers naturally resulted in staples 
and other foods that were spoiled or inadequate to the needs of men who engaged in 
heavy labor all day.78  
 Federal agents reported that the company brought all the water for drinking and 
cooking purposes from Miami in barges towed by steamers. Each camp had one or two 
water tanks of 5,000-gallon capacity, which the steamers towed and refilled. At camp 
number 80 on Key West, the company obtained water from the city, three miles distant. 
Yet the federal agents and the doctor they interviewed (all of whom made visits to the 
camps in 1906) confirmed that: “The principal illness has been on account of 
constipation and diarrhea.” One obvious cause of these two conditions was contaminated 
food and water. Thus poor provisions—a result of the isolation of the camps and 
negligence of the company—accounted for the suffering of sick workers. Even if the 
company’s reports are true, the great distances from production centers and the desire 
to keep costs down meant that food and nourishment in the camps remained quite poor 
for the majority of workers.79  
                                                        
78W.C. Wilson and J.C. Meredith Affidavit, ibid. 
79J.C. Meredith Affidavit, ibid.  
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 Federal reports consistently mentioned that bosses withheld food from men who 
did not work, and even the foreman, Clyatt, contended that he witnessed men starve to 
death in their tents from malnutrition. It is unclear from the reports exactly how 
reliable the food supply was for the majority of workers, but based upon the consistency 
of reports, many of the men in the camps experienced poor food provisions at one time 
or another during their stay in the camps. Reports of local black restaurant owners 
providing food for hungry men appear throughout the records. One Sophie English in a 
sworn affidavit testified that she “ran a restaurant at camp # 1 on Key Largo.” She did 
not specify if the company contracted with her or not, but she served the black work 
camps, which according to the engineers, the company did not provision. English stated 
that: “when sick, [the men] were refused food from the commissary because they could 
not work.”  One Joe Dawson, being sick and unable to work, begged continually to be 
sent out of the camp, but he was denied food and transportation, and English stated that 
she “fed him from my table the best I could.” She went on to explain that after pleading 
for two weeks to be released, Dawson died and was buried inside the camp. English also 
stated that she saw many men “taken up from my table while eating the food I had 
prepared for them, and taken back sick and driven out to work.” The lack of adequate 
food contributed to workers’ inability to meet the labor demands of foremen.80  
 As Frank Sabia promised some of the men back in New York, much of the work 
on the Florida Keys was done with “pick and shovel,” but unlike his promises of “easy” 
work in a “great place” the men found the labor conditions to be both dangerous and 
unhealthy. The hardships workers confronted in the Florida Keys contributed directly 
to their desire to leave the camps. The workers testified to being forced to work at                                                         
80Sophie English Affidavit, ibid. 
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gunpoint, and that the company starved and even shot men for failure to follow orders. 
Back in New York, Sabia had specifically promised many of the men better jobs than 
that of crude manual labor. John Reiss and his friend Charles Zinke, having escaped 
from the trains at Miami, were arrested and forced by the police at gunpoint onto a boat 
to Camp number 5 on lower Matecumbe Key. “We arrived at this camp about 4 a.m., 
and we were told to go to work, which we refused to do. I told them that I was a 
carpenter and was hired as such, and [I] was told that it didn’t make any difference 
what they said in New York ‘You take the axe and go to work.’”81  
 The work of grading railways included clearing the vegetation, busting the 
corral rocks and forming embankments on which tracks could be laid. The engineers 
employed dynamite and tractors in some places, but workers carried out most of the 
labor of carving a railroad from the island terrain with simple, handheld implements. 
J.C. Meredith, the construction engineer, confirmed that the workspaces extended from 
Homestead on the mainland to that of Key West, a distance of 125.35 miles. Of this total 
distance the engineers designed the railway to be built over 75 miles of land, 25 miles of 
swamp, and 29.35 miles of water. Meredith also clarified that though machines would be 
used on much of the grading in the swamps, at least 1.5 miles of the swamp work would 
be done by hand. The special agent for the federal government reported that: “in 
drilling the coral preliminary to blasting the men work under a task system, that is they 
are required to drill so many feet or holes per day. The task varies according to the 
hardness of the coral.” In addition, many workers suffered injuries and some died from 
dynamite and gasoline used in clearing the island rocks for the railway.82  
                                                        
81John Reiss Affidavit, ibid;  
82J.C. Meredith Affidavit, ibid. 
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 The practice of working the men roughly 10 or 11 hours through the hottest 
part of the day reveals the lack of concern on the part of the company for the men 
performing such arduous labor in the hot, muggy, sub-tropical environment. The 
special agent found that most foremen had 15 to 25 men working under their 
supervision. The foremen testified that the workday began at five a.m. and continued 
until five p.m. Men were marched at gun point from the tents to the work site and back 
again at the end of the day, compounding their suffering in the hot humid weather. 
Though the foremen stated that each “section” of track was roughly three miles long, 
and the camps situated “about the middle” of these sections, by the end of the project, 
when the men were perhaps most exhausted, undernourished, or even injured, the walk 
to work could be as far as two miles each way, sometimes through snake and alligator 
infested swamps.83  
 The special agent noted that in some of the camps the men walked long 
distances through knee-deep water to reach the work site and that this contributed to 
the poor health of the workers.  Workers reported that those men at the Homestead 
camp suffered more hardships than others, as “they have to get out into the water or 
mud; 30% are in the mud every day.” Harry Hermanson, the 19 year-old who was taken 
to Florida under the influence of alcohol paid for by the labor recruiter in Brooklyn, was 
one of these workers. He testified that he worked on a “sunken island” where—
ironically—the boss’s name was Mr. Good. Apparently, upon approaching the worksite 
in rowboats, Good told the men to jump overboard. When some of the men resisted, 
Mr. Good then told the men “jump overboard or I will blow your brains out.” 
Hermanson testified that: “We did jump overboard and worked in the water all day.”  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The water was “up to our wastes and sometimes our necks,” The extreme environment 
of the Florida Keys comprised perhaps the single most important reason for the 
company to recruit men who knew little about the place. Men unfamiliar with the 
hardships of the climate, the landscape, and the horrendous working conditions were 
more susceptible to manipulative recruiters who reported of beautiful, sunny Florida.84  
 The special agent found that workers had a hard time contending with the 
natural terrain of the Florida Keys, even without the abuse of their bosses. The rocky 
coral landscape, which made up the chief ground susrface of the islands, was repeatedly 
cited as a painful to sleep on. The rocks caused men suffering when they were on their 
feet as well. “The coral of which the Keys are formed, being rough and gritty, is very 
hard on shoes, a laborer frequently wears out a pair of shoes in a month, sometimes in a 
week.” And in clearing the land to make way for the railroad the men encountered what 
they called “poisonous wood” which upon contact irritated the skin, and caused rashes 
and fevers. Even where there were no poisonous plants, the vegetation was so thick on 
parts of the island that in order to lay the stakes workers had to chop through what 
E.T. Clyatt called a “wild jungle.” Clyatt claimed that even after being cleared, the 
vegetation grew so rapidly that “in the final survey one had to cut a trail to see the 
stakes which had been laid.”85  
 Conditions for the men were so terrible that even foremen and engineers took 
note of the workers’ suffering. The foreman Clyatt confirmed most every aspect of the                                                         
84Harry Hermanson Affidavit, ibid. Hermanson’s age, along with evidence that even younger boys of 15 
or 11 years of age were being worked in the camps, suggests that younger workers were more easily 
intimidated into performing the worst jobs. His affidavit includes some of the grossest forms of abuse and 
though many others suffered similarly, his case is particularly notable. 
85Poisonwood trees, kin to poison ivy looks like a harmless tree but emit poisonous sap that burns and 
irritates skin. See Victoria Shearer and Nancy Toppino, Insiders Guide to the Florida Keys and Key West, p. 
13, Morris Publishing, (2002); E.T. Clyatt Affidavit, in DOJ Files NA, RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, File 
50-162-1. 
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workers’ complaints. Clyatt stated that “after having charge of the men on the island for 
about two months he became very much disgusted with the conditions there, and the 
orders that he was asked to carry out.” He claimed that: 
…there was a general understanding from headquarters that no man should be allowed to leave 
the island, sick or well; that the men should be driven out of their tents at 5 A.M. each morning, 
and compelled to work whether they were in a condition to do so or not; that one of the 
commissary rules was that no man should receive any food if he did not work and that, as a 
result of this rule, many who were ill with fever and suffering from the treatment of the bosses 
were obliged to lie in their tents in a starving condition.86 
 
Clyatt argued that often the reason for illness and inability to work related directly to 
the environment, explaining: “the mosquitoes were poisonous and many [workers] 
became very ill because of the insects” and that in addition to the harsh physical 
environments “the bosses were brutal and beat the workmen often with the axe handle, 
pointed revolvers at them and threatened them in every way if they seemed too ill to 
work rapidly.” Workers argued that the harsh environment and deplorable treatment 
led to their decisions to attempt to leave the work camps. As the Department of Justice 
agent investigating the camps reported:  
…perhaps the greatest cause of discontent among the men is that they are totally unused to 
such conditions as prevail on the Keys. Practically all of these men came from New York and 
Philadelphia. Hardly any greater contrast could be found within the limits of the United States 
than that between these large cities and the barren Keys over which the RR extensions [are] 
being built. The men brooding over their sittuation, imagine that they are banished on desolate 
islands far out in the sea and they know that even when they reach the mainland, they have to 
make a long and expensive journey to reach home. They are lonesome and homesick, tired of the 
work, tired of their surroundings, and they intend to return home as soon as possible. 87  
  
                                                        
86Ibid. Clyatt ultimately became the key deponent in the Federal court case, which attempted to expose 
peonage labor practices in the Florida Keys camps. His testimony as a foreman is key to the confirmation 
of the many worker affidavits, which complain of harsh treatment in harsh environments. See Daniel, 
Shadow of Slavery (1976). 
87 Federal Agent Report, “Reasons For Returning North” in DOJ Files NA, RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, 
File 50-162-1. 
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 The presence of white American, ethnic Italian, Greek, as well as southern black 
workers distinguishes rural-industrial peonage regimes from other forms of endebted or 
coercive labor throughout the South. In certain instances the sleeping arrangements in 
the camps were segregated, and the record shows black workers received harsher 
treatment. However, the white and Mediterranean workers from New York and 
Philadelphia became just as vulnerable as southern blacks once they reached the isolated 
camps, and like the black workers, they remained trapped great distances from their 
families and social networks back home. Reports that blacks had authority to restrain 
and coerce white workers at gunpoint remain contested in the records. However, when 
and if this did take place, it certainly made the conditions of white workers’ experience 
more unusual. The records also show more than one case of local blacks who were not 
held as workers aiding both black and white workers during their time there, and upon 
their attempted escapes from the camps. Unlike the white Protestant, Greek and Italian 
workers, black workers were not brought from the North. It is likely that some of the 
black workers were prisoners leased by the Florida East Coast Railroad Company, and 
intersections between peonage and convict labor appear throughout the records related 
to the Florida Keys work camps. The harsh physical spaces and conditions of the 
Florida Keys contributed to the manifestation of a similarly horrendous, if not entirely 
equal experience for workers of all races inside the camps.88 
 The decision to employ white, European immigrant, and southern black laborers 
reveals the similarly marginalized status each group shared in the eyes of the labor 
recruiters and foremen. Recruiters and foremen could manipulate leased convicts and 
the perpetually underemployed to carry out such difficult work. J.C. Meredith, the  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construction engineer, informed the federal agent that when the work first began on the 
railroad, “negroes only were first employed.” These black workers reportedly came from 
Georgia and Florida, having fallen victim to similar “false promises” of recruiters who 
would later convince whites and immigrants from the North to travel south. The black 
workers too were alarmed to find that the work was on an island, having been told that 
they were to do railroad work only a few miles from Miami. At that time as many as 500 
blacks in three separate camps labored on the railroad extension. This supply of black 
workers remained inadequate to the railroad’s labor demand and so the FECR and Sabia 
Co. began to recruit northern men. According to Meredith, white workers were not 
employed until the later part of October 1905. 
 The racial ideology of black indolence conflicts greatly with white stereotypes of 
black physical strength and environmental fortitude. Foremen inside the FECR camps 
stated that “Negroes made indifferent laborers. They knocked off work a great deal, 
really averaging about 4 workdays a week.” In clearing the right-of-way for the 
railroad, the records show that blacks—like whites—had to contend with the same 
“poisoned wood” found on the islands. The foremen claimed that black workers were 
immune to the poisonous wood and thus were put to work clearing it. In actuality, 
foremen forced blacks to clear the poisoned wood because bosses cared less for their 
health than that of the more costly white workers whom the company transported from 
distant cities. But foremen recognized southern black workers suffering inside the Keys’ 
labor camps even if they were supposedly more seasoned to hard labor and acclimated to 
the harsh climate. They admitted that the blacks came to work in the camps during the 
heat of summer, which was “the worst season.” Like whites, the principal complaint of 
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black workers was the mosquitoes, which even their white bosses agreed “were very 
numerous and ferocious.”89 
 It is clear that although white and black workers shared in their suffering of the 
Florida Keys physical environment, neither the company nor the bosses treated them 
equally. The company segregated the work camps by race, and though white workers 
charged that they worked under the supervision of black bosses, Meredith claimed these 
accusations were untrue. “We have had only one negroe boss, a man named Green, and 
he is not with us. He was a sub-foremen under a white foreman, and all the men in his 
gang were negroes.” Most black workers labored under white walking bosses who 
brutalized them in ways that were already familiar across the South. In camp number 3, 
one foreman named Albert Frozier reportedly used extremely brutal tactics to coerce 
black workers. E.T. Clyatt testified that Frozier “beat negroes on the head with a pick 
axe.” Clyatt stated that many foremen beat, and even killed black workers in the camps, 
and that he “buried several negroes who have died on the Keys from the treatment.” 
One Jake Anderson, called ‘Rockhouse’ by his fellow workers, suffered particularly 
sadistic torture at the hands of a boss by the name of W.C. Grover. Grover shot 
Anderson in the arm and then made him carry a bucket of water with his wounded arm 
while Anderson was in what Clyatt called “an almost dying condition.” Grover 
reportedly killed another black worker named Lindey in the same incident and was 
                                                        
89J.C. Meredith Affidavit, ibid. It was not stated that the blacks first brought to the Keys were convicts, 
however, the practice being so common in Florida and Georgia leads one to accept the likely presence of 
convicts in the camps; Meredith stated that black workers were not sensitive to the poisoned wood, but 
there is no factual evidence for such a statement. 
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known to have taken black workers to Cape Sable, where he sold them to another 
company for his personal profit.90  
 Lindey and Anderson’s attempt to help one another against Grover’s attacks 
reveals the reality that, in the absence of protection from the company or the law, 
workers in the camps assisted each other. The isolation of the camps and the great 
distances from public services left workers to seek support from each other and local 
residents, often crossing southern racial lines to find aid and comfort. Jake Anderson 
testified that: “I stayed at Key Largo eight months and begged to be sent out. Each time 
I was refused and beaten.” He confirmed that he was “shot in the arm by the foreman 
and did not receive any attention from the company after I was shot but was cared for 
and fed by one Mr. Dell.” Both black and white workers reported that Sophie English, 
the black restaurant operator, provided food and medical attention to men from the 
camps. She testified that: “The foremen carried pistols and shot at the men” and stated 
“To my personal knowledge, Mr. Ball, a foreman, did on several occasions shoot men 
and break their arms, and I had to care for them and dress their wounds.” Sophie 
English did not deny help to “The white men from New York” whom she fed. “They 
would slip into our camp and beg for food and water.” E.T. Clyatt confirmed that 
English and others like her offered aid to workers saying: “many died and more would 
have died had it not been for several negro women who had restaurants in or near the 
Keys and cooked for the men and gave them food.” Local blacks also provided liquor to 
workers in the camps for a price.91 
                                                        
90E.T. Clyatt Affidavit, ibid. In the rural industries of the south employers often paid men who could 
supply, or capture and return, workers. Grover was reported to have made tidy profits stealing men from 
the F.E.C.R. camps and selling them into the nearby turpentine farms. 
91Jake Anderson, Sophie English, E.T. Clyatt Affidavit, ibid. 
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 The distribution of alcohol to workers in the camps undermined their health and 
added to their debt. Bosses profited from liquor sales, siphoning men’s wages and 
prolonging their contracts. The camps’ isolation from towns made alcohol a precious 
commodity. Agents and foremen reported that a black man named Parson King 
operated a saloon in one of the camps where “whiskey and beer were sold in quantity.” 
King ran this saloon with the permission of one of the division engineers, Mr. 
Dusenberry. E.T. Clyatt testified that Dusenberry argued with King, explaining that he 
would replace King with another man if he did not get more money from King’s “liquor 
traffic.” But liquor was not solely the purview of black entrepreneurs, nor did all the 
foremen and engineers view it as an optimal business. Both inside and outside the 
camps, bosses and locals stated that drunken workers threatened the progress of 
construction and disrupted the community.92  
 A report entitled “LIQUOR SMUGGLED INTO THE CAMPS” made by the 
special agent investigating the work camps, stated that in some camps “a good deal of 
‘boot-legging’ business” existed, “while in others there has been none at all.” Apparently 
just before the arrival of the special agent,  the foremen reported that a “booze-boat” 
carrying a reported 60 gallon cask of liquor anchored off the Key all night, and within 
an hour or two the camp “was in a very hilarious condition.” The drunken workers 
attracted the attention of the camp foremen who sent a man to buy some of the liquor to 
use as evidence in prosecuting the men who sold it without a license. The camp officers 
notified the Deputy U.S. Marshal for Dade and Monroe Counties, but it is unclear if any 
prosecution took place. The foremen claimed that “the drinking bout demoralized the 
working force,” For workers suffering from terrible labor and oppressive conditions,  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alcohol represented an irresistable though unhealthy escape that compounded their 
repression inside the camps.93  
 Illegal gambling also occurred widely throughout the FECR camps. Despite 
official prohibitions, camp officials did not attempt to prevent gambling, as they stated it 
was “the only amusement in which the men can indulge.” Isolated from more 
wholesome forms of entertainment, bosses used liquor and gambling to squeeze workers 
for their wages. Reports also suggested that black gamblers conned the workers, 
pilfering their wages, however foremen likely knew that any money workers lost in the 
camp forced them to remain on the job longer. Clyatt testified that: “professional 
colored gamblers…fleeced the men whenever they had money.” But Clyatt admitted 
that the foremen allowed these gamblers into the camp, and that they “were allowed to 
come and go at will.” Both vices operated as part of the system through which bosses 
restrained workers by purloining their hard-earned wages, and keeping them in the 
service of the company. Gambling and drinking contributed to the system of 
entrapment workers experienced in the camps.94  
 Poor provisions, unrelenting toil, and unsafe environmental conditions all 
contributed to illness and suffering of FECR workers. E.T. Clyatt reported “You could 
not tell a sick man from a well man.”95 Several foremen assured federal agents that the 
camps were  “located in as healthful places as can be found on the Keys.” However, the  
dreadful conditions workers and foremen reported obviously contradict the projection of 
good intentions in such statements. The Keys work camps were on the whole terrible 
places to live and work. Foremen’s claims that men coming from the North had  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“constitutional diseases” they brought to the camps may have partially true. Yet 
workers clearly suffered illnesses contracted while in the Keys camps and many of the 
illnesses related directly to the particular physical environment they encountered 
there.96  
 Initially, medical care did not exist in the camps, but even the health services 
eventually provided did not nearly meet the needs of workers. J.C. Meredith admitted 
that the company’s physician made no visits to the camps prior to January 1, 1906. The 
one doctor finally employed by the company was responsible for thousands of workers 
in dozens of camps across hundreds of miles. Meredith stated that this physician did 
make some visits after January 1906, but that “we have no record of the number of calls 
made by him.” During that same month the company secured a “hospital building” 
where patients could be housed. Joseph Halpin, a 17 year-old worker, testified that upon 
falling ill he was put in what he called a “sick tent.” Halpin stayed there for two weeks 
“but received no medicine, aid or medical attention whatsoever. We simply stayed 
there.” A report by the resident physician, J.A. Heitlinger M.S., for the months of 
January through March 1906 claims that he treated 161 patients in the hospital and 127 
“out doors.” The reports obviously do not account for all cases of illness, nor all deaths 
that occurred. It only states that “the number of deaths in the hospital was 4; the 
number of deaths from accidents was 3.” This does not account for the men reportedly 
murdered by foremen, or those who died in their tents. The lack of medical care 
compounded suffering and contributed to deaths resulting from maltreatment and 
disease.97  
                                                        
96E.T. Clyatt Affidavit, Report of Federal Agent, “HEALTHFULNESS IN THE CAMPS,” ibid. 
97Joseph A. Halpin Affidavit, ibid. 
  87 
 Illnesses directly related to the physical environment of the camps appear most 
frequently in the physician’s report. As noted in the records on food and water in the 
camps, the principal maladies included constipation, diarrhea, and “bilous fever,” likely 
due to poor dietary provisions and hard labor in hot weather. Among the other chief 
illnesses experienced in the camps, typhoid fever remained the highest reported, 
confirming the occurrence of contaminated water in the camps. Nearly all the workers’ 
affidavits as well as those of the foremen E.T. Clyatt, and the black restaurant owner, 
Sophie English, made it clear that mosquito-born illness occurred consistently in the 
camps, leading to the death of several workers. Men who suffered from “absesses” due to 
the extreme heat and lack of hygiene, rashes from poisoned wood, and “lacerated 
wounds” from clearing underbrush also topped the list. Labor-related injuries also made 
the report, including cases of “exhaustion,” “Dynamite burns,” “Gasoline burns,” 
“Contusions,” “sprains,” and something labeled “Corrupt Practices,” obviously not 
referring to election bribery, most likely meaning venereal diseases. A handful of men 
earned a free ride home due to their illnesses, though the majority remained, forced to 
contend with their afflictions in the camps.98 
 The physicians’ reports do not mention the race of the patients treated, though 
the fact that blacks were not “provided for by the company” suggests they likely 
received little or no real healthcare while in the camps. Racial stereotypes of black 
workers as more prone to promoting vice and violence do occur in the records, as does 
evidence that black workers were given access to women that do not appear to have 
been available to white workers. The federal agent stated that on the whole the black 
workers in the camps were “well behaved” though he attributed this to the camps being  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so well isolated as to prevent black workers’ access to distractive habits. Deputy Sheriff 
Hill arrested several black workers for “boot-legging” and one, Joe Bloomer, for his 
involvement in a “cutting scrape” with another black worker. Bloomer was fined in Key 
West but escaped imprisonment due to his “having acted in self-defense.” A black 
worker named Williams who reportedly killed another black worker was tried and 
subsequently sentenced to the penitentiary. In one extreme case, someone dynamited an 
unsuspecting black worker while he slept in his tent. The report blamed the murder on 
another black worker, but no evidence was provided to support the claim. This vicious 
level of violence did not occur in reports on white workers, suggesting that black 
workers experienced poorer protection and more abuse than white workers.99 
 One federal agent asserted that “The Negroes are to a large extent afflicted with 
syphilitic diseases, in some cases in a very advanced stage.” This he attributed to the fact 
that, “In each of the two negro camps there are a dozen or more negro women, who are 
said to be the wives of the men, and in some cases their kept women.” The agent went 
on to report that some of the women were examined a few days before the visit of the 
special agent, and four or five of them were deported on account of their diseased 
condition. The agent reported that syphilitic diseases prevailed among whites as well, 
but not nearly to the extent that they affected black workers. This may be due to the 
fact that: “In none of the camps were there any white women and in none of the white 
camps were there any negroe women.” In isolated spaces so far from home, white 
workers, largely from the North, did not bring their wives, nor were prostitutes allowed 
in the white camps. So while some whites may have already had syphilis upon their 
arrival at the camps, the disease was not continuously brought in and spread as it was in  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the black camps. The women in the black camps, while perhaps providing some 
companionship, also contributed to the higher incidence of venereal diseases.100  
 The treatment of black workers appears not to be on the whole significantly 
worse than the treatment of the majority of white workers from the North. The harsh 
physical environment, along with the attempts by foremen to retain labor, created a 
degree of similarity in treatment for black and white workers alike. Ethnic and racial 
ideologies, which placed black and immigrant laborers in a lower caste, relegating them 
to unstable employment, directly contributed to the manipulation they suffered in the 
FECR camps. Regardless of relative differences in treatment, exposure to the vagaries 
of the physical environment and violent foremen created a similarly horrific experience 
for black and white workers in the Florida Keys work camps.101 
 The workers who reported their grievances regarding the labor conditions in the 
camps consistently invoked not only the island geography, but also the harsh physical 
terrain as barriers to their escape. When workers did manage to leave the camps, either 
through escape or with the consent of foremen, they found that the southern labor 
mechanisms of vagrancy laws and chain gangs stood in their way of returning home. 
Often, local police returned workers to the camps, but in at least a few cases—one 
notable for the number of men involved—local towns offered support to workers who 
refused to go back to work in the camps. But more often reports show many locals 
perceived foreign workers as “vagrants” and “hoboes.” The behavior of workers, and the 
options they pursued once outside the camps offer a view of their reliance on seasonal 
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migratory labor patterns, as well as the role isolation and physical barriers played in 
obstructing their attempt to return home.102 
 Sheriffs apprehended some workers who escaped even before arriving at the 
camps. The local sheriff in Miami arrested Albert Grant, one such worker, and several 
fellow escapees for vagrancy after they fled the trains. The sheriff placed them in “Snake 
Creek Prison” where they “slept in a barrel, worked one day and complained about 
sleeping in a barrel and were told to ‘get out and go back to Miami.’” They walked the 
16 miles back to Miami, where they remained for four days. There the sheriffs forced 
them aboard the boat Biscayne, which carried workers to the Keys work camps. Two 
men jumped off the boat, and the sheriff threatened the others at gunpoint to remain on 
board. Upon their arrival at the Keys, most of the men were put to work cutting and 
clearing trees. Grant received light detail as a cook’s helper. After one day of this 
relatively easy labor he “left them, told nobody, and crawled along the watersedge [sic], 
got some coconut and drank the milk, saw no chance of escaping and went back.” The 
workers were literally prisoners, at the mercy of the island geography, bosses, and local 
police.103  
 Once in the camps the men were stuck, but this did not deter them from trying 
to leave. The foremen, E.T. Clyatt stated that one of the locals, a manager of a fruit farm 
five miles from Planters, Key Largo, “has a small dock, and repeated requests are made 
to him from distressed men to be permitted to go out on their pier and signal to passing 
vessels.” But the men did not merely hope for help from ships passing by. They also 
appealed to the local fishermen who owned small sailboats and rowboats in the waters 
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around the Keys. Some of these ‘conchs’ as foremen called them “would take the men 
away from the islands at night, for $1.00 each.” When the company discovered this 
support, Clyatt stated the order came to “shoot any fishermen who steals our men.” One 
foremen asserted that he would “riddle their boat with bullets” if he caught them 
helping the workers to escape.104 
 The same dense tropical vegetation that proved difficult and dangerous to clear 
by hand provided cover to men brave enough to attempt to flee the camps. The men 
often utilized what some called the “wild jungle” to aid them in their attempted escapes. 
Clyatt told agents: “The men would sometimes hide in the bushes sick, and begging for 
assistance, or pity.” Though simply hiding in the swamps did not guarantee escape from 
the islands themselves, it offered a short reprieve from hard labor and violent foremen. 
Bosses caught many men attempting to escape to the woods and drove them back at 
gunpoint. The survival and escape of the men often depended on the support of locals 
like Sophie English, who Clyatt confirmed gave the men food to “take to the swamps, 
where they would hide until they might steal away on one of the boats belonging to the 
conchs.” These local fishermen provided the only real opportunity for escape from the 
island labor camps.105 
 Some men attempted to escape by stealing small boats to navigate on their own 
without the guidance of fishermen. For many men, even getting away on the boats 
proved too difficult in their weakened condition. Robert Martin tried to leave by boat, 
but being too sick, he did not get away before “the boss came and made me get out, gave 
me a thrashing.” After fainting in the midst of subsequent work, Martin was “sick a 
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week in my tent with hardly anything to eat” and even then he tried to escape to a 
restaurant in the black camps, the boss captured him and drove him back to the 
worksite. “I tried to work but got stricted [sic] and the men took me to the company’s 
launch and brought me again back to the camp.” Even when workers managed to take 
to the sea on boats, the unfamiliar waters presented a great obstacle. Clyatt reported 
that in August of 1905, some men tried to escape in a rowboat, having been refused a 
pass. “After drifting around in the sea without provisions and no drinking water for 
days,” they encountered a local pilot named Tug Pelton, who reported their 
whereabouts to the company. The company captured them and on their return a boss 
named Froxier kicked them and ordered the men “thrown overboard, but they were 
rescued by their companions.” Such harrowing tales illustrate how the ocean waters 
constituted an integral component of the FECR camps’ peonage labor regime.106  
 Several bosses and labor agents readily acknowledged that the physical 
environment presented a significant barrier to workers’ escape. The dense tropical 
foliage formed as formidable a barrier as the ocean currents. E.T. Clyatt confirmed the 
reports of the workers stating: “On the eastern part of the island there was a line 
schooner and the mail boat that made 2 trips a week to Key West but it was almost 
impossible for the workmen to get to that side of the island because of the density of the 
undergrowth magnolia; in fact it was a wild jungle.” Thus the Florida Keys provided a 
uniquely convenient space for the company hoping to retain labor by limiting workers’ 
ability to leave of their own volition.107  
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 The physical barriers reinforced the legal constraints created by vagrancy laws. 
Max Lipetz, one of the labor recruiters working for Frank Sabia in New York stated: 
[Triay] was talking with us and he said ‘When they go down there they will have to 
work for transportation; if not they’ll be put in the chain gang. [Sabia] nodded his head 
and answered “else have to swim 60 miles.’” Company officials’ documentation of their 
awareness that isolated and treacherous physical spaces functioned to retain labor in the 
Florida Keys offers a crucial window into the intersections between labor and 
environment in the modern South.  
 Labor migration and mobility characterized much of the proto-industrial 
economy of the South. Vagrancy laws allowed for the return and further exploitation of 
workers who did somehow manage to escape amounting to a private-public system of 
exploitation. The nexus of peonage and convict labor appear throughout the historical 
literature on the modern South. This held true for the Florida Keys as well. Such 
vagrancy laws existed as a mechanism of employers to acquire large labor forces for 
harvest picking or difficult proto-industrial labor. One of the major disincentives for 
workers leaving a labor camp was the likelihood of arrest by local law enforcement for 
vagrancy. E.T. Clyatt confirmed that, “in fact all the sheriffs on the East Coast of 
Florida are practical servants of the company.” Many workers who escaped from the 
Florida Keys work camps fell victim to vagrancy laws and subsequent convict labor. 
These vagrancy laws stood in the way of workers’ preference short-range migration, 
known as “shifting” which allowed them nominal independence from poor working 
conditions, low wages, and coercion. Some workers escaped both the worst horrors of 
the railroad work camps, and the restrictions imposed on them by vagrancy laws, 
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integrating themselves into the migratory seasonal southern labor force, and working 
their way home through jobs in various rural industries.108 
 Clyatt testified that constables L.M. Nicholson, and one Mr. Wilson arrested 
escaping northern workmen upon the slightest provocation, often under false pretenses. 
He reported that a convict camp existed at Ogus, only eleven miles from Miami. The 
justice of the peace W.S. Ill charged men with vagrancy, and gave them the option of 
returning to the company work camps or being sent to the chain gangs, where often 
they were “then leased again to the railroads or the surrounding turpentine camps.”109  
 Sam Rosen went to Florida in November of 1905 with the initial shipment of 
New Yorkers recruited by Sabia Co. After working for three weeks without pay, Rosen 
tried to quit, was arrested, and taken to a judge who ordered him to return to the camps 
or go to jail. Rosen’s affidavit states that he “chose jail.” The court sentenced him to 
roadwork at Miami alongside black convicts. After 10 days, the authorities released him 
for good behavior, but with no money, food, or housing, he went back to work on the 
FECR where they promised him $1.50 a day and $3.00 board. After working two weeks 
laying pipes in the ground, he asked for his pay, but company officials told him that after 
deducting his transportation costs and board the company owed him no money. This 
was often the sort of provocation that drove men to run.110  
 Albert Grant, John Reiss, and Charles Zinke all knew each other in New York. 
Together they signed up for work at the Sabia Co., and together they boarded the trains  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to Florida. Their stories are similar in that they all managed to escape at some point, 
fleeing from the Keys work camps. Yet all did work at the Keys camps at some point, 
and all were confined to chain gangs at various times throughout their journeys.. A 
foreman allowed Grant a pass from camp to visit Miami, where the sheriffs ordered him 
and several other men to leave town. The men walked 70 miles to Palm Beach where 
they were arrested and put to work on the local chain gang, where Grant suffered 
hunger, illness, and physical abuse at the hands of the guards. With money from his 
mother, Grant paid his fines and made it to Jacksonville, where he worked on the Clyde 
Rail Line for one month.111 
 Reiss’s friend Charles Zinke escaped at Miami as well, but was arrested and 
sentenced to work on the roads at Snake Creek. The sheriff eventually took the convicts, 
including Zinke, to the FECR boats and forced them aboard at gunpoint. Zinke labored 
on the Florida Keys railroad, but at some point earned a pass from the camp and walked 
from Miami to Palm Beach, where the police arrested him and put him to work on the 
chain gang. After eight days he “stole away” and caught a train to Jacksonville. There 
he worked on the railroad for 11 days and earned five dollars pay. His family sent him 
money and he returned to New York by train, arriving on April 17th 1906.112  
 Joseph A. Halpin, the 17 year-old from Brooklyn, managed to escape by hiding 
on one of the company boats. Police caught Halpin and put him before one “Jail Judge 
Brooks.” Given the option of returning to the FECR camp or working on the chain 
gang building roads at Monroe, he chose to return to the Key’s camp number 82 on 
Ramrod Key for one month. There he fell ill and bosses left him to starve in a tent. 
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Eventually Halpin left the camps and found work with the Burnham Clam Chowder Co. 
at Caxambas Island, earning $1.50 a day. He reported the rest of the story in his 
affidavit: 
I worked one month and went to fort Myers where I caught a freight train and went to Lakeland, Fla. 
where I was arrested for vagrancy. A contractor came to us and said ‘if you work for me, I will get you 
out of jail.’ We told him we would, he got us out and he told us to walk up the tracks for about two miles 
where we could find the Atlantic Coast Line camp. Two other men and I caught a freight train made our 
way to Danford Fla. we got on a boat at Danford, Fla. and left for Jacksonville. We boarded another 
freight train for Waycross. We were arrested in this place for vagrancy and were sentenced to work in 
the chain gang, hard labor, and we had to cut trees and collect the turpentine.  
 
After serving his time, Halpin went to Savannah, Georgia where he found work on a 
railroad at Millen, Georgia. He stayed on there three weeks and then stole rides on 
freight trains to New York. He arrived in New York on “Decoration Day, May 29, 
1906.” The men’s experiences highlight the common use of vagrancy laws to retain 
labor and the widespread use of coerced workers in the extractive industries and 
construction sector. However, workers’ strategic migration eventually improved their 
situation by returning home to family, friends, and familiar physical environments.113  
 The assistance and support from family members suggests migrant laborers 
were not as shiftless and vagrant as foremen argued. The great distances between the 
work camps of the South and the homes and families of the workers from northern cities 
made foreign workers ideal for exploitative labor regimes. Workers’ inability to 
communicate easily with their families back home made them easier to constrain. Lipetz 
stated: “Hundreds of people came to complain while I was there [Sabia Co. New York, 
NY], fathers and mothers would come in and cry and say that their sons had gone away 
and had never been heard of and that they had received letters relating the miseries that 
they were experiencing in the Keys.” One woman, whose husband went to the camps, 
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wrote repeatedly but received no answer. She finally complained in person to Mr. Triay, 
the recruiter who had sent her husband south, but he ignored her. Lipetz reported that 
“at last, despairing, [she] came to the office and made a scene when [Triay] said he 
would telegraph the chief engineer at Miami. I don’t think the man was ever found.” 
Lipetz added, “Mothers and sisters would come and cry daily. [Triay] and [Sabia] 
would joke about it afterwards.” The inability of workers’ families to gain information 
from employers made it difficult for them to help workers escape the camps. But families 
repeatedly acted, despite difficulty, to pressure Sabia Co. to provide answers regarding 
the whereabouts and condition of their loved ones.114  
 The great distances between New York and the Florida Keys made it nearly 
impossible for families to physically find their loved ones and return them home. 
However in at least one case, this did occur. Amanda Hermanson, Harry Hermanson’s 
mother, testified that she went looking for Harry when he didn’t come home in 
November 1905. Local bartenders at both Burn’s Liquor Store on the corner of 
President and Van Brunt St., and Higgins at Hamilton Ave. and 14th St., informed her 
that: “a young man had been around Brooklyn picking up boys to go south.” She took a 
train to Jacksonville and then Miami where she checked in with the FECR engineers, 
who dismissed her inquiries. She then hired a boatman to take her to Miami; and there, 
after she paid Harry’s transportation costs, the company released him to her. Most of 
the poor immigrant families whose loved ones went to the Keys did not have the 
resources and determination of Mrs. Hermanson. Still, documentation of several cases of 
mothers and family members sending money to their loved ones in the camps shows the 
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level of their commitment. Hermanson’s persistence and activism is emblematic not only 
of the love and concern felt by family members, but also of the strong ties and pragmatic 
intelligence that characterized immigrants who traveled long distances and overcame 
great hardships to live and labor in the United States.115  
 In at least one significant case, several men who the company transported to the 
Florida Keys refused to go to work in the railroad camps. Claiming that they had been 
promised higher wages, they managed to avoid being coerced into working in the camps 
by remaining in the town of Key West and garnering the support of locals, including 
the mayor, citizens, and a Cuban cigar-makers union. This strike of sorts illustrates 
workers’ desire to find reasonable work in a seasonable climate, and their ability, 
through mobility, to avoid coercion. T.J. Russell, the Secretary of the Central Labor 
Assembly of Key West, gave a report to the federal agent investigating the camps in 
which he stated that the men “claimed that they had been shanghaied.” He went on to 
say, “I think some of them really were surprised to find themselves on an island. I am 
sure some of them thought they were outside the U.S.” The men went to the city of Key 
West to see the Mayor, Geo L. Babcock, who gave them permission to sleep in the local 
baseball diamond. A group of local Cuban cigar-makers led by one Mr. Gonzalez 
collected money and provisions from local citizens to support the workers, whose 
primary concern was the disparity between the wages promised them in New York and 
those they actually received in the camps. The men showed local officials the circulars 
passed out back north stating that they would be paid $1.25 per day. The city of Key 
                                                        
115Amanda Hermanson Affidavit, in DOJ Files NA, RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, File 50-162-1. 
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West contacted the engineers at the FECR camps and a process of negotiation over 
wages, labor, and provisions in the town ensued.116 
 Russell reported that: “The first impulse of the people here was to help the men.” 
Though the men refused to go to work on the railroad, many of them found work at 
various odd jobs around Key West, laboring as carpenters, day laborers, etc. Some even 
scabbed during a carpenters’ strike underway in the city. But though the townspeople 
did not believe the men should be mistreated, the reality of ‘foreign men’ with no 
families or employment living in the area left many in Key West worried. Russell stated 
that the townspeople “were afraid of them, as they were considered a dangerous class.” 
Hundreds of men “loafed around town, and many got drunk and disorderly—in fact the 
large majority were bums.” Complaints of the use of profane and indecent language “on 
the streets” appeared repeatedly in the record. Russell went on to state that: “The 
people were afraid to leave their houses open, as is the custom here.” The town 
appointed a committee, who asked the workers to select five representatives with whom 
they would meet. This committee determined that “there were two factions among the 
men. The majority were hobos…but some of the younger men were of a better class.” 
The committee expressed that unless the men went to work on the railroad there was 
no more they could do for them, though they did arrange a local resident, William B. 
Curry, to open a restaurant for the men “at a charge of 45 cts a day, $3.25 a week. The 
men agreed to this price.” The singular support given to workers by the citizens of Key 
West, followed by their subsequent unwillingness to truly absorb the workers into the 
                                                        
116Special Agent Report, ibid. 
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community, shows the fundamental differences posed by culture and class, as well as the 
townspeople’s prioritization of their own safety.117 
 Vagrancy law and opportunity created by migration made up the two dominant 
aspects of workers’ experience in the vicinity of the work camps. The very ability to 
leave work made the men “hobos” in the eyes of the residents, and subject to arrest by 
local officials. The deputy sheriff of Dade County, A.P. Core, reported that: “the 
majority of the men were drunkards and deadbeats, and won’t work unless they have 
to.” And Deputy Sheriff W.H. Morris, also of Dade County stated “…I have always 
called on [foreign workers] to conduct themselves properly or leave the county. But 
many do not head this advice.” Yet some men managed to avoid both harsh labor and 
legal punishment. Many walked to North Miami, as Morris stated, “…because it is 
outside the city limits” where they lived at “cheap restaurants” and purchased “whisky at 
low dives.” Rumors circulated among the men that “a cordon of guards around Miami” 
prevented them from leaving. However, many still left the town rather than go to work 
in the camps, prompting Russell to claim that “Between Ft. Lauderdale and Palm Beach 
the tramps have stripped the fruit farms of fruit.” But many of the men did not escape 
Florida without being caught in the legal system of coerced labor.118  
 James T. Sanders, the Municipal Judge at Miami, provided statistics showing a 
total of 789 convictions for “Drunk and Disorderly, Fighting & rioting, Vagrancy, using 
profane and indecent language, Trespassing, and Contempt of Court.” The large 
majority of the men could not pay the fines and thus were forced to work off their fines 
at 50 cents per day. They worked on the local roads and slept in a crowded “stockade” 
                                                        
117Ibid. 
118W.H. Morris Affidavit, ibid. 
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that a federal agent described as “a large frame structure, the floor containing straw on 
which the men slept.” However, men did manage to escape the stockades by cutting 
through the wire on the windows with hand-fashioned devices. The agent, attempting 
to show the negative consequences of peonage labor patterns on local citizens, reported 
of the Keys camp escapees that “…the people here and at towns above here were scared 
by this great influx of people such as they had never had before.” However, a local judge 
stated: “So far as serious breaches of the peace are concerned, these hoboes were the best 
lot I ever saw. 95% of them were guilty only of drinking and of swearing on the 
street.”119  
 The tropical climate and undeveloped landscape of the Florida Keys informed 
Henry M. Flagler’s decision to develop the FECR railroad to support tourism and 
industrial transportation in the region, just as the idea of gainful employment in 
pleasant weather amid natural abundance led many men to sign up for work on the 
FECR at Sabia’s office in New York City. However, the great majority of the men who 
went to work in the FECR camps could not avoid the brutality of forced labor or the 
difficulties of the scorching tropical sun, jagged corral terrain, and deadly organisms, 
not to mention rotten food, miserable sleeping conditions, and inadequate or 
nonexistent healthcare. The affidavits of workers in the Keys resound with the suffering 
they experienced at the hands of violent bosses and the torment of the tropical 
landscape, pests, and disease on the islands. Struggling to work in water, cutting 
poisonous underbrush amid swarms of mosquitoes drove workers to desperation, 
leading them to resist foremen, and attempt escape from the islands. The difficulty of 
the labor regimes and the physical environment facilitated workers’ resistance and                                                         
119Federal Agent Report, ibid. 
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reinforced foremen’s enforcement of peonage schemes to retain workers. The seascapes 
aided the retention of most workers though ultimately many  managed to leave the 
islands.  
 That many men upon leaving the camps notified federal officials leading to 
investigation and a legal suit against the Sabia Co. proves workers’ resiliency and their 
pragmatic utilization of federal agencies to expose unfair labor practices. However, the 
the failure of Progressive reformers in the Department of Justice to achieve a legal 
victory against the Sabia Co. proves the strength of state and federal support for 
industrial enterprise and the difficulty of proving the workers were forced to labor 
against their will due to indebtedness or threat of violence. The Sabia case was only the 
beginning of the DOJ’s long initiative to prove peonage was widely practiced in rural 
industrial operations.  
 In the same year, seven hundred miles north, deep in the Great Southern Pine 
Forest of Alabama, another Progressive industrialist of Standard Oil fame utilized the 
same system of labor trafficking and peonage to supply a newly constructed railroad and 
lumber mill. Like the tropical island seascapes of the Florida Keys, the great southern 
pine forests informed industrialists’ vision of transforming nature into profits. But 
unlike the FECR project, the modern lumber industry created a uniquely dangerous set 
of environmental and labor conditions that workers were both uninformed about and ill 
prepared to handle. Though some similarities exist in the strategies of recruiting, 
trafficking, and retaining labor in the FECR and Alabama lumber camps, the forests 
facilitated a distinct and more fluid set of social and environmental relationships among 
employers, workers, foremen, and animals that allowed Progressive reformers to expose 
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abuses and achieve an ostensible legal victory in the struggle over peonage labor in the 
rural industrial south.120     
 
                                                        
120  Pete Daniel, Shadow of Slavery (1976). The Sabia case began when a New York grand jury indicted 
Frank Sabia, Edward Triay, and two other men under the 1866 slave-kidnapping law. Defendants 
admitted to peonage, arguing that slavery could not exist because it was illegal. The case failed due to the 
bribery and disappearance of witnesses and an unsympathetic court. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
“In the woods they can do anything they want to and no one can see them but 
God:”  The Jackson Lumber Company’s Alabama peonage labor camps 1906-1907.  
 
 On a warm spring day in 1904, former Governor of Maryland and accomplished 
lumberman E.E. Jackson, along with several of his associates, traveled to Alabama to 
view their massive holdings of southern yellow pine forests. The party took a private 
train car owned by the President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, Milton H. 
Smith, to a small outpost on the end of the line known as Opp, Alabama. The American 
Lumberman journal wrote that the men spent two days “in the timber.” Clad in fine suits 
and surrounded by lumber industry journalists, they walked the forest landscapes and 
discussed their plans to establish the nation’s finest lumber operation. As an 
entrepreneur and leading figure within the expanding southern lumber industry, 
Jackson possessed the natural and financial resources to carry out his vision of a 
productive, efficient, and well-ordered lumber mill in the woods of Alabama. But in 
order to extract southern timber, Jackson’s company of managers, foremen, and laborers 
faced the difficult task of converting the yellow pine into saleable lumber goods. The 
enormous size and scope of the Jackson Company’s production required transporting 
and managing both laborers and machinery across thousands of miles, deep into remote 
forests, creating a uniquely dangerous set of working conditions.121  
 In the summer of 1906, one year after Theodore Roosevelt founded the U.S. 
Forest Service and laid out his conservationist policy for the national forests, a conflict 
of local and national importance arose over labor in the Jackson Lumber Company’s                                                         
121"Model Sawmill Plants, XXIII." American Lumberman Vol. 60 (November, 1900) 28-29; “The Personal 
History and Public and Business Achievements of One Hundred Eminent Lumbermen of the United 
States,” American Lumberman, Third Series, (Chicago, 1906) 391, 393; “Woman Will Help in War Against 
Trusts,” New York Times, September 15, (1907). 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forests in Alabama. Several Jackson Lumber Company workers subjected to the forest’s 
under-developed landsccape, and suffering from poor provisions and brutal labor 
management, defied the lumber camp foremen and their bloodhounds, escaped into the 
woods, and notified federal authorities that they were held against their will, whipped, 
and forced to work at gunpoint. Following investigations into the southern lumber 
industry, in November of 1906 the Department of Justice prosecuted the Manager at 
Lockhart, William S. Harlan, and several of the labor foremen and unlike the failed case 
against Frank Sabia, ultimately the federal courts convicted Harlan and O’Hara of 
exploiting their labor. The Department of Justice files relating to peonage 
investigations place the conflict over peonage labor inside Jackson’s forest labor camps 
squarely within the wider movement for labor reform and offer a window into the 
inhumane labor regimes that characterized southern rural-industrial enterprises.122  
 The lumber industry media, federal investigators, and workers all used 
environmental rhetoric to describe both the opportunity they envisioned in the great 
southern forests. Workers and reformers employed notions of wilderness to describe the 
suffering and abuse they experienced in Jackson’s forests. Lumbermen employed notions 
of man over nature to highlight the development of an efficient industrial town in the 
forest. The lumber industry media viewed the Lockhart operation as a premier example 
of what Gifford Pinchot called man’s “wise use” of nature. However, the isolation of 
southern forests allowed foremen to coerce laborers through debt peonage and physical 
violence. Workers resisted their exploitation, using the woods to escape and report 
foremen’s abuses. Workers and Reformers characterized southern forest industry labor 
camps in environmental language conflating forests as wilderness, men as beasts, and                                                         
122 Mary Quackenbos Affidavit in DOJ Files NA, RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, File 50-162-1). 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animals as workers. Jackson’s lumber camps operated as dynamic spaces where divergent 
human interests clashed within the natural confines of the forest. The physical 
environment inside Jackson’s forest’s facilitated peonage labor regimes and contributed 
to workers’ miserable condition. The same forests that isolated men from legal 
protection allowed them cover in their escape. Ultimately, reformers and journalists 
used the Jackson forests as an allegory for the danger and disaster that peonage labor 
regimes represented.123  
 In several ways, the case of the Jackson Lumber Company’s peonage labor 
regime resembled the mechanisms that labor recruiters and foremen in the FECR camps 
carried out to supply workers for their project. Recent European ethnic immigrants 
from Hungary, Greece, and Russia along with Americans from the North signed up for 
jobs based on false representations of the southern climate and landscapes. Once inside 
the great remote forests, armed guards and vicious woods bosses bound them through 
debt and violence to labor on railroad construction and timbering operations, forcing 
men to flee when they could and report abuses to federal officials. However, the story of 
the Jackson labor camps stands apart from the FECR camps in that the forests 
facilitated a more contentious struggle between workers and foremen and blurred the 
lines between men and animals. 
 The distinct physical features of the southern pine forest and the mixed labor 
system in the camps created unique frictions among workers and woods bosses. The 
                                                        
123 Ibid; For a discussion of Environmental History methodologies see Gunther Peck, “The Nature of 
Labor: Fault Lines and Common Ground in Environmental and Labor History,” Environmental History 11, 
no. 2. (April, 2006) 212-238; See also William Cronon, “Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing 
Nature in History,” The Journal of American History 76, no. 4 (March, 1990) 1122-1131; For discussion of 
Padrones and foreign contract labor in western industrial camps see Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free 
Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 1880-1930 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
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dense forests that frightened men and added to their agony also aided workers in their 
escape, aggravating bosses. The integrated character of work teams and sleeping 
arrangements generated ethnic conflict inside the camps between workers. And the 
landed access to the forest allowed reformers to more easily enter the camps and expose 
abuses there. The forest industry represented a unique business interest of local 
property owners, employers, and national industrial magnates like Jackson. Their 
regional political power formed an important opposition to reformers seeking to 
prosecute abuses in the lumber industry. 
 Furthermore, unlike the static island archipelago of the Florida Keys, the forests 
of southern Alabama allowed a much more fluid set of labor and environmental 
relationships than did the FECR camps. The unique mingling of modern machinery in 
the forests created a distinctly dangerous working environment for men in the Lockhart 
camps. Saws and logging trains both eased the timbering process and represented 
dangerous threats to men’s safety and health. The history of black labor and residence 
in the southern forests meant that immigrants worked with and sometimes were 
guarded and abused by black men, who were both bosses and laborers in the camps. And 
the widespread use of horses, oxen, and dogs inside the forest labor camps informed 
men’s sense of their own dehumanization into chattel, and highlighted animals’ multi-
varied role as workers, companions, and extensions of the woods boss. Ultimately the 
nature of forest labor, the human and non-human workers, and the actions of the lumber 
industry enabled progressive reformers’ attempts to expose peonage labor regimes in 
the Jackson labor camps. 
 Lumber industry journalists viewed the physical environment of southern pine 
forests as the ideal space for development of industrial lumber operations. The Jackson 
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Lumber Company, like Henrgy M. Flagler planned to develop the town of Lockhart in a 
broad region of Long Leaf Pine forest that covered nearly three-fifths of Alabama and 
Florida west of the Appalachia River. The lumber industry media touted the timber 
industry as bringing economic, industrial, and social development to the forest. The 
company town included “the provision of comfortable homes and pleasant surroundings, 
for the employees.” In addition the American Lumberman noted “the fine and healthful 
climate and fertility of the soil will assist materially in making Lockhart an ideal 
industrial community.” Unlike the island seascape of the Florida Keys, lumbermen 
believed the high and fairly level landscape of the Jackson forest lent itself to railroad 
construction and easy access to internal and foreign markets. To industrialists and 
lumbermen, the Jackson Company’s Lockhart operation represented progress for the 
region of the Deep South and the nation as a whole.124 
 Until the 1880’s, northern and western lumber dealers had expressed doubts 
about the quality of southern lumber. They viewed southern timber as weaker due to 
the warm climate. However, by 1893, forty-one percent of the nation’s softwood came 
from the South, and builders used southern pine in construction of the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago that year. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
American lumbermen viewed southern timber as an enormous untapped resource. In 
1900, Alabama contained over 5,000 square miles of Longleaf Pine forests referred to by                                                         
124 Historical actors, historians and ecologists identify three distinct forest belts in the United States. The 
Northern Belt of coniferous pine forest stretches from New England through New York, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The Central pine belt begins at the Chesapeake of Virginia and 
runs through North Carolina, Northern Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas. The Southern pine belt 
stretches from southeastern Virginia all the way to eastern Texas and includes shortleaf, loblolly, and 
slash pine, all of which were marketed as “southern” or “yellow pine.” Southern forest industries provided 
timber and pitch tar to European markets beginning in the seventeenth century and by 1900 Chicago and 
the eastern U.S. consumed much of southern timber. See Richard Walter Massey Jr. A History of the 
Lumber Industry in Alabama and West Florida 1880-1914, (Vanderbilt University Press, 1960) p. 28; "Model 
Sawmill Plants, XXIII." American Lumberman Vol. 60 (November 10 1900. 28-29; "The Story of a Yellow 
Pine Sextet." American Lumberman Vol. 73 (March, 1904) 43-74. 
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the lumber industry as ‘yellow pine.’ The ecological characteristics of the Long Leaf 
Pine forests contributed to lumbermen’s opportunistic visions of the region. Alabama’s 
South-western Pine Hills’ climate of hot summers, mild winters and frequent fires kept 
down underbrush and regenerated its sandy soil. Visitors described the Long Leaf Pines 
as having “stately trunks [that] rise 40-60 feet and then spread out their dense foliage, 
which joins above like the arches of a cathedral. There is little or no undergrowth, and 
the view fades into a maze of the column-like trunks.”125  
 Historically, Southerners viewed forests as open to public access, and southern 
states did little to regulate them until the late nineteenth century when industrial 
consolidation and a national labor surplus made extraction profitable. Individual 
landowners and the slaves of wealthy planters cleared forests for cotton lands and used 
the woods for recreational hunting and fishing, as well as to supplement their diet. The 
Southern Homestead Act of 1862 allowed the clearing of forests as long as residents 
occupied the land. By the 1890s fake homesteaders working for timber companies cut 
nearly half of all timber illegally. Companies paid homesteaders to set up crude shacks, 
clear-cut timber, and deliver it to market via streams and rivers.126 
 The vast isolated and unregulated character of southern forest landscapes 
presented both opportunity and challenges for emerging industrial lumbermen, who 
sought to extract timber and transport it to eastern markets. Prior to 1900, the federal 
government did not attempt to regulate southern forests, and southern juries “would                                                         
125 Richard Walter Massey Jr., A History of the Lumber Industry in Alabama and West Florida 1880-1914 
(Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1960) p. 28; F.V. Emmerson, “The Southern Long-leaf Pine 
Belt,” The Geographical Review, Vol. 2 (January, 1919) 81; Roland M. Harper, Forests of Alabama 1878-1966 
(Tuskaloosa: University of Alabama, 1943); A.E. Parkins, The South: It’s Economic and Geographic 
Development, (New York: J. Wiley & Sons; London, Chapman & Hall, 1938). 
126 Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia 
Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Massey, A History of the Lumber 
Industry: (1960) 30-35. 
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not convict a man for taking timber from public lands.” In the 1880s an organized group 
known as the Slater Gang stole timber on federal and private lands around Big 
Escambia Creek near Pensacola, Florida. D.D. Hall, a local cattleman, reported that the 
Slater Gang stole steers and used them to transport lumber to creeks, where they could 
ship it to markets at Pensacola. The Slater Gang avoided arrest and prosecution, 
disappearing by the early 1900s. In general, local homesteaders cut timber illegally or 
set fires to clear woods for agriculture, defying the efforts of industrial lumbermen to 
stop these practices.127   
 The economic, technological, and social changes that characterized the rise of 
industry in the United States developed uniquely in the rural isolated landscapes of the 
Deep South. Northern investors such as Rockefeller and Morgan financed much of the 
rural industrial development of the Gilded Age South. But southern industry was not an 
entirely new phenomenon, and southern businessmen participated with northern capital 
to bring industrial development to modernize the South. Governor E.E. Jackson of 
Maryland—a conservationist, Methodist, and Republican—represented the 
consummate southern businessman, expanding his business mightily through vertical 
integration within the lumber industry. The company town of Lockhart embodied the 
extractive conservationist ideology, which viewed southern forests as gardens to be 
cultivated for human use. The lumber industry media portrayed southern forests as 
untouched serene spaces ripe for cultivation by high-minded management. As a leader 
                                                        
127 Willis G. Clark, Memorial Record of Alabama, (Madison, Wisconsin, Brant & Fuller, 1893), Vol.1, 303; 
Interview with Mr. Ed Leigh McMillan and John Kent, a local resident Nov. 16, 1949, in Massey, A 
History of the Lumber Industry, (1960). 
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in the lumber industry, Jackson expanded his business in the late 19th century and grew 
as powerful and reputable as many of his northern counterparts.128 
 As an owner and entrepreneur, Jackson primarily viewed southern forests as 
commodities in the abstract. He contended with the scale and scope of southern forests 
through expansion, consolidation, and employment of foreign contract labor. In 1870, 
the Jackson flooring mill in Baltimore was the leading business in the city—and a 
Washington, D.C. factory made flooring and cabinets for the emerging middle-class 
housing boom of the early 20th century. In 1874, Jackson bought timber in Nansemond 
County, Virginia and built the first railroad in the South used exclusively for lumbering 
purposes. Jackson purchased additional timber in Suffolk County Virginia, as well as 
Gates County, North Carolina, near the Chowan River. In 1886, Jackson grew 
interested in Alabama’s Long Leaf Pine forests, “backing his faith by extensive 
purchases.” With help from investors in Pennsylvania, he began buying timberlands in 
Alabama and Florida and later organized the Jackson Lumber Company and the 
company town of Lockhart, Alabama.129 
 In keeping with industrial trends toward consolidation, in 1904 Jackson merged 
his business with E.S. Crossett, C.W. Gates, J.W. Watzek, and W.S. Harlan to create a 
vast southern empire of lumber operations throughout Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Louisiana. Jackson sold these men 150,000 acres of timberland as well as shares in 
Jackson Lumber Company. That year E.S. Crossett of Davenport, Iowa having earned 
                                                        
128 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129 Northeastern trade in wood flooring drove human interest in converting naturally grown timber of 
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his wealth in the Wisconsin timbering industry, founded Fordyce Lumber Company in 
Fordyce Arkansas. By sharing management and profits with mid-western lumbermen, 
Jackson proved himself a major contender in the industry, establishing a powerful 
reputation and securing national investment partnerships that spread management 
responsibilities across the entire southern yellow pine region. Lumber industry media 
characterized Crossett and Jackson as “practically the same management” overseeing 
operations in several large lumber tracts throughout the South. In 1904, the lumber 
industry journal American Lumbermen described Jackson and Crossett as part of “The 
Sextet” of the biggest sawmill owners in America. 130    
 Lumbermen such as Jackson utilized a common, though complex, language in 
their description of timber operations when they employed the popular Gilded Age 
environmental idiom of man over nature. They portrayed the Lockhart operation as the 
height of technological advancement and civilization brought to the underdeveloped 
spaces of the southern forests. Industry media touted the scope and sophistication of the 
Lockhart operation, its modern machinery, mass production and mechanization of labor 
as signs of progress converting the unused wilderness into a space of economic 
opportunity, social advancement, and production of domestic consumer goods. American 
Lumberman reported: “Lockhart is as a sawmill town should be—in the woods—but it is 
in the very center of civilization.” The modern technology that Jackson transported to 
Lockhart made the forest a truly rural-industrial space where both technological  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advancement and wilderness came together in the name of human progress. Industry 
journalists wrote that the Lockhart plant consisted of “two [saw] bands and a 48 inch 
gang [saw], with a capacity of 250,000 feet in a 22 hour run and will later be increased 
in size to have approximately that capacity in an 11 hour run.” The plant also had a 
planning mill equal in capacity to the saw mill, and brick dry kilns with capacity of 
160,000 feet per day powered by brick-housed boiler plant of 72 inch by 18 foot boilers, 
“8 of these will be required for saw mill and dry kilns and 2 more for planning mill,” 
they reported. For lumbermen, technology represented the cornerstone of new 
possibilities in industrial production.131  
 The process of envisioning, managing and producing the material of southern 
forests into commodities for the industrial market largely defined lumbermen’s 
relationship to southern forest labor spaces. The American Lumberman journal sold the 
advanced character of Lockhart’s business and industrial operation to men of the 
business and management class who either sought to invest in or find employment with 
the Jackson Lumber Company. The journal reported the Lockhart operation produced 
“great quantities of comb-grained yellow pine flooring for shipment to fastidious New 
England. This product pleases the easterners so thoroughly well that they have not yet 
been able to get enough of it.”  The language of consumption expressed the forest 
industry’s interest in portraying itself as adding economic fuel to a growing bull market, 
while cloaking the harsher reality of the labor involved in harvesting timber. For 
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technology and consumer demand alone do not turn forests into the products of 
fashionable domestic spaces.132  
 The industry media’s emphasis on capacity and production employed deceptively 
systematic and sanitized language that promoted notions of progress for the south 
contrasted with the truly barbaric conditions of forest industry labor. The isolation and 
danger of forest industry labor made it unattractive to men with families or those who 
had any alternative means of earning money. Forest industry required the difficult work 
of railroad construction. Southern railroad expansion in the 1870s increased demand for 
axmen to cut railroad ties as each mile of track required 3,000 ties and an additional 200 
replacement ties per mile each year. At the time most forest labor consisted of local 
part-time farmers who engaged in seasonal work on the railroads. Southern farmers 
sought to avoid long term work cutting trees and laying track primarily due to the 
brutal character of the labor. Some locals participated in timbering and eventually took 
work in sawmill camps to supplement their meager farming income. But most local 
white farmers would not do such difficult work on a permanent basis.133  
 The difficulty of felling enormous trees and moving the heavy fresh timber made 
forest industrial labor exceedingly dangerous. Woodsmen reported that: “even the most 
expert crews were not always certain of the direction a tree would fall.” When trees 
crashed to the ground, limbs broke off and hurtled through the air in random and 
unpredictable directions. Mark King, a woodsman working in the early 1900s, recalled 
that “On one occasion, a limb about the thickness of a mans arm hit the head of one of  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the cutters so hard that it killed him instantly and left a depression in his skull several 
inches deep.” The horrendous character of forest industry labor, and locals’ preference 
for avoiding long-term employment under those conditions, represented a perennial 
challenge to lumbermen.134  
 The shortage of available labor led lumbermen to seek alternative labor sources 
for their industrial timbering operations. By the 1890s, rural industry overcame labor 
shortages by recruiting and contracting immigrant laborers. This system of “foreign 
contract labor” included tapping into foreign immigrant labor pools with the help of 
labor agents, known as Padrones, in northern and eastern cities who targeted foreign 
immigrants for positions working in the southern forests. By 1906, the Jackson Lumber 
Company employed labor agents, Sigmund S. Schwartz, Smith & Company, and Frank 
& Miller Company, to recruit immigrant workers for southern forest industry jobs. The 
Jackson Company offered labor agents cash fees of $3.00 for each man they sent south. 
Like those who found themselves ensnared by Frank Sabia, foreign immigrant workers 
knew little of the dangers of the forest industry, and their marginal social status made 
them susceptible to manipulative labor agents involved in peonage labor networks. The 
Jackson Lumber Co. relied heavily on foreign contract labor and concealed its abusive 
labor practices in the dense forests outside the reach of federal regulation.135  
 Social justice progressive reformers such as Mary Grace Quackenbos discovered 
immigrant families who reported their loved ones who left for southern jobs and had 
lost contact or disappeared. Quackenbos, the granddaughter of wealthy abolitionists,  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established herself as an attorney and set out as a pioneering investigator and 
prosecutor of labor abuses involving immigrants in Manhattan’s lower east side. In 
1905 she founded the “People’s Law Firm” to further the work of New York’s Legal Aid 
Society among workers and the poor. Through mostly immigrant women who reported 
their sons and husbands missing, Quackenbos discovered a slew of peonage labor camps 
in Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi. After approaching the Department of 
Justice with her findings, the Assistant Attorney General, Charles Wells Russell, hired 
Quackenbos to join the DOJ as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, the first woman ever 
to do so.136 
 By 1906 Federal investigators began investigating peonage labor abuses in 
southern rural industrial labor camps in an attempt to prosecute both labor agents who 
misrepresented wages and provisions, and corporate management who subjected 
workers to debt peonage and physical violence inside the forests. Simultaneously 
muckraker journalists began to condemn the lumber industry for its wasteful practices, 
exploitation of workers, and rampant laissez-faire capitalism. Alexander Irvine, a writer 
for Appleton’s Magazine, who worked undercover in 1906 to expose abuse at the Jackson 
Lumber Company, wrote that Lockhart is “a town where men were parts of machine—a 
machine to grind out profits for men who never saw the place, who never sensed its dull 
brutal life.”137     
 Like those who sought jobs in the Florida Keys, workers suffering from high 
unemployment and difficult labor conditions in northern urban cities sought 
opportunity in southern forest industry jobs. Men reported leaving industrial labor in  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New York that required long hours in uncomfortable physical conditions. George 
Flemming, an American, worked at the Crown Extract Co. in New York stated: “I left 
because I couldn’t stand the heat of the boilers.” Workers seeking employment accepted 
labor agents’ promise of “good jobs” in the South, assuming that better opportunities 
awaited them in the southern forests. Felix Pouleski worked for the American Sugar 
Refining Co. in New York and claimed he responded to Schwartz’ ad in the paper 
because “I wanted to go to [the] country.” Joseph Lyons accepted a job in Georgia 
because “I thought I could save money and make a man out of myself.”  Initially, 
workers struggling against high unemployment and difficult labor conditions in 
northern cities envisioned the rural landscapes of the southern forests as spaces of 
comfort and self-improvement.138 
 Whether working for Sabia, Schwartz, or Smith and Co., labor agents 
consistently used idealized descriptions of the southern workspaces to embolden 
workers to sign up for jobs in southern forests. Recruiters lured workers with stories of 
easy labor in comfortable climates, often recruiting men who did not want to work in 
the poor conditions of urban industrial jobs. Patrick Creaven, a worker from New York, 
met a man who told him that he had heard of jobs offered by one S. Schwartz at First 
Street who promised good work at $1.50 per day. According to Creaven, Schwartz “told 
us good stories about work in the South.” Schwartz’s recruiter lured workers by 
describing the South as “nice country and easy work.” He told the men of a pencil 
factory in Georgia where they would work. Max Cantor signed up with Schwartz on 
July 4, 1906, and reported that he went south with 34 other men. Another New York 
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recruiter, the Frank & Miller agency, promised workers skilled labor positions. Frank 
and Miller promised Rudolph Lanniger a “good job” and they hired Manuel Jordomons, 
a Bulgarian mason, to do skilled work in Georgia.139    
  In sworn affidavits taken in 1906 workers directly linked the labor agents in 
New York to the Jackson Lumber Company. Jacob Ormanskey testified that Smith and 
Company was “An agent of the saw mill company…at Lockhart, Alabama.” Ormanskey 
reported the company “brought us by steamer from New York to Savannah, where 
another agent of the company, a negro, met us and took us by train to Milner, Alabama. 
From there this negro, who was a foreman for Smith & Company, took us by wagon to 
Lockhart, about twenty miles from Milner.” Frank & Miller shipped Rudolph Lanniger 
south to Savannah via steamship, then by rail to Lockhart in July 1906. Ormanskey and 
other workers reported that the foremen who escorted them from Savannah to 
Lockhart, many of whom were black, carried rifles, coerced workers, and deterred 
escape attempts.140 
 Once inside the Jackson Company forests workers found themselves trapped 
inside isolated railroad construction and timbering sites subject to horrendous labor 
regimes. Though labor agents portrayed southern forests as serene and idyllic, the 
actual physical conditions in the forest industry labor camps were extremely harsh. The 
combination of intense heat, lack of amenities, and heavy timber made working in the 
forests a harrowing job. Average temperatures for July-August in the Alabama forest 
reached over ninety degrees Fahrenheit and humidity levels consistently topped ninety 
percent. Workers consistently referred to working in what they called “the burning  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sun.” Direct, prolonged sun exposure caused serious physical injury to workers 
unaccustomed to and unprotected from such powerful heat. Alexander Irvine noted that 
after working in the hot sun for several days, Herman Ormanskey gained the sympathy 
of even some bosses because “the skin had peeled off his arms.”141  
 In addition to the heat, workers immediately noted the isolation of the camps as 
a threat to their safety. The forest lumber camps lay miles away from the town of 
Lockhart. Workers characterized the landscape of the forest labor camps as isolated and 
having poor visibility. They recognized their increased vulnerability when working in 
the forests far away from towns, transportation, or government, and they expressed 
their sense of danger in their descriptions of the forest labor camps. Louis Krieger 
specifically noted the lack of transportation or infrastructure in the forest labor camps 
when he explained how he was taken to “the woods where there was no train station.” 
Mike Trudics explained that as the foremen took him to the pine drift seven miles into 
the forest “a sort of dread seized me…I was filled with suspicion.” What workers called 
“Gallagher’s camp” lay eight miles from the sawmill at Lockhart, and Irvine wrote that 
“A thick gray mist lay low in the valley in the early part of morning.”142  
 The men who entered the southern forest labor camps viewed them as a 
wilderness and they expressed their concern in stark terms. Workers’ described the 
Jackson Company forests as “hell.” Their isolation, heat, humidity along with the armed 
labor bosses rendered them powerless in the face of terrible odds. Mike Trudics 
explained to Alexander Irvine: “So here we were, out in a wild place, helpless and at the 
mercy of men who laughed at contracts and out of whose hip pockets bulged revolvers.”  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In the forest workers opportunities seemed to disappear, replaced only by the miserable 
climate, terrifying landscapes, and violent labor regimes. Bosses tortured them, bound 
and punished them when they resisted. The isolated woods impeded their ability to 
obtain help from family and friends. Foremen forced Harry Korsinsky at gunpoint to do 
what he called “pick and shovel” work in the extreme heat, neither of which he was 
accustomed to. After only a few hours of such horrendous labor, most men felt they 
might not survive the Jackson Company’s forests.143 
 Workers confronted not only terrible environmental conditions inside the 
Jackson Company forests, but also barbaric labor regimes enforced by foremen or 
“woods bosses.” Louis Kriger landed at Brunswick Georgia where black guards, armed 
with shotguns and pistols, escorted him into the woods. He saw three or four Irishmen 
run from the forest labor camp, and the boss chased them down, whipped them, and 
brought them back with “their hands tied behind their backs.” The sight of men, hands 
bound and coerced at gunpoint, convinced newly arriving workers they had entered a 
dangerous environment even before they met the violence themselves. Joseph Neil also 
worked at Brunswick, Georgia; he saw a foreman strike a boy named Joe in the face with 
a shovel. “I saw his mouth bleeding. He had gone to the woods and the boss went after 
him.” Workers learned quickly that violence characterized Jackson’s forest industry 
labor camps.144 
 The informal title “woods boss” intimated what workers expressed—that inside 
the forest labor camps, human foremen became part of the harsh physical environments 
enforcing a vicious law of predator and prey. Workers described foremen’s brutality as  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an additional hardship that made forest industry labor unbearable. The expose 
journalist and Jackson Company laborer, Alexander Irvine, depicted the foremen as 
“ignorant, illiterate men” who “only know the law of the jungle.” To workers, bosses 
represented the primary threat to their health and freedom. In describing the 
appearance and behavior of S.E. Huggins, a boss at Lockhart, Irvine portrayed him as 
embodying the harsh forest landscape. Irvine stated: “Huggins is a typical frontiersman. 
He was probably born among the pines and inherited the knots. His face has the 
appearance of a turpentine tree newly chipped. It bears the marks of the shack.” Irvine 
described Huggins as tall, heavy built: “He shambles—usually with a cloud on his face 
and a chip on his shoulder. He understands the wild. He belongs there, and men who 
cannot easily adjust themselves to the life find little mercy or consideration at his 
hands.”145 
 Robert Gallagher, another of the foremen in the Jackson Company camps, called 
by workers “the bull of the woods,” routinely used debt peonage and physical brutality 
to extract labor from workers and timber from the forest. Irvine described Gallagher as 
an Irishman being only “a generation or two removed from the sod.” He had a talent for 
profanity, and was a “genius” as a labor driver. Gallagher used transportation charges as 
leverage to keep workers in the camps and regularly abused his workers when they 
defied his orders.  He tied Manuel Jordomons, Harry Lyman, and John Cox to trees and 
pistol-whipped them for faltering under the arduous labor of cutting trees for railroad 
ties. Workers reported he regularly fired his pistol within inches of their face, neck, and 
chest to terrify them. The men in the Jackson camp said that Gallagher took a certain 
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sadistic pleasure in abusing one young man especially. Gallagher reportedly beat the 
endearingly nicknamed Herman ‘Square-head’ Orminsky “on a daily basis.”146  
 Food became a crucial factor in workers’ experience inside forest labor camps. 
Many went without food on their long journey to the South and they hoped to find 
sustenance once they arrived at the job site. Upon entering the camps workers 
immediately noticed the lack of provisions, citing them as one major reason the forests 
were not fit for working men. George Flemming described the food as “awful.” Camp 
cooks served workers moldy bread and “tripe” meat. At one meal, bosses gave Max 
Canter and men in his camp 20 biscuits for 38 men: “not enough to go around,” they 
told investigators. The fare was certainly not sufficient caloric intake for men carrying 
out such extreme labor. Patrick Creaven reported: “The fare was not fit for a 
workingman.” The shortage of adequate food and shelter made the already difficult 
physical environment even more of a burden as the camps offered little respite for 
workers. 147 
 A lack of permanent structures revealed the inherently temporary nature of 
forest industry labor spaces. As camps moved deeper into the woods, the men lived 
further from permanent housing or stores. They described the poor sleeping conditions 
as a significant hardship and linked inadequate housing to their inhumane treatment. 
Bennie Garubert, sent to a railroad camp in Georgia, found no quarters: “We had no 
place to sleep at all, no houses, no cars…we slept in the woods.” Harry Korshinsky 
found no place “fit to sleep in after twelve hours of work each day.” Jackson’s labor 
agents transported Max Cantor and a party of thirty-four men deep into a forest, two  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miles from the town of Fitzgerald, Georgia. Cantor reported there was “no place to 
sleep, a few broken up houses with floors all broken up, no beds, no mattresses, or even 
straw.” Some men reported being provided tents to sleep in. Men were put in 8’x12’ 
tents, eight men to a tent. Some men slept on what they called “sodden bedding,” 
literally using the forest debris to cushion them from the hard ground. Though the 
records indicate that the company bosses left many workers exposed to the elements, 
the company provided some men minimal shelter in the Jackson lumber camps. 148 
 The forest industry camps’ only real buildings were cramped train cars used to 
house crowds of men. The isolation and tight quarters of the boxcars stood in stark 
contrast to the image of expansive southern forests. At the Lockhart camp, box cars 
fitted with “rude bunks” called “shaking jacobs,” accommodated between twenty and 
forty-eight men. Irvine described the “small [12’x 9’] space in center which serves as a 
lavatory…barbershop and sitting room…[with] a wash basin that 11 men share.” 
These small crowded spaces contributed to the spread of disease. Irvine wrote simply: 
“In the box car, chaos, junk, effluvia!” Poor living conditions represented more than a 
mere discomfort for workers; they served as a principal site for the spread of typhoid, 
posing a significant risk to workers’ health, and causing the death of at least two men in 
the summer of 1906.149 
 The distant forest labor camps rarely had sanitary water supplies. Irvine noted 
that one mile from the Lockhart camp lay a “shallow ditch” that held the only available 
water supply for the camp. The men dug two wells, both of which produced “almost no 
water.” Workers used what little time off they had to bathe and launder their clothes.  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Yet even during their free time, workers’ reports reveal the unhealthy conditions they 
lived and labored in. On a Sunday, Irvine attended what he called a “washing party” at a 
small trench roughly twelve inches deep, worming its way sluggishly through the 
woods, where the men attempted to wash clothes but mostly got drunk on whiskey and 
sang songs. The lack of sufficient food and sanitary water led to the spread of disease, 
causing great suffering in the camp.150  
 The Jackson Company employed a physician named Dr. Trammel who attended 
to some of the men. The company charged each man $1.10 per month for insurance and 
medical care, offsetting their pay, and forcing them further into debt. The company used 
this debt as leverage to keep workers against their will. Trammel said many men in the 
camp were treated for typhoid and other intestinal diseases. He explained: “Typhoid 
fever is caused by a germ…but its origin is difficult to trace.” Irvine wrote that such 
diseases obviously came from the “foul, stagnant, swamp, which is the only water 
supply. I saw with my own eyes the excrement of both men and beasts dissolving in the 
ditch from which we got our drinking water.” Workers sometimes filtered or boiled the 
water before drinking it, but in the summer of 1906, twenty-six men fell ill with fever 
and two died. One man, Joe Hooley, lay dying in the boxcar for several days.151  
 Though the sawmill at Lockhart was a rather technologically sophisticated 
operation for its time, labor in the forest camps was dull, crude, backbreaking work, 
worsened by the brutality of the woods bosses. The cutting, hauling, and loading of 
trees to the mill required men and horses to confront the dangers of heavy, freshly cut 
timber, flying splintered branches, and buzzing saws. Men and horses worked within 
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“teams” in particular positions. The work of timbering required ‘sawyers’ who cut down 
pines, ‘swampers’ who trimmed the trees, and ‘skidders’ who used horses to pull or 
“snake” trees into position. The ‘chainer’ bound logs on the ‘cross-hauler’ with a team of 
both men and oxen or horses that loaded them onto rail cars for transportation to the 
saw mill. The process required extreme physical exertion, concentration and quick 
reflexes. Small mistakes caused serious injury.152 
 The work lasted from six a.m. until dark. Foremen punished men who could not 
perform to their expectations. Jacob Ormanskey reported being marched to work in the 
morning and put to “cutting trees.” Black armed guards watched over each squad of 
workers. “When we were not able to do the work the negro whipped us. He whipped me 
several times on my head, eyes, and back until I bled.” Bosses forced Edward J. Stone, or 
“Stoney” as his fellow workers called him, to carry 200 lb. railroad ties at gunpoint. 
Much of the work in the camps required men to perform tasks beyond their physical 
abilities. An unnamed man reportedly suffered physical injuries carrying ties, the heavy, 
coarse timber tore the skin from his shoulders exposing the flesh and bone beneath. The 
difficulty of the work regime led to worker resistance inside the Jackson Company 
forests.153  
 Both lumber industry leaders and journalist Alexander Irvine noted worker’s 
unpreparedness for the arduous labor required in timbering operations and the violence 
foremen used to coerce labor out of the men. Irvine wrote: “A man who sells shoelaces 
on the bowery is not easily transformed into a lumber jack. Attempts to affect such a 
transformation brought into play the cowhide and the bloodhound.” But workers took  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any opportunity to escape from the camps, fleeing into the forests in hope of making it 
to a nearby town or train station. One worker, Mike Trudics, testified: “Hardly a day 
passed…without some one being run down by the bosses or the bloodhounds and 
returned and whipped.” Thus not unlike the county farms and state penitentiaries across 
the South that utilized the convict lease system, the Jackson Lumber Company used 
coercive labor regimes to maintain labor in the forest industry labor camps. 154 
 Gallagher and other foremen experienced great difficulty in monitoring and 
retaining labor in the dense forests. Bosses often had to chase down, capture, and return 
men to work in the camps. This violent pattern of escape, capture, punishment and 
return came to characterize relations between workers and foremen in the Jackson 
Company forests. Jacob Ormansky reported that over each team was a “negro 
guard…with a pistol and a strap.” One John Dubrin tried to get away and they caught 
him and locked him in “a dark cellar” in the ground for three days, literally using the 
land to retain and punish him. Ormansky reported seeing several men tied to trees and 
whipped for trying to get away. Michael Trudic, arrived in Lockhart on July 18th, and 
attempted to escape on the very next day. He “hid in the woods” but Gallagher 
eventually caught and “horse-whipped” him. Trudics explained: “In the woods they can 
do anything they want to and no one can see them but God.”155 
 The men continually resisted Gallagher’s brutality, forcing him to contend with 
their repeated defiance and attempted escapes from the camps. Workers often utilized 
the visual cover provided by the dense forest to resist the labor demands of bosses. 
Gallagher employed men, horses, and bloodhounds along with the isolation of the  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environment to contain and coerce workers. Camp foremen caught Arthur Buckley, a 
boy under the age of twenty, resting in the forest and had him flogged thirty times. 
Max Cantor testified Gallagher used “negroes on handcars” and dogs to catch four 
“Jews” who escaped into the woods. A worker only fifteen years of age escaped into the 
woods and the bosses captured him and beat him severely. Gallagher did not always 
catch escaped workers. Louis Kriger ran away into the forest with seven other boys, and 
immediately after leaving they came across another group who joined them. Emerging 
from the forest they came upon a bridge where they saw the foreman and a policeman 
standing, so they escaped the opposite direction into the woods. The woods functioned 
as difficult spaces in which to monitor and control workers, and provided a significant 
obstacle to bosses’ attempts to retain labor.156  
 The forests were also fluid spaces where men consistently found opportunities to 
defy bosses. The forest provided cover under which some men absconded from the 
camps. Foremen struggled against the limited visibility in the pine drifts as they 
searched the mazes of trees for escaped workers. Max Cantor escaped to the woods with 
a group of men, and, avoiding the road, found a section of peach trees. They ate peaches 
off the ground until they reached a distant town. Jacob Ormanskey reported “while one 
of the guards was asleep I sneaked off and struck a freight train and came to Atlanta.” 
Charles Maskowitz, alias Bennie Garubert, worked only three days before the lack of 
sleeping quarters, poor food, and horrendous labor drove him to escape. On July 8, 
1906, after hearing “some Irish men had run away before we came…about twelve of us 
ran away too.” Garubert and the others used the forest to hide and managed to elude 
foremen and their bloodhounds. “On the bridge we saw two carriages with sheriffs and  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bloodhounds. There were nine of us and we laid flat in the grass…for two hours.” 
Eventually the men escaped through the swamps.157 
 Workers who could not physically escape dealt with the hardships of their 
condition through the main temporary relief available inside the camps: whiskey. 
Drinking dulled the pain of sore muscles and torn skin as well as the anxiety of living 
under such violent coercion. The company provided liquor to the men for a price and 
workers’ drinking debts contributed to the system of peonage. Irvine noted upon 
entering the camps that the foremen sent him to replace the team driver who was “on a 
drunk.” Irvine wrote that: “All the negroes and most of the whites borrow money every 
Saturday night,” and some men walked through the woods to company saloons in 
Lockhart or Florala. Bob Anderson, a “colored…teamster…gets drunk twice a month, 
often is locked up in jail, and Gallagher pays his fine,” Irvine wrote. Florala was a 
“license town” where the men exchanged their hard earned money for “liquor and 
lewdness.” On his return from the bars to camp one night, Irvine got lost in the 
darkness of the forest. When he finally made it back to the camp, inside the boxcar he 
found that several men were in a state he described as “helplessly drunk.” Irvine wrote 
that the sleeping car “had the tang and odor of a stable.” Irvine underscored the 
intemperance of the forest labor camps, showing how alcohol functioned as a health risk, 
a symptom of social disorder, and a device the company used to indebt workers.158 
 In describing the forest labor camps workers and federal investigators argued 
the forest industry camps reduced workers to chattel. Workers viewed the camps as 
places unfit for men where the company housed them in corals, fed them poor food, tied 
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them to trees, and lashed them with horsewhips. John Gindes, testified that “the work at 
the camp was very hard and we were treated like cattle.” Jacob Ormansky asserted: 
“The workmen were not treated like men, but like dogs.” But workers also lived with 
animals in the camps. Both dogs and livestock performed crucial roles in industrial 
forest labor and men worked along side animals, named them, and mourned their 
deaths. These fluid social and environmental relationships underscored how the forest 
labor camps operated as dynamic spaces where industrial exploitation and company 
bosses reduced men to chattel, and yet where men often identified with, and even 
empathized with, their fellow animal laborers.159  
 Animals suffered the difficult labor and injuries associated with forest industry 
labor just as the men did. Camp bosses and employees used bloodhounds and other dogs 
for both security and companionship in the Lockhart camp. Bloodhounds as a breed had 
a long history in the South tracking escaped slaves, convict laborers, and peons. In the 
southern forests, hound dogs suffered similarly to workers and endured both the heat 
and dangerous labor. The Florala News, giving voice to the public concern regarding an 
influx of foreigners and vagabond workers into the area, reported: “The Company keeps 
trained dogs to run down such fellows as jump contracts and violate the laws.” The 
presence of dogs as security for the camp reassured locals. Southerners felt confident in 
dogs’ ability to track down and help bosses capture escaped workers whom the local 
community feared as both foreigners and vagrants. Dogs thus occupied a multiplicity of 
positions as trusted allies of bosses, a security force for locals, companions to workers, 
and camp laborers themselves.160  
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 Gallagher kept a kennel of bloodhounds that he used to catch escaped workers. 
Black guards handled the dogs skillfully and worked and communicated with dogs to 
track escaped workers. Gallagher also used black workers to test the dogs. He ordered 
one unsuspecting black man into the woods on an errand, and then sent the hounds 
after him. Mrs. Bellinger, the wife of foremen Archie Bellinger, noted the dogs’ 
proficiency stating: “They treed the nigger alright.” Men also kept dogs for companions 
in the camp. Irvine noted that the cook, Hughie, had a “slew of pups” for pets. Dogs also 
suffered the difficult physical environment and excessive labor of the camps. Bloohounds 
have thick coats and struggle in hot weather, easily overheating or even dying while in 
pursuit of escaped workers. Bloodhounds characteristically suffered from eye and skin 
infections if not properly cared for, and occasionally incurred injuries from heavy 
equipment. Irvine noted that one “ol’ pup,” named Nellie, was “cut in twain” by a 
logging train car in the camp. Workers publicly mourned Nellie’s death, revealing the 
emotional attachment men felt for their animal companions acknowledging the 
awkward similitude men and animals occupied in the forest.161 
 The Jackson lumber operation drastically altered the forest landscapes from 
mixed-use spaces for locals and their animals to a clear-cut wasteland. As forests used 
for grazing turned into spaces for timbering almost overnight, newly built, fast moving 
log trains killed or injured cattle that roamed the forests and occasionally wandered 
onto the tracks. Horses pulled logs from the pine drifts to the train cars day after day in 
the heat and humidity, and suffered mortal injuries as a result. Thus animals served dual 
roles inside the forest labor camps as both extensions of the camp bosses and workers  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who suffered alongside men. Irvine had a unique opportunity to see the dual role of 
animals as workers and companions in the camps, and he made a conscious choice to 
write about animals in order to express both the brutality and camaraderie workers 
experienced. Irvine wrote of a “tall, powerful, steel-grey four year old horse named 
Steel” and an older horse named “Larry” who worked in the camp. He described a man 
named Ollie, “the biggest man in the camp,” who cared for Larry and Steel. “Steel 
seemed to understand Larry and Ollie understood them both…[he] treated them kindly 
and they haul more lumber than any other team in camp.” Irvine’s story of these 
majestic horses did not end with his description of their mutual affection for Ollie, or 
their success as a team. Irvine told Larry’s story as an allegory to appeal to readers’ 
sympathy toward animals and to portray both the inhumanity of the bosses and the 
resilience of men and chattel who driven beyond their abilities, nevertheless continued 
to work together.162 
 Irvine wrote that Larry was a “very powerful horse…but for some years he has 
been mentally unbalanced.” Larry came from Michigan and reportedly worked under 
“many drivers of many nations” who “treated him with varying degrees of 
consideration.” On a bet, one teamster argued that he could set a record for logs pulled 
in a day—and using Larry to carry out the task, he left the creature “stupid.” The “horse 
doctors said his mind was blank,” Irvine wrote. “He was so stupid that they could not 
work him.” Frustrated with Larry’s incompetence, Gallagher’s assistant led the horse 
into the woods—not unlike the men—and beat him over the head and left him bleeding 
for dead. However, Larry eventually regained consciousness and somehow returned to 
camp. Irvine’s story about Larry anthropomorphized the horse by portraying him as a  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laborer who experienced exactly what many men faced in the camps. Irvine’s allegory 
revealed the men’s identification with the animals they worked alongside, an experience 
many workers felt keenly in the camps, along with their dread of human violence and 
their hope to survive that cruelty themselves.163   
 The diversity of worker’s ethnic and national background, combined with 
southern foremen, and local black labor, made the camps dynamic sites of racial and 
ethnic relations. Labor agents targeted immigrant workers for labor in the South not 
only because of their ignorance of the actual conditions there, but also because their 
immigrant status reduced their ability to find alternate employment or to legally 
challenge poor treatment. Newly arrived southern and eastern European immigrants 
found fewer employment options in the vast labor pools of the urban North and thus 
sought opportunity in southern forest industry jobs. Workers often traveled to, worked 
in, and ran off from the camps in ethnically homogenous groups, and their reports 
reveal their hyper-awareness of ethnic difference inside the camps. Foremen’s violence 
gave expression to Gilded Age class hierarchies and racial ideologies of white 
supremacy, which held that immigrants and blacks occupied inferior social categories.164 
 Signifying the Victorian obsession with ethnic difference, nearly all the 
Department of Justice affidavits begin by designating the ethnic or national origins of  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the witness testifying. Eugene P. Newlander, “a Hungarian,” worked for the Jackson 
Lumber Company as a labor agent. John Filzalovski, a fifteen year old “Slavish boy” 
testified to his labor in Fulton County Georgia in August of 1906, and Jacob Ormansky 
reported: “I left New York five weeks ago in company with about sixty men, fifteen of 
whom were Russian Jews, like myself.” Investigators noted Louis Kriger was “a recent 
immigrant from Wilkomir, Russia.” Kriger stated that “three or four Irishman” ran 
away from the camp upon his arrival, revealing that in the camps where men did not 
know one another, physical appearances and language differences often served as key 
indicators of their identity.165 
 Workers included the varying ethnicities among the camps’ many disconcerting 
qualities. Though they all shared a similar condition as peonage laborers, they 
expressed distaste for one another. A young Irish boy named McGuinnis refused to 
sleep in a train car with Greek workers, and for this transgression Gallagher, also of 
Irish descent, apparently pistol-whipped him into submission. Irvine described the 
camps as both ethnically mixed and segregated, attributing the separations to both 
worker choice and southern custom. He noted that southern workers called the 
foreigners “dagos” and “sheenies.” Men called one camp “the dago camp” for its large 
Italian element. Irvine described his team as “a strange mixture—a Dane, a Virginia 
‘cracker,’ a Michigan lumber jack, two Negroes, and an Irish man.” He pointed out the 
distinction between the “White car” and the “Negroe sleeping car.” He described the 
town of Lockhart as being “divided racially by a grove of pine trees” and having both 
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white and black schools and churches. Even within ethnic groups, violence existed based 
upon the hierarchies of status that the forest industry camps relied upon.166  
 Though the term ‘boss’ links the social hierarchy of the peonage labor camps to 
the southern legacy of slavery, African-American workers occupied positions both as 
peons and as guards within the camps, representing the often incongruous racial 
relationships that characterized peonage labor regimes. The forced integration of men 
in the forests and the use of black men as guards contradicted the distinctly segregated 
character of most New South workspaces. The forest industry labor camps offered 
opportunities for black laborers that local whites preferred not to fill. This allowed 
blacks to obtain positions of authority within the camps. Bosses often employed African-
American men to guard and hunt down escaped immigrant workers. The presence of 
armed black guards made the camps particularly unfamiliar and frightening to 
immigrant workers.167 
 The southern custom of de jure racial segregation drew Irvine’s attention almost 
immediately upon his entering the camp. But once in the pine drifts, nearly eight miles 
from the company town, he met and worked alongside African Americans such as Bob 
Anderson, a black teamster. Though workers of varying ethnicities lived and labored 
alongside one another and some black guards assumed positions of power over white 
workers, the woods bosses acted out commonly recognized patterns of racial violence in 
the camps. Irvine reported Gallagher caught two black workers fighting and egged 
them on. He gave them metal pipes and coerced them at gunpoint to fight on. Gallagher 
extended his brutality toward all laborers regardless of race, but in this case he 
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instigated a particularly violent form of ‘entertainment’ that revealed both the common 
southern racial ideology of black inferiority and his personal sadistic temperament.168 
 Like the European immigrant workers, Irvine described the camps in terms of 
commonly held white racial ideologies that associated blacks with both vice and social 
disorder. Irvine wrote: “The Negroe car held fifty men, ½ dozen playing cards” and a 
“group of singers around a banjo.” Irvine linked their gambling to their singing noting 
“The financial losses of the singers added color to the words of the song.” Blues music 
dealt with hard labor and lack of opportunity experienced by southern working class 
folks. Yet in his attempts to express sympathy for black workers, Irvine reinforced 
racial ideologies of blacks as especially emotive. Even as Irvine attempted to expose 
black workers’ exploitation and whites’ sense of racial superiority, he expressed the 
awkward discrimination perhaps acceptable to his Progressive northern white audience, 
which identified blacks as victimized laborers and symbols of social disorder. He offered 
a critique of white workers who talked of “nigger’s inferiority” explaining “…but 
Negroes did the best work in camp.” Yet Irvine identified black workers as 
unsophisticated and crude, indicating that the particularly “smutty stories” white 
workers told “would make [even] a Negro blush.” Black workers’ role in the camps 
underscored their unique position in the modern south: they were crucial to rural 
industries new labor regimes, but many whites viewed of them as dangerous threats to 
the social order.169 
 Mary Grace Quackenbos and Alexander Irvine viewed the southern forests as 
violent spaces, where innocent workers met the abuses of the forest industrial labor  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system. Exposing the abuses of the company and proving that foremen held workers 
against their will required reformers to physically visit the camps themselves. In the 
summer of 1906, male investigators ventured into the southern forests disguised as 
workers in order to interview the men. Quackenbos prosecuted the foremen in court, 
clashing with the local lumber industry in an intellectual contest that reached the 
highest levels of the U.S. government, including Presidents Roosevelt and Taft. The 
investigations and trials place the southern forest industry squarely within the national 
Progressive movement for workers rights.170  
 The earliest federal investigators to visit the southern work camps in northern 
Florida faced swarms of mosquitoes, traversed swamps up to their chests, and found the 
forests were “infested with wild animals of all kinds, snakes, alligators, and other 
reptiles.” Investigators asserted that the physical environment of the southern forest 
industry labor camps contained significant dangers to workers’ health and provided 
obstacles preventing their escape. They wrote that the men “are through the natural 
circumstances and conditions held in abject slavery.” They rejected foremen’s claims 
that they carried shotguns to defend against the “wild panthers,” rather than to coerce 
the laborers. Quackenbos wrote that the “cruelties practiced” in the camps in Florida 
and Alabama were “not easy to get at...unless detectives could spend many weeks in 
those camps and subject themselves to the dangers.”171     
 Quakenbos and federal agents noted the difficulty of exposing peonage in the 
South, both because of the remoteness of the camps and the hazardous environment, but 
also the seeming conspiracy between business and law enforcement. Several workers  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who complained disappeared before they could testify in court. In reference to the 
earlier Clyatt case of 1902, where bosses were convicted for capturing escaped black 
workers and returning them to labor in the Florida forest industry camps, Alexander 
Irvine wrote that federal officials reported “The two Negroes [witnesses] disappeared 
suddenly and forever! They vanished as if the earth had opened and swallowed them.” 
Workers reported that C.H. Monecke, deputy Marshall in Florida, worked for the 
Jackson Lumber Company to arrest men who escaped and return them to camp. Florida 
Justice of the Peace, James Johnson, testified that Gallagher used his court as an 
“auxiliary” to the Lockhart labor regime. The mutual agreement between southern 
lumbermen and local law enforcement served as one of the principal factors in the 
broader system of coercive labor regimes.172  
 Will Nanse, an undercover investigator for the Department of Justice, ventured 
into the Jackson camps in July 1906. He wrote to Quackenbos that he “hired on” as a 
worker so that he could talk with the men without drawing the attention of the 
foremen. Nanse witnessed the cycle of escape and capture so central to peonage work 
camps when he reportedly saw “an old man…aged 35 run away at night…Gallagher 
caught him 8 miles from the camp in the woods” and brought him back. Nanse 
interviewed Edward J. “Stonie” Stone, who reported that the foreman, Archie Bellinger, 
took Arthur Buckley, an 18 year-old “American,” and whipped him for fighting with 
another worker named William Hoffman. Federal investigators’ correspondence and 
affidavits provided legal power to workers’ harrowing tales. But translating the harsh 
reality of workers’ experiences into legal proof of wrongdoing on the part of the Jackson 
Lumber Company remained obscured by the rural isolation of the camps and the  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deception of the forest industry and immigration societies who profited from trafficking 
in workers.173  
 Before long Nanse found himself exposed to Gallagher’s violence. Nanse 
witnessed not only the beating of one man for refusing to sleep in the same car with 
Greek workers, he also reported seeing the foreman, Archie Bellinger, return from 
beating a man in the woods. Nanse reported: “He told me that he whipped a boy who 
was quarreling and I had seen him lead the boy off.” Nanse saw Gallagher shoot a black 
worker named John. Nance said John “had been working and had quit,” attempting to 
leave the camp on a logging car. Gallagher threatened John “I’ll whip you” to which 
John replied: “No, you’ll have to kill me, I won’t go to be whipped.” Gallagher agreed, 
stating: “I’ll kill you” and fired his pistol at John three times. John fled through the 
woods, and Gallagher gave chase firing his pistol “at least a dozen times.” Nanse did not 
witness the outcome of the incident and it is unclear whether Gallagher killed John or if 
he escaped. Regardless of the result, the forest concealed the violence that was so 
common in peonage labor camps. Federal investigators such as Nanse enabled some 
workers to testify to their condition, and in the process brought the violent social and 
environmental relationships of the camps out of the depths of the forests and into the 
federal courts.174  
 Quakenbos’ correspondence with local immigration societies, and information 
gleaned from workers’ affidavits, reveal the degree to which employers knowingly 
concealed the poor conditions of the camps within the secluded southern forest 
landscapes. Quackenbos communicated with Gerold Rolfs, the German Consul at  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Pensacola, Florida, who sent Mr. Emile Lesser, the president of The German 
Immigration Society and the United Hebrew Charities, both centered in Birmingham, to 
inquire into reports of workers being retained against their will at Lockhart. Lesser 
visited the Lockhart camp in August of 1906 with the predetermined intent of reporting 
that “no peonage existed there” and found that the foreman, Mr. Harlan, was 
conveniently in St. Louis. He met a Mr. Kennedy and a Mr. Adler in the office. The 
company doctor escorted Lesser to the camp where he said: “I found no peonage.” By 
the time investigators arrived, Gallagher “spirited away” Buckley and Ormanskey to a 
“turpentine camp in the woods…[where] they were kept out of sight.” Nanse reported a 
second case in which Arthur Buckley and a German worker, “Jake” ran away into the 
woods. Huggins pursued them captured, whipped, and returned them to camp. When 
Lesser came from the German Consul, Huggins took Buckley and Jake into the woods 
to hide them from Lesser, and eventually to Pensacola to avoid their being deposed.175  
 Like the southern lumbermen, local southern immigration officials clearly stated 
their own personal interest in maintaining the system of foreign contract labor in the 
forest industries. Lesser stated: “The German Consul at Pensacola Florida asked me to 
make a statement that no Peonage existed in the Lockhart camp of the Jackson Lumber 
Company and I did so.” An attorney reporting on the O’Hara case wrote that 
Commissioner E.O. Locke, the Clerk of the District Court held a preliminary trial and 
on the 11th or 12th of July, retained O’Hara on a charge of peonage. The attorney stated 
that Kirt Sanders, who “through some body’s fault, was given to escape and as I am 
informed, was given a hint by those in charge at Buffalo Bluff to do so…has not since 
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been found, although his part in the peonage seems to have been that of a brutal 
overseer.” Multiple interests colluded to conceal abuses in the dense isolation of the 
southern forests.176  
 Immigrant labor societies stood to benefit from the system of foreign contract 
labor, as it was a profitable business in the South. Lesser acknowledged that Gallagher 
was a “brute” but stated that he personally favored the: “increase of German 
immigration to the South,” as it “was a good cause and that the state should endorse the 
opening of an immigration office abroad to direct European immigrants to the South.” 
Rolfs stated that “any conviction for peonage would materially hurt Southern 
Immigration” by restricting the flow of workers to the forest industry camps. 
Quackenbos wrote that Lesser believed and stated that any letter attesting to peonage 
in Lockhart “would not hurt the company” because U.S. Attorney Mr. Sheppard told 
him they “could not convict the company unless it was proved that the company 
authorized Gallagher’s abuses.”177 
 Lesser’s testimony was crucial to the investigation into the Lockhart operation, 
and it confirmed Quackenbos’ assertion that southern local authorities and rural isolated 
landscapes facilitated employers and foremen’s concealment of labor abuses. Quackenbos 
asked Lesser if he heard the testimony of Mr. Mihaly, who claimed he had been beaten 
on Laurell Hill Road, as well as the corroborative testimony of Mr. Paul, Dr. Craig, and 
his wife. Lesser replied: “No. I did not go to Laurell Hill where that man was supposed 
to be whipped, I did not talk to any people except the company people while I was at 
Lockhart, and the men who were Germans and were working there.” Quakenbos’ 
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investigation of peonage abuses in Florida revealed extensive systems that undermined 
workers’ physical safety, personal mobility, and individual freedom.178 
 The attention brought by the Harlan and O’Hara cases as well as Alexander 
Irvine’s article brought the abuses at the Jackson Lumber Company to the attention of 
the U.S. government and the public at large. Both the trials and the article brought 
peonage labor abuses to the mélange of Progressive reform, but not an end to its 
widespread practice. The New York Times reported that “in the guise of a magazine 
writer…as Miss Grace Winterton, [Quackenbos] compiled a mass of evidence which 
was so startling in its truth and proof that Assistant Attorney General Charles W. 
Russell was immediately designated by the government to begin an exhaustive 
prosecution.” William S. Harlan, manager of the Jackson Lumber Company, was 
convicted and sentenced to eighteen months in prison and a $5,000.00 fine. Foremen 
Huggins and Hilton received sentences of thirteen months and $1,000.00 fines, and 
Gallagher received 15 months and a $1,000.00 fine. Jackson Lumber Company lawyers 
used legal appeals to drag out the Harlan case in what U.S. Attorney R. Pope Reese 
called “open defiance to the lawful process of this Court and the mandate of the Circuit 
court of Appeals.” Reese said: “it might be well for the Department to call the matter to 
the attention of the President that he might be given the opportunity to revoke the 
commutation of sentence of imprisonment upon Harland, Huggins, and Hilton.” Thus 
what began as owners’ opportunistic visions of productive southern forests and workers’ 
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desire for reasonable labor and employment in pastoral southern landscapes turned into 
a legal dispute of national political significance.179 
 The pro-business Republican administration clearly favored the continuing 
development of southern forests and offered its support to southern lumbermen. In 
1909, President William H. Taft agreed to commute the sentences of Harlan, Huggins, 
and Hilton but only after they “surrendered to accept the action of the court.” The 
Jackson Lumber Company attorneys persisted in defying the courts by filing ‘habeas 
corpus writs’ until eventually the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
Government’s prosecution in November, 1910. Responding to the pressure of southern 
lumbermen, Booker T. Washington wrote a letter on behalf of Harlan because he had 
consistently employed black workers at Lockhart, saying: “there are few men anywhere 
in the South who have stood higher than Mr. Harlan or have done more for the 
development of the South.” The violent social and environmental relationships 
characteristic of the southern forest industry ultimately represented progress for the 
South and even Booker T. Washington who, concerned as he was with the abuse of 
African-American laborers, sought to leverage the support of southern lumbermen for 
his various social causes by vouching for their reputation in employing black workers 
and bringing economic development to the South. 180  
 The combination of worker resistance, federal investigation, trial, and 
convictions, along with nationally published media attention exposed the brutal labor 
regimes and the environmental dangers of the Jackson Lumber Company labor camps. 
In 1907, Alexander Irvine reported that the lumber industry media sent a photographer  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to the Lockhart camp to document the conditions there. The Lumber Trade Journal of 
New Orleans took pictures of Gallagher, workers they called simply “lumberjacks,” and 
the camp saloon. Irvine wrote that: “The entire gallery of pictures might illustrate some 
body’s back yard in the heart of a city, but of the lumber camp there is not the faintest 
suggestion.” Later that summer, a cyclone destroyed the Lockhart camp leading Irvine 
to report that: “every man in the cars got more or less cut up.” One worker asserted: “it 
rained pitchforks,” several of the sleeping cars caught fire and burned up, and one black 
worker named George Jackson suffered a broken leg. Even after the trials came to an 
end and the storm destroyed the camp, industry media and muckraking reformers 
portrayed forest industry labor camps in terms of workers’ exposure to the dangerous 
physical environment. Thus he Lockhart camp remained a site of violent social and 
environmental relationships.  
 The Department of Justice peonage files and Irvine’s article attest to the 
centrality of peonage labor spaces as crucial and common sites of labor violence and 
environmental danger in the twentieth century South. Peonage labor spaces embodied 
the opportunity variant social and ethnic groups envisioned in the South; revealed how 
divergent visions of land use created conflict between workers, foremen, and federal 
deputies; and signified both the continuity of coercive labor and the progress of 
industrial infrastructure in the South. Even after the convictions of Harlan and O’Hara, 
and the success of the 1911 Alonzo Bailey case outlawing indebted labor, peonage 
remained widespread throughout southern forest industry and agricultural labor 
regimes. The relationship between isolated rural industrial spaces and peonage labor 
continued through the changes brought to the region by industrial and agricultural 
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mechanization of the 1920s and the demographic migrations surrounding U.S. 
involvement in the two great global wars of the twentieth century.181  
 Ultimately, modern lumbering was different than railroad construction in the 
Florida Keys, though Jackson’s operations included the use of railroads. The 
introduction of industrial technology into the woods made them uniquely dangerous 
work environments, and the forest landscape facilitated a more fluid set of labor and 
environmental relationships. The great southern forests provided natural resources to 
both corporate conglomerates like the Jackson Lumber Company as well as local 
residents seeking to profit off of the woods. Many of the lumbermen who supported 
Jackson and opposed the DOJ prosecution of Harlan and O’Hara were small landowners 
who profited from harvesting trees for railroad ties or chipped and scrapped the oleo 
resin for turpentine in the naval stores industry. Southern turpentine owners recruited 
their labor from the poor, largely black work force that lived in the region. Employers 
and workers saw turpentine work as a traditional way of life, but one that workers 
resisted with their mobility, creating a perennial challenge to employers who in turn 
colluded with law enforcement and the federal government to maintain an indebted 
labor force. So too did the Democratic party’s gentlemen’s agreement of ‘home rule’ and 
the federal assistance of the New Deal and war time commercial regulation serve 
landowners and employers at the expense of poor black turpentine laborers. By the 
early twentieth century, the naval stores industry advanced and either through 
northern factors or foreign competition, southern naval stores workers were part of a 
modern financial and industrial system that devalued hard labor in order to maximize  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profits all while avoiding legal prosecution or public scrutiny for violating peonage 
statutes. 
 Unlike the railroad and modern lumber industry, tapping pine trees for 
turpentine required little mechanical machinery, and instead of working in uninhabited 
forests where labor had to be imported, turpentine employers relied on a regional short 
scale migratory labor force who knew the woods and the work. Though some of the 
immigrant workers in the Jackson tract worked tapping trees for resin, the wider naval 
stores industry relied on local white and black labor, which lived in camps onsite and 
often worked  seasonally and by the task in the pine drifts. Owners typically provided 
minimal housing quarters and offered food, clothing, and medicine through a 
commissary, and many workers lived in the turpentine camps their entire lives. The 
majority of turpentine workers lived in a pattern of cyclical debt that practically 
amounted to a system of peonage labor, though of a more familiar and perhaps less 
violent tinge than that of the FECR or the Jackson Lumber Company labor camps. 
 Turpentine owners such as the Langdale family of Fargo, Georgia argued that 
the landscape informed their identity as “woodsmen” and that their local informal 
practice of turpentine cultivation was both a form of environmental conservation that 
relied on peonage labor and eventually federal assistance. They lived and labored 
alongside their black peons who they believed chose turpentine work out of a cultural 
identification with the woods. The hard toil and poverty that workers experienced as a 
result of being indebted by employers reinforced an expressive and violent culture 
inside the camps, which local law enforcement failed to regulate and which faded only 
with the demographic shifts and economic transformations of the manufacturing and 
service economy of the mid-twentieth century.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
“…a real woodsman:” The Langdale family’s informal forest conservation and 
peonage labor in the Okefenokee forests. 
  
 On a warm April day in 1911, John Wesley Langdale, aided by his trusty 
hounds, walked the woods of his land on the western edge of the Okefenokee Swamp 
near Fargo, Georgia. Tired and thirsty, he stopped and took a drink of water from the 
swamp. Upon returning home, Langdale grew ill with typhoid fever. His illness 
worsened over the course of two months in the intense summer heat until he died on 
June 7, 1911. Langdale’s family recalled that he was “a real woodsman.” As a young 
man, he settled in Fargo in the 1880s and he made his living as most people in the 
region did, off of the land. He fished and hunted in the forest nearly every day. He raised 
hogs and cattle he claimed were “native to the woods.” He dealt in forest industries, 
created turpentine stills, built a sawmill in Echols County, and acquired hundreds of 
acres of land, in the process becoming one of the wealthiest men in the area. To his 
family, Langdale embodied the ethos of Okefenokee woodsman culture that was deeply 
rooted in independent, informal use of forest ecology. At the same time though, he also 
relied on the exploitation of peonage labor to profit in a modern, dynamic market 
economy.182  
 Following his father’s forest entrepreneurialism, Harley Langdale inherited the 
family business and in May of 1919 he incorporated it as the J.W. Langdale Company. 
The company included real estate, naval stores, lumber, livestock, and a mercantile 
exchange. Like his father, Harley Langdale raised his three sons in the woods and 
Harley Jr. and John J. Langdale learned to be woodsman from their father and his black  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laborers. Eventually they earned university degrees in forestry, and attained powerful 
and lucrative positions as state conservationists, railroad company directors, and forest 
products managers. By 1960, the Langdales’ holdings included more than one hundred-
fifty thousand acres of swamp woodlands worked by hundreds of hands. In multiple oral 
histories and interviews the Langdale men described themselves as woodsmen, workers, 
conservationists, and labor managers. Harley Langdale Jr. attributed their success to 
their knowledge of the woods and their ability to exploit cheap labor through debt 
peonage. The Langdales described the turpentine business as both a natural way of life 
and a form of environmental conservation that blended local informal ecological values 
such as mixed agriculture and hunting and foraging, with academic forestry principles. 
However, the Langdale’s economic success relied on maximizing turpentine operations 
by illegally exploiting the labor of vulnerable men and women through debt peonage.183  
 The Langdale’s Turpentine camps and the workers who labored there embodied 
both peonage labor regimes and the resilient southern “woodsman” culture. Labor 
relations inside the Langdale camps involved complex notions of opportunity, freedom, 
and obligation that shifted with the mechanization, outward migration, and agricultural 
reforms of the early 20th century. Managers demanded hard labor, offered little pay, and 
operated intricate systems of provisions and penalties to entice and retain workers 
inside the camps. Workers sought opportunity and independence in the quarters and 
pine drifts, and they responded to exploitation in complex modes that asserted their 
own personal identity as woodsmen. The isolated pine drifts, swamps, and turpentine 
stills were dangerous work spaces where workers experienced great hardship as well as 
some nominal independence. Some workers considered forest labor a “way of life.” The                                                         
183 Harley Jr. Interview in Forest History Society archive, Durham, North Carolina, (1991). 
  148 
housing quarters, commissary, and “juke joints” inside the camps were dynamic spaces 
reflective of violent, racially charged culture workers called the “rough life.” Turpentine 
workers directly confronted the difficult physical environment of southern swamp 
forests and contended with exploitative bosses, violence, and poverty as best they could. 
Often, workers fled the camps seeking opportunity elsewhere, encountering dangerous 
repercussions from bosses and local law enforcement officials.184  
 Both the Langdale oral interviews and workers affidavits in the Department of 
Justice archives confirm that by the early 1940s, turpentine employers confronted 
increasingly difficult economic and political imperatives. Workers sought opportunities 
in urban centers and foreign competition drove down profits. In the process employers 
often colluded with local law enforcement to retain their labor force. Managers often 
employed violence and violated the legal rights of workers in the process. When 
coerced, many workers sought legal recourse with the F.B.I. and the Justice 
Department. By 1945, global market forces and worker mobility contributed to the 
decline of the Langdale camps and the larger turpentine industry in the United States. 
The Okefenokee turpentine camps offer a unique perspective on southern rural 
industrial cultures during the volatile period of the inter-war years when antiquated 
forest labor regimes succumbed to global market forces.185 
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 In the wake of the First World War, the United States, and the South in 
particular, grew increasingly urban. Americans and Southerners embraced a national 
popular culture forged through new media including radio, Hollywood films, and an 
increasingly commercialized culture that celebrated consumer capitalism and 
recreational leisure. Black outward migration to southern cities and northern industrial 
jobs changed the social character of the country, bringing southern dialect, gospel, 
blues, and country music, and soul food to northern urban working class communities, 
informing white audiences and forever infusing uniquely black southern cultural 
expressions into the wider American mass culture. National news media celebrated 
shared economic expansion, fretted over the financial collapse, depression, and another 
international war even in the midst of widening poverty in rural areas. In a period 
characterized for such drastic change and shared experience, southern woodsmen 
laboring in rural industries such as the Langdale turpentine camps were left behind.186 
 The Langdale turpentine farms in the Okefenokee swamps embodied several 
crucial tensions unique to rural industrial labor regimes and to the intersections 
between white landowning woodsmen such as the Langdale men and the mostly black 
communities of workers who also identified as woodsmen. The Landgales uniquely 
blended progressive conservationist forestry practices while simultaneously relying on 
highly exploitative and illegal labor regimes that worked men hard, paid them little, and 
ensnared them and their families in a cycle of poverty and debt. The Landgale 
turpentine camps were part of a dynamic global market system, and evidence suggests 
workers knew they were subject to volatile systems of international finance, although to                                                         
186 Fon Wyman Boardman, America and the Jazz Age: A History of the 1920s (New York: H.Z. Walck, 1968); 
Page, Smith, Redeeming the Time: A People’s History of the 1920s and the New Deal (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991). 
  150 
what degree is unclear. Workers cultural expressions reflected the difficult physical 
labor, poverty, alcoholism, and violence they experienced in the turpentine camps. 
Likewise, the Langdales and other white employers relied on “enticement” which 
generated physical violence among neighbors, law enforcement, and kinship networks 
in the Okefenokee swamps. As in other peonage labor camps, the physical environment 
facilitated exploitation of workers and often made their lives miserable. The Langdales 
in particular, and their business more broadly make it clear that the environment in the 
Okefenokee Swamp informed their way of life and contributed to their identity as 
woodsmen workers.187  
 Like many early Anglo-American settlers on the southern frontier, John Wesley 
Langdale followed the Native American tradition of utilizing the rich natural resources 
of the Okefenokee Swamp. This dynamic ecological zone consists of 438,000 acres of 
cypress forests, marshlands, lakes, and islands within the present day state of Georgia. 
The swamp evolved over seven thousand years and rests in an enormous peat filled bog 
atop a saucer shaped depression, which once lay beneath the surface of the ocean. A 
naturally occurring line of saw palmetto trees indicates the boundary of the swamp. The 
Native American Deptford, Swift Creek, and Weeden-Island cultures occupied the 
swamp for nearly 2,500 years prior to European colonization. The Choctaw tribe, which 
inhabited the area prior to white settlement, called the area okefenoka, or “the land of the 
trembling earth” due to the peat beds and sand floor which caused the land to shift 
suddenly underfoot.188  
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 The Okefenokee cypress and long leaf pine forests support a diverse ecological 
system of over four hundred plant and animal species including alligators, bears, great 
cranes, cottonmouth snakes, and carnivorous sundews. Temperatures range from below 
freezing in the winter months to over 100 degrees in the summer with high humidity. 
Average rainfall reaches over sixty inches per year and thunderstorms are common. 
Lightning constitutes one of the swamp’s most important features, for naturally 
occurring fires enriched the fertility of soil and facilitated rich grass growth. The 
combination of earth, rain, and fire along with wildlife and human labor contribute to a 
dynamic, constantly changing landscape. The Okefenokee has historically been an 
ecological and social space characterized by its isolation and community. The swamps 
and forests provided security and independence as well as subsistence to those who lived 
there, and also yielded commoditized resources to indigenous cultures, Anglo settlers, 
and African-Americans seeking opportunity in the landscape.189 
 White settlers pushed out the Choctaw and Creek cultures in the early 19th 
century, but they carried on the natives’ mixed-use ecology of hunting, fishing, and 
farming in the forest swamp. The Langdales and their neighbors and kin, such as the 
Burnetts and the Carters, prided themselves on their frontier ecological practice of 
living off wildlife and subsistence agriculture as well as engaging in forest industries. 
They also raised “woods cows,” sold trees for railroad ties and housing construction, 
and tapped long leaf pine trees for oleo-resin and boiled it in stills to make turpentine. 
Tapping trees for rosin constituted a local way of life in the Okefenokee swamp. Perhaps 
the oldest industry in North America, networks of coerced labor and turpentine crops  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connected the isolated pine drifts of the great southern forests to Atlantic and global 
markets since the early 17th century.190 
 Turpentine cultivation began in North America in the seventeenth century. 
Environmental and labor historians assert the apparent continuity of coercive labor 
regimes in turpentine camps dating back to slavery regimes that began in the Carolinas 
and expanded into the forests of Georgia and Alabama. They also reveal that the 
growth and prominence of the naval stores industry were driven directly by the 
demands of an expanding Atlantic market system. The task labor system, born in the 
rice plantations of colonial Carolina, also developed in turpentine farms throughout the 
South as bound and free labor negotiated their relationship with owners in the context 
of isolated southern forest landscapes. In addition, turpentine camps were dynamic 
mobile enterprises, and innovation in technology led operators and workers to improve 
extraction methods throughout out the 19th and 20th century. Until the Civil War, 
landowners cultivated the forests through slave labor. As such, attracting and retaining 
workers became central to the woodsman culture in the post-bellum period. The 
Langdale men saw themselves as part of a long tradition of southern woodsmen and 
labor managers challenged with retaining forest workers.191 
 The Langdales were practitioners of the local woodsman culture as well as 
market-oriented entrepreneurs that reached back to the colonial era. Generating 
turpentine for profits required managing a skilled and regimented labor force. The 
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Landgdales viewed their handling of turpentine labor as part of their identity as 
members of a historically continuous woodsmen culture. Human labor was a central 
component of the Okefenoke forest ecology long before the Langdales developed their 
turpentine operations. As Anglo-Saxon and Scotts-Irish settlers migrated into the 
backwoods of Georgia they took up the subsistence agriculture, hunting, fishing, and 
foraging of their indigenous predecessors. However, white and black woodsmen and 
their Indian trading partners increasingly participated in the Atlantic commercial 
system. In the 1700s, the trade in deerskins and eventually the naval stores industry 
connected the isolated forest region to Atlantic markets. Thus, Okefenokee woodsmen 
identified as local, semi-autonomous, frontier individualists while simultaneously 
laboring and cultivating products for the Atlantic market economy. During the volatile 
market cycles that characterized the inter-war years, most turpentine operators 
acquired forest industry labor pools by attracting workers with provisions and retaining 
them through contracts and debt. Thus the Langdales’ local conservation ecology relied 
upon peonage labor.192 
 The Langdales were part of an extended kinship network within a community 
that lived and labored on their forest swamplands. Harley Langdale Jr. said of his 
family, “we’re workers, as my father used to say. [Langdales] were always down in 
those woods.”  Langdales settled in the woods of frontier Georgia, as did many, because 
it was the most isolated, impenetrable, and thus readily available land in the region. The 
land “was just sort of thrown away,” Harley Jr. claimed. Langdales were “poor and 
worked hard and didn’t have anything and land wasn’t worth much…they was scuffling, 
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but they were honest, hard working people.” Their identity and sense of independence 
came from their perception of the woods as their personal space. The Langdales staked 
their reputation on their family history and their ability to survive off of the forest. 
“They were very good substantial citizens…a lot of them [had] a few acres, penned the 
cattle at night, grew sweet potatoes and sugar cane and corn and beans…but it was a 
poor sort of living…hard living too.”193 
 John Wesley Langdale spent much of his young adulthood hunting alligators for 
their hides, rounding up cattle and swamp hogs, and buying and selling timber rights 
for profit. His grandsons retold stories of John stalking alligators at night, using his 
lantern to catch the reflection in their eyes. He used an axe to “chop them on their 
head,” skin them and use the meat for food. He could supposedly call swine from as far 
as five miles away and herd them 30 miles to sell in distant markets at St. Augustine, 
Florida. Langdale hunted birds and harvested their feathers, which his wife then used in 
her hat business. In November of 1899 he bought and sold timberlands belonging to 
four of his neighbors, John W. L., Dave L., F.R. Allen, and John S. Manhim, offering the 
buyers a sixty-day option. Langdale’s frontier lifestyle did not set him apart from his 
kinfolk and neighbors in the piney woods, but his business acumen did.194 
 Langdale accrued a significant income and increased the quality of life for his 
family while instilling in his sons an appreciation for the swamp as a source of both 
recreation and long-term profits. Langdale believed boys should be raised in the woods, 
as they were a male space. His sons went to school three months a year and spent the 
rest of the year working the turpentine crops. In 1905, John Wesley Langdale sent his 
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wife and daughters to live in Jasper, Florida, so the girls could receive a proper 
education, but Langdale remained at their country home with the boys and his “stiller,” 
John Franklin Register, who was later struck down and killed by a bolt of lightning 
while tending the copper turpentine still. Harley Langdale, who was born in 1885 and 
grew up on his father’s estate in Council Georgia, recognized the dangers of forest labor 
at an early age, and sought to become a businessman who could use the swamp as a 
source of recreation and profit rather than as a laborer.195  
 After grammar school, Harley attended Normal College and Business Institute 
in Abbeyville, Georgia. After college, he returned to Council, married a local 
schoolteacher, and managed a twenty-eight thousand acre tract of land owned by his 
father. He ran a turpentine operation, sold timber for railroad crossties, and occasionally 
contracted with lumber companies. Harley went on to study law at Mercer University 
and eventually became a lawyer and a judge. Most locals called him “Judge Harley,” 
conveying his social status, and he used his professional connections to expand the 
family business and become a leader in the wider southern turpentine industry. In 1919, 
he created the J.W. Langdale Company. By purchasing land below market value, Judge 
Harley expanded his family holdings. “The going price of land was two or three dollars 
an acre.” Billy Langdale remembered, “My daddy bought some [for] as little as twenty-
five cents an acre.” Shrewd business sense and negotiating for reduced compensation 
allowed the Langdales to carve significant profits out of the forest landscapes.196 
 In keeping with Okefenokee woodsman culture, Judge Harley continued his 
father’s cattle business, managing thousands of head of steers, which he sold to local 
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restaurants for two dollars a piece. The cattle, on which many families in Echols county 
depended for survival, lived and bred in the woods. Cows and oxen ate the green moss 
that grew in the swamp. Locals called them “woods cattle” and Harley Langdale Jr. 
described them as “kinda rough” with horns. “Some of those cattle are just as mean as 
they could be…they were hard to pen.” When railroad companies built tracks through 
the area they altered the grazing patterns of forest cattle. Companies erected fences to 
keep cattle off the tracks, but Harley Jr., who later worked for the Georgia Southern & 
Florida Railroad and later became director of the company, remembered identifying 
dead cattle on the tracks by the buzzards circling overhead. Eventually screwworms and 
cow ticks infected many of the cattle. In the 1930s, federal programs to eradicate the 
parasites angered many local cattlemen who responded to what they perceived to be 
federal intrusion with acts of sabotage and gun violence. In contrast, the Langdales 
viewed their informal ecology as a means to maintaining their independence, but they 
did not always reject federal programs meant to encourage conservation.197  
  Though Judge Harley was essentially a businessman, he still deeply identified 
with woodsman culture, which he saw as a set of land and labor management practices 
mixed with recreational use of the forests. The Judge loved hunting wild hogs and 
birds. Like his father before him, the Judge walked the swamps and woods of his family 
estate, carrying a rifle and a flask of homemade corn liquor locals called “buck.” “My 
daddy never was one to do much manual labor.” Billy Langdale recounted.  But Judge 
Harley managed his forests for profit and loved spending time in the woods. “He’d sleep  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out there,” Harley’s sons recalled. Like his father before him, he hunted alligators at 
night, used corn to attract wild hogs locals called “piney woods rooters,” sometimes 
catching as many as a hundred at a time and herding them to market. Locals in the 
Okefenokee let their cattle and swine roam free in the woods. As part of this informal 
land use, owners sometimes captured livestock they considered wild or unclaimed by 
their neighbors and marked them as their own. Harley branded his hogs and cattle with 
the “swallow fork and an underbit in each ear.” Langdale traded hogs to his neighbor, 
Bob Brown, near Blunts Ferry, for Brown’s homemade grape wine. Langdale took the 
grape wine he bought from Brown and put it in the commissary at the turpentine camps 
to sell to his workers, connecting local informal land use to peonage labor regimes.198  
  Judge Harley’s children fondly recalled growing up in the country. They 
enjoyed “roaming through the woods, the opportunity to observe the flight and nesting 
of birds, and the beauty of rain falling in sheets through the pine trees.” They 
remembered visiting kin, bathing in the same swamps where they fished. Billy Langdale 
said, “While you were taking a bath little catfish…would be nibbling on your 
toes…we’d take a fishing pole and catch him and clean him and then…fry those fish.” 
To the Langdale men, life in the woods meant both opportunity and hardship. Being 
woodsmen allowed them to remain relatively self-reliant, but forging a life from the 
swamps meant contending with a rugged and difficult physical environment.199 
 As grown men, the Langdales remembered their family estate as an isolated and 
poor place. “It was a large county with low population,” Billy Langdale recalled. “Echols 
county is mainly timber and swamp.” Folks in the pine swamps lived off the land but 
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had few material possessions or currency to buy goods and services. “Back in those days 
nobody had anything…just home living, eating and goin’ around the farm or fishing, 
whatever you did to live. I’d ride around with my daddy, [I] wouldn’t have no clothes 
on except a pair of overalls, no shirt, no shoes.” The Langdales grew their own corn and 
killed and prepared their own game. In addition to subsistence farming and hunting, the 
Langdales’ ability to harvest rosin from the pine forests allowed them to generate a 
good income. Harley Jr. explained “…it was mostly from naval stores that people got 
something to eat and got ahead a little bit, made a little bit of money.”200 
 The Langdale’s informal local ecology was based on turpentine farming, which 
involved difficult labor, and Judge Harley’s boys learned the hardship of turpentine 
work at a young age. Judge Harley operated hundreds of crops of turpentine; each crop 
required at least fifteen men to chip, scrape, and collect the gum from the trees. Judge 
Harley knew many of his workers by name and provided living quarters and a 
commissary to them at a cost, and offered them commissary goods on credit, indebting 
them to the company in the process. The Langdales depended on their labor in order to 
profit from the woods. “You’ve got to have a lot of labor,” Billy admitted, “blacks 
mostly, and there’d be some whites.” On the farm the Langdale children played with the 
children of turpentine camp laborers. They remembered the “little colored boy” who 
drove the girls in an apple-box wagon pulled by a goat.  The boys scrapped buckets and 
chipped trees alongside men named “Black boy,” “Cut-eye,” and “Dad.” John 
remembered that he “learned how to dip and chip from them.” Eventually, Judge Harley 
brought a young black man, Eddie “Boy” Hall from the turpentine camps to live and 
work at the family home in Valdosta. Hall was sixteen when Langdale hired him as his  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personal assistant, and the two developed a close relationship. Hall worked around the 
house and accompanied the Judge on hunting trips. The children reported that Hall was 
a “talented quail hunter” and a deacon in his church.201  
 Judge Harley put his sons to work in the family business, initiating them into 
woodsman culture through a right of passage marked by hard labor alongside his black 
forest hands. John J. Langdale remembered that he “worked in the woods…with the 
mules and the horses…dipping gum.” Harley Jr. worked stacking pulpwood and 
admitted that the black workers taught him how to properly scrape and dip the gum 
from the trees, not his father. John W. spent summers working as a dipper at the 
turpentine camp in Tarver, Georgia, and eventually Harley Jr. was given the position of 
“foremen” on the dip squad. The Langdale boys described the hard labor they and all 
turpentine workers experienced in the swamps. William recalled that he carried 
crossties from the swamps, “[I] sometimes tripped over a cypress knee and the cross tie 
fell on top of me.” The work was “boring,” he recalled, “not to mention strenuous and 
unpleasant because of [the] heat and insects.” John W. remembered, “the mosquitoes 
were very bad in [the] swamp.” Workers used the swamps to cool themselves off and 
alleviate the nuisance of mosquitoes. John W. said he often “sat down in the water. The 
water came up to about my neck. Of course that made my body mosquito free, and it 
relieved my suffering from the heat.” But the swamps also contained dangerous 
creatures, such as poisonous snakes and the infamous alligators the Judge hunted at 
night. Judge Harley thought that every swamp should have at least one alligator in it, 
“at least until it got big enough to eat a dog,” then he’d kill it.202  
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 The Langdales’ turpentine management practices blended both local ecological 
values and Progressive academic forestry. While they harvested some timber for sale, 
their primary trade was tapping the pine trees for turpentine. Maximizing gum 
production required careful management of the local ecosystem, and as such, the 
Langdales protected their trees against fire and insects, and condemned the wasteful 
practices of other companies. Harley Jr. recalled that his father, “was progressive to 
some extent…we followed [him] in that way…We had a policy of being conservative.” 
The Langdale men long believed that the nature of the turpentine business was 
conservative because it re-used trees; they only cut them down to sell for pulp after they 
tapped them of all the gum each tree produced.203  
 Judge Harley taught his sons to conserve the life of their trees by not tapping 
them with too many faces. The “slash” pine that produced the most gum could easily be 
chipped to early or too often, thus reducing the longevity of the tree. Harley Jr. 
explained the importance of “putting up one turpentine face, not putting two, to work 
the tree out but putting one and let the tree rest a little bit, put another one there and 
then you’d have a vein you could put another one.” Harley Jr. expressed his belief that 
no tree that could be used to produce turpentine should be cut for lumber. This maxim 
stemmed partially from his personal conservative principles of maximizing resources as 
well as the practical rational that fewer markets existed for pulpwood, or even timber, 
than for turpentine. “really all the income [made by] most everybody down in this 
section of the country came from naval stores. Sawlogs didn’t bring any money, cross 
ties to some extent, and you didn’t have any pulpwood market.” However, if conserved, 
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slash pines might produce gum for 15 years, providing reliable income in a low cash 
economy.204 
 Factors offered landowners such as Harley Langdale access to capital and linked 
the isolated labor spaces of the Okefenokee to Northern investment and foreign trade 
markets. Factors became a major institution throughout the South in the mid 19th 
century. Harley Jr. explained: “See in the wintertime you didn’t make any crude gum, 
that was [an] expense…you had your labor and you had commissaries and you 
furnished them everything.” In winter, workers prepared trees, placing cups and gutters 
on tree faces. By spring, usually in April, factors expected owners to start paying back 
their loans, “borrow in the wintertime, pay it back in the summer time, and you do that 
every year.” Factors charged exorbitant rates, often as high as eight percent interest on 
their loans. In addition they charged two and a half percent on gasoline for trucks, mule 
feed, and wholesale groceries for workers. Langdale recalled “It was a big business but it 
was easy credit, hard to pay back.”205 
 Local banks considered forestlands “wastelands” and thus refused to loan to 
owners directly. “Finty’s company” financed the Langdale opeartions consistently. 
Factors might hold as much as five million dollars in capital, borrowing from local and 
national banks. “One factor got most of his money out of Chicago,” Harley Jr. recalled. 
Factors controlled the turpentine market by dealing directly with export markets, 
controlling supply and manipulating prices. “Particularly the export markets…” Harley 
Jr. explaind, “factors had those kinds of things sewed up. They could get several 
thousand drums of rosin together…you couldn’t hardly get out from under them.” 
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According to Harley Jr., the only way to get out from under the debt of factors was to 
pass the cost on to his labor by working the men hard and paying them little. “Most of 
all turpentine labor was black labor, if you could handle those and knew how to get the 
work out of them, well then you could get along with the factors pretty good because 
you could operate.”206 
 The turpentine business fluctuated with the overall prosperity of the economy. 
The crude gum, or oleo-resin, was a raw product which chemical plants broke down and 
finished into solid rosin or liquid turpentine. Rosin went into soaps, varnishes, and 
many chemical solvents. Turpentine most commonly went into paint thinner and 
industrial cleaning agents. Both rosin and turpentine sold in domestic and foreign 
markets, predominantly in England and the Netherlands. In the 1930s, the depression 
decreased demand for oleo-resin, creating a surplus of gum, driving down prices. But 
Harley Jr. explained, “The thing that really broke them was the fluctuation of the price, 
manipulated by the factors and the brokers, and the exporters.” In the tradition of the 
cooperative agriculture of the Populist era, Judge Harley sought to protect his profits 
and in 1936, he founded the American Turpentine Farmers Association in order to 
counteract price fluctuations and market manipulations by factors and brokers. Harley 
Jr. explained: “The main purpose was to stabilize the market.”207 
 As part of New Deal era agricultural relief programs, the Federal government 
extended significant resources to support southern turpentine farmers who experienced 
profit losses due to large surpluses of product and deflated prices. The Commodity 
Credit Corporation stepped in and provided loans to the ATFA if they withheld their 
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resin from the market.  The CCC, a part of the National Recovery Administration, was 
widely criticized and was eventually declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Many businessmen viewed the program as restraining competition, but the Langdales 
viewed the program as a “great blessing.” Harley Jr. stated, “I don’t think the CCC ever 
lost any money on loaning money on rosin because they made a level there and during a 
period right during the war they would sell it out at a profit. We’d get [an] extra bonus 
from them when they’d sell some of it.” In addition to the CCC, the Naval Stores 
Conservation Program paid farmers to quit tapping their smaller trees in an effort to 
preserve forests. “They were talking about more conservation, growing more trees, 
getting trees bigger for lumber. So those two things helped us considerable. I would say 
that was one program I just couldn’t criticize.”208 
 By the late 1930s, Judge Harley’s sons took over the family business, regularly 
serving as managers of turpentine operations, labor camps and the workers who lived 
there. They earned college degrees in forestry conservation, and through incorporation, 
consolidation, and labor management, they continued to develop the family business 
throughout the volatile period of the inter-war years, when labor mobility and 
mechanization of agriculture changed the turpentine industry markedly. Harley Jr. 
graduated from the University of Georgia in 1937 with a degree in forestry and became 
an apt manager of his family’s forests. He continually developed his knowledge not only 
of current forestry practices, but also of regional industrial networks, government 
regulations, and global lumber markets.209 
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 Harley Jr. believed his family developed their unique land use practices directly 
from their personal knowledge of, and history with, the land itself. The limitations of 
the environment dictated his families approach to maximizing resources. “This land 
down here is what they call wet lands…it has a hard pan under it…its not very 
productive, and so we try to plant a species of tree that will grow the best on that 
particular piece of land.” Specifically, slash pine grew naturally in lowland swamps and 
was easy to regenerate. They replanted the slash pine in spacious rows to allow for 
better access for rosin harvesting, instilling, a utilitarian order into the woods.210 
 However, Harley Jr.’s academic training, even in a southern state university 
connected him to intellectual networks that crossed national, cultural, and 
environmental boundaries. In college, Harley Jr. learned—as many American forestry 
students, including Gilford Pinchot, had before him had—from European literature on 
forest management. Landgale described the distinction between academic forestry 
principals and his personal regional experience in the Okefenokee. Professors used 
German forestry books translated into English, which espoused practices that he 
claimed “really didn’t pertain to what we’d been doin’ in the South. We didn’t have fire 
protection, we didn’t have the markets, and nobody had the money to practice forestry.” 
However, in his forestry studies, Harley Jr. developed an appreciation for wider 
concerns of resource sustainability, global markets, and federal regulation that were not 
widely valued by his fellow lumbermen in rural Georgia. Thus his formal academic 
training allowed him to embrace forestry management practices that were distinct from 
those of many of his neighbors in the Okefenokee forests.211 
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 The Langdales competed with lumbermen and what they called “peckerwood 
mills” or “push hard mills” that cut trees for their immediate market value and wasted 
the trees potential output. Most operators abandoned trees after 3 to 6 years. Much of it 
was then cut for lumber. Before 1909, turpentine operations typically did not last more 
than 10 years in one location. Harley Jr. accused the pulp wood mills of “selling out” to 
the large lumber manufacturers when prices went up. They also tapped trees higher and 
higher to get quicker results. They cut tree faces “higher than the ceiling,” chopped 
trees full of wormholes, and even sold burned wood to the pulp mills. Harley Jr. argued 
they wasted as much as half of the trees’ total value doing so. These quicker, less 
sustainable methods forced the Langdales to compete, often losing money. Most 
producers questioned whether pulp and paper mills were going to put them out of 
business.212 
 Judge Harley’s emphasis on maximizing resources and Harley Jr.’s training in 
forest conservation as well as their ready adoption of federal forestry strategies played a 
crucial role in the success of the Langdale Company. Harley Jr. learned that the prime 
age at which a tree produces gum is between 18-20 years. Many farmers cut Long Leaf 
and Slash Pine trees as soon as they could to make quick profits. When farmers cut trees 
too early, they lost out on the potential productivity of the tree. Some operators tapped 
trees as early as seven years old. “The Forest Service was a leader in trying to have 
forest regulations,” Harley Jr. stated. They taught farmers to plant trees in 12 foot 
rows, replace them in 35-year rotations, and to regularly thin around the trees to 
protect against fires. They also helped form the Timber Protective Organizations 
(TPOs) throughout the southern forests. Under the Naval Stores Conservation program  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the federal government “stepped in,” he explained, and “encouraged [farmers] not to 
[cut] anything less than nine inches in diameter.” In this capacity at least, Harley Jr. 
welcomed government intervention in local forest management practices.213 
 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, conflicting land use practices among local 
woodsmen in the Okefenokee, the U.S. Forestry service, large scale turpentine 
operators, and lumber companies pitted the Langdales against many of their neighbors. 
The Forest Service and big lumber sought to protect forests against fire that might 
damage their crops. The government undertook massive education programs to 
convince locals living near their forests to help prevent wildfires. Local mixed land use 
practices long employed fire to regenerate grass for cattle, and some woodsmen, 
including the Langdales, practiced informal fire prevention methods. However, many 
locals often started fires accidentally while distilling moonshine, while others burned 
forests intentionally to damage lumbermen’s financial profits. In the words of Harley Jr., 
fires could “wipe out a forest and an operator.” The Langdale men all recalled the 
regularity of fires and “confrontation with illegal operators,” resulting in personal 
violence and destruction of property and farm equipment.214 
 The Langdales believed their use of fire was both local and conservative and that 
their practice set them apart from forestry experts and some of their neighbors. In 
addition the use of controlled burning and the prevention of wild fires constituted a  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difficult and dangerous aspect of workers’ responsibility in the Langdale camps. The 
Langdales and their workers set fires annually to clear under-brush, regenerate soil and 
grass for their cows, and prevent unintentional fires that might damage their timber. 
They made a clear distinction between burning and “controlled burning” to indicate 
their purposeful, careful use of fire. Harley Jr. recalled a visit to Valdosta in the late 
1920s by famed advocate for the turpentine industry, Dr. Charles Herty. Fifteen or 
twenty men assembled in the county courthouse to hear Herty discuss the potential for 
improving the turpentine industry in Georgia. Herty shocked many in the crowd when 
he asserted that the greatest hindrance to forestry in South Georgia came from those 
who “burn their woods every year.” “He didn’t say ‘control’” Harley recounted, “He said 
‘burn their woods every year.’ And we did back in those days.” Landgale explained that 
they burned in order to protect their “investment in the cups and gutters and gum in 
the trees.” The Langdales consistently cleared grass one foot in diameter around each 
tree face to prevent damage to their crop. “Then you would burn the woods and hope 
those faces would not catch.” Harley repeated himself, perhaps revealing his dismay, 
“[Herty] said the greatest hindrances [to forests] were wildfires and the turpentine 
operators.”215 
 Harley Langdale Jr. defended his family’s use of fire as both conservative and 
local, but fires in general remained a significant threat to turpentine trees and thus to 
the Langdales’ profits and their workers’ security. Farmers, cattlemen, and liquor still 
operators were not the only source of fire. In addition to killing John Franklin Register, 
lightning storms caused regular fires that represented a danger to turpentine crops and 
workers’ safety. Naturally occurring thunderstorms in the spring and summer months  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carried with them the danger of possible wild fires. John J. Langdale and his workers 
often spent nights awake, monitoring the forests for fires during hot, dry years. William 
remembered spending many summer nights vigilantly waiting to put out any potential 
fires. John J. stated that fires were the only part of managing forest industries that he 
did not enjoy.216  
 Whether burning to defend against spontaneously occurring fires or to 
preemptively protect trees, fire protection represented an extensive and consistent 
aspect of labor in turpentine forests. “We had the turpentine labor, and we had the 
backpack pumps.” John explained, referring to the water canisters workers carried on 
their backs into the woods to extinguish fire. Workers carried out a series of practices 
meant to protect turpentine trees against the threat of fire. In order to keep underbrush 
from getting too close to their crops of trees, the Langdales workers regularly cleared 
out the pine drifts. John J. explained “we wouldn’t have anything over about three years 
[of] rough [brush]…we’d go there and rake the debris around those trees and burn it 
again, get the rough down.”217 
 Next to fires, insect infestations represented the greatest danger to the 
Langdales’ turpentine crops. The Langdales lost trees to the infestation of several 
different types of insects. Turpentine beetles regularly struck trees, tunneling beneath 
the bark, weakening the wood, and making it more susceptible to Ips and pine bark 
beetles. Ips beetles, or Ips calligraphus calligraphus, Ips grandicollis, and Ips avulsus 
attacked trees particularly in dry periods, when trees are freshly cut, or “when natural 
events such as lightning storms, ice storms, tornados, and wildfires create large 
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amounts of pine suitable for the breeding of beetles.” John J. recalled that they lost as 
much as ten percent of their trees due to insects. Insect damage increased dramatically 
when they began using sulfuric acid on the trees. The acid “put a strain on the tree that 
kept the wound open.” The Langdales stood apart from many local lumbermen in their 
conservationist approach to managing forests.218    
 A crucial part of the local informal ecology and culture of the Okefenokee was 
homemade liquor. Southerners manufactured 100% corn whiskey, moonshine, or “white-
lightning” in stills not unlike the turpentine stills used to cook pine tree gum. Billy 
Langdale remembered that his father Judge Harley made his own liquor called “corn 
buck,” which he kept in the same shed where they cured meat. Liquor stills expanded 
during prohibition, and for many rural Southerners, cooking whiskey became a 
secondary economy. “If we saw a liquor still we just made out like we didn’t see it…it 
was almost looked at as an honorable industry for people.” Not all distillers took 
precaution with their operations, and according to Billy Langdale, “there was a lot of 
deaths caused by liquor that wasn’t properly made.” However, southern woodsmen 
continued to drink. The Langdales’ neighbor, Lewis Corbett, made “a lot of money out 
of it, and he was a very honorable citizen.” When asked by the interviewer, Dr. Claire 
Strom, why liquor stills were so prevalent in Echols, Georgia, Langdale replied, “It 
depended on the isolation of the land.”219 
 Liquor in general was part of rural southern culture, and the Langdales 
expressed their belief that alcohol use and the violence associated with drinking were  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direct products of the remoteness of the landscape and the volatility of the community. 
“Back in those days…I guess we’d be like a frontier…a little old common town…had 
ten, eleven, twelve bars in town. Farmers would come in just like the western, they 
would drink till they got drunk…fightin’ and carrying on you know just like it was a 
wild place.” Langdale expressed the common knowledge that “a man with liquor can’t 
maintain.” He also explained the relationship between alcohol, family and class 
divisions, and violence by saying “there was some family feuds…some little family 
spats…some families were a little bigger than others I guess.” The fact that some 
families made out better than others reflects a fact that historians have long 
overlooked—woodsmen in the Okefenokee may have been part of an isolated, informal 
culture, but folks there were highly conscious of social and economic status. In fact, the 
Langdales’ informal conservation land use practices relied on divisions of labor and 
power relations that stretched back to the early modern era but which intensified during 
the inter-war years.220  
 The Langdales believed, as some turpentine workers attested, that tapping, 
scraping, and distilling oleo-resin constituted “a way of life” for many people in the 
region. Camp foremen regularly described their labor as a distinct demographic that 
preferred turpentine work for its solitary nature and the tight-knit community centered 
around the workers’ quarters. Dipping gum allowed workers some degree of nominal 
independence, and interviews with turpentine workers in the post war era reveal that 
they themselves expressed a cultural pride in being turpentine workers, partially 
because it was difficult labor, but also because they claimed to love the isolation, natural 
beauty, subsistence, and recreation of the forests. However, many workers, not unlike  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the Langdales themselves, acknowledged the extreme difficulty of turpentine labor and 
the system of peonage that plagued them. The tension between on the one hand, the 
pastoral notion of a labor force, personally drawn to the work of the pine drift, and on 
the other, the clear system of political and economic peonage designed to retain 
workers, remains a central contradiction in the turpentine industry.221  
 In order to acquire labor, recruiters, or “cruiters,” as workers often called them, 
sought out labor in the South by advertising in local and regional newspapers or 
physically seeking them out, offering provisions and incentives to hire on. A 1915 
advertisement in the Florida newspaper, The Breeze, read as follows: “Wanted: 20 negro 
Men, who will chip or pull twenty crops of Turpentine Boxes or Cups as they are or 
where they are.” Foremen and managers competed with one another for workers. The 
Langdales used moonshine to entice workers off of other farms. William Langdale 
recalled traveling to Florida with a “tracker who knew the hunting grounds” near the 
town of Crawfordville. William Langdale wasn’t tracking animals so much as he was 
men. Once they found a group of men in the forest, they loosened them up with liquor 
and “pitched the job to them.” Langdale offered to pay the accounts at their current or 
previous jobs, transferring their debt to his camp. He also offered to move their 
belongings. This common practice, which southern employers called “enticement,” 
reveals the complexity of peonage labor regimes. Employers sought labor and offered 
potential workers accommodations in an attempt to attract them, often instigating  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violent conflict from previous employers, while simultaneously ensnaring them in a 
cycle of debt and obligation designed to retain workers in their camps.222  
 Workers in the Okefenokee region also participated in the informal forest 
ecology and identified themselves as members of the unique southern woodsman 
culture. The heavily obstructed spaces of the swamp forests forced operators to send 
workers into the pine drifts relatively unsupervised. Employers expected labor to 
perform their job efficiently and effectively. Workers supplemented the meager 
provisions employers offered by hunting forest wildlife, fishing, and raising pigs. 
Turpentine workers developed a reputation for their strength, skill, and environmental 
knowledge in the southern pine forests. Workers often learned turpentine skills from 
their elders and began chipping and scrapping as early as ten years of age. They lived 
with and worked alongside the animals of the camps, especially mules and dogs. Often, 
workers responded to the severity of the camp conditions by expressing both 
desperation and resilience, revealing their suffering and determination. Sometimes they 
responded in anger and violence. Above all, workers recognized their unique position as 
woodsmen and skilled labor in a complex, volatile industry.223 
  Turpentine camps were both informal ecological and cultural spaces that 
consisted of single men and families. The size of the camps depended upon the number 
of pine tree crops, which largely determined the number of workers and their families. 
Many workers were single men, some of whom only lived and worked in the camps  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temporarily. However, cultural anthropologists who studied turpentine camps in the 
1970s confirmed what the Langdales and other white employers and black workers 
claimed: that many workers lived and labored in the camps their entire lives, even if 
they migrated between camps within the long leaf pine region. Families passed down 
the skills of chipping, tapping, and distilling oleo-resin from one generation to the next. 
Some workers were born and died inside the camps without much exposure to the 
outside world. Camps grew and declined in response to market and demographic forces, 
and the communities inside the camps were as dynamic and complex as the industry 
itself.224 
 The physical amenities of turpentine camps revealed both the community spirit 
of workers as well as the system of debt peonage that entrapped them. The center of 
turpentine communities were the camp “quarters,” a legacy of the slave system, which 
generally included a few dozen shanties, a barn or lot for work animals, milk cows, or 
hogs, and a copper still housed in an open two-story structure with a brick fireplace. A 
separate structure housed the cooper shed where workers manufactured and stored 
barrels. Large camps had a wagon shed and blacksmith shop for making repairs, and a 
few had small sawmills accompanying them. Nearly all camps had a commissary where 
workers bought food supplies, work clothes, and tools when necessary. Most camps 
contained a “juke” where workers drank, danced, and gambled after work, and many 
camps had a cemetery not too far from the quarters. Some families had their own 
cemeteries. Workers often used wagon wheels, truck axles, or pieces of light stone and 
wood to mark the headstones of their kin.225  
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 Housing in the quarters consisted of aging, crude structures, repaired with spare 
scrap materials that created a patchwork aesthetic, signifying both the poverty and 
ingenuity of forest workers. The number of shacks depended on the size of the crops and 
thus the number of workers. The houses generally had shiplap walls, wooden floors and 
solid wood windows with no screens, allowing mosquitoes to penetrate them during the 
day, and raccoons, rats, and snakes at night. Some homes were larger than others and 
some had porches, but they were all generally dilapidated structures, which left workers 
exposed to the physical environment of the forest. The shacks provided no running 
water or electricity. Some had beds, a small table and set of chairs; however many did 
not. Workers commonly provided their own mattresses and cookware, along with 
whatever tools they needed. Workers generally owned only what material belongings 
they could carry, or what employers could help them move in a wagon or trailer.226  
 Turpentine workers’ daily lives not only revolved around the physical 
environment of the forests, their labor constituted a crucial role in the formation of the 
pine drift landscapes. The informal forest ecology relied upon workers clearing and 
planting pine forests to produce the maximum desired output of resin. Harley Jr. 
explained that they cut trees from the swamps and replanted them, literally cultivating 
the pine drifts by hand. Workers planted the pine trees in rows roughly a dozen feet 
apart. From March through October, men carried out the chipping, scrapping, and 
dipping of gum from mature trees. The Langdale men recalled: “Life in the turpentine 
woods…[was]…most hard work and drudgery.” Their identity as woodsmen came as 
much from their love of the forests as their baptism through hard labor in the pine 
drifts. Workers recognized the Langdales’ social position as white landowners and  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foremen, but they also claimed a similar identity as woodsmen based upon their labor in 
the Okefenokee.227  
 The typical workday consisted of waking at four a.m., feeding the mules, oxen, 
horses, and chickens. The men harnessed the stock animals, and prepared to travel into 
the pine drifts before dawn. The chipping process was done by hand through a “short 
chopping motion of the arms.” With one or two strokes on each side of the tree, workers 
cut away the bark to reveal the gum inside the trunk. Men carried out the chipping 
every three days otherwise they reported the gum crystallized and hardened on the face 
of the tree. Employers expected workers to completely chip a full crop of roughly 
10,000 trees each week. Large operators separated dippers from chippers. Men 
dominated axe work and dipping, though occasionally women and young boys dipped 
gum.228 
 Workers went back to perform the dipping process, or collection of gum, 
monthly. Employers generally paid workers fifty cents to a dollar per barrel, a wage 
that remained consistent throughout the 1900s and 1920s. The Langdales generally 
paid fifty cents per bucket of gum. The wagon drivers who carried the buckets into the 
woods kept track of the amount of gum emptied into the wagon by each woodsman. 
Most foremen hired older more trustworthy workers who might not be able to walk the 
long hours required to scrape gum, but who could manage the mule drawn wagon and 
whom they trusted to keep an accurate count of the buckets.229 
 Some turpentine farms had “side camps” that lay a distance removed from the 
camp and the main crop of trees. Moving woodsmen to and from the main camp to  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scattered timber tracts took several hours per day by mule or wagon. Side camps often 
had tents or wagon structures where workers might live for short periods while 
harvesting the crop. Whether walking to and from the pine drifts or camping 
temporarily in the side camps, turpentine laborers spent their lives in the woods, often 
distanced from their employers. They often walked the pine drifts alone, perhaps with a 
dog for a companion or a mule to pull the dipping cart. They admitedly took time for a 
nap in the shade of a tall pine, or swam in the swamps to cool themselves off. This 
nominal independence represented one of the most attractive qualities of the woodsman 
culture, especially for poor, dependent black southerners who consistently negotiated 
their own control over domestic and agricultural labor relations and sought to limit 
white oversight as much as possible.230    
 Workers coped with the drudgery of camp life by maintaining a resilient, 
expressive culture that sustained them and their families in the face of the toil and debt 
they experienced. The 1980s documentary film “Spirit of the Pines” captured the unique 
sub-culture that Dr. Albert Ike attributed to the “isolation” of the camps. The “rough 
life,” as workers called it, was reflected in the labor, recreation, and cultural expressions 
of turpentine workers. The men and women of the camps labored, loved, gambled, 
fought, cursed, sang, and prayed. Workers expressed their highest hopes and greatest 
frustrations while at work and in the juke joints after work. Violence often erupted 
between workers over various transgressions. The stories and songs that come out of 
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the camps convey a culture that could only have been produced in conditions of brutal 
labor and grinding poverty.231  
 In the pine drifts, workers sang to pass the time, ease their labor, and express 
their shared circumstance. They expressed both their exploitation and their resilience in 
the working and living spaces of the turpentine camps. John W. Langdale recalled that a 
worker would announce his dumping of a bucket with a “musical call” so that others at a 
distance from him in the forest could hear him. “Put one down for my baby,” he might 
sing, or “Dollar bill,” or “I owe de man.” Workers sang most of the day in what Judge 
Harley Langdale called “a long quavering chant.” A man would sing: “Woke up this 
morning aweepin’ and amoanin, Goan try to make a dollar for me, a quarter for my 
baby. Said I’d cut a hundred. And it looks like I’m gonna make it. So I want you boys to 
help me. For I’m agoin to howl.” The other workers hearing him replied with “amens” 
and “yes man” and “help him lawd” or “oh yes.” Workers expressed their keen awareness 
of debt peonage through their songs, supporting one another in the African-American 
“call and response” idiom. This particular song explains the complex system of peonage 
labor in a vernacular unique to workers, which owners wrongly perceived as an almost 
romantic hymn.232 
 The commissary served as an important physical space where workers often met 
and shared their lives but was also representative of the institutions of peonage where 
high costs and interest rates entrapped workers in cyclical debt. The isolation of 
turpentine camps prevented workers from accessing alternative stores or wholesale 
grocers. They had no choice but to purchase a portion of their food, household goods, 
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and tools from their employers. One commissary from the W.W. Harrison Farm in 
N.W. Florida belonging to The West Florida Naval Stores Company of Pensacola, 
Florida kept dried beans, condensed milk, sugar, coffee, flour, salt, rice, black eyed peas 
and cane syrup. Commissaries also sold clothes such as boots, clack hats, brogans, 
overalls, shirts, and cotton stockings. Employers largely stocked their commissary with 
goods from factors or merchants who charged exorbitant interest rates, a cost which 
employers passed on to their workers. Harley Langdale Jr. confessed, somewhat 
indifferently, that in order to profit from turpentine crops, employers had to squeeze 
their labor, often forcing them to work for long periods without pay and charging their 
workers high prices for provisions on credit, which they then used to retain labor on 
threat of legal prosecution for violating contracts if they refused to work or left the 
camps.233 
 Food in the camps generally consisted of corn, meats hunted, or raised in the 
camp, and assorted vegetables sometimes grown in personal gardens or trucked in from 
the factors and merchants who supplied the camps. Hunting was a way of life for many 
in the turpentine camps and dippers and chippers often took rifles into the woods, or 
used traps to capture rabbits, squirrels, or the occasional deer. Depending on time and 
the availability of fertilizers, some camps had gardens where workers grew mustard and 
collard greens, sweet potatoes, and corn beans. Workers and their families also raised 
chickens and pigs inside the camps. Specialty recipes included a dish called “dooby” that 
consisted of cured meat, onions, and cornbread. Often, cooks used raccoons or possum 
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meat and well-supplied commissaries provided cane syrup to go with nearly every 
meal.234  
 The Commissary often served a dual purpose as a social space after work and on 
weekends. The “juke” which was sometimes housed in a separate building, allowed 
workers to relieve their physical and emotional strains and it also operated as a nexus of 
cultural solidarity and economic entrapment. Socializing at the juke included heavy 
drinking. Workers drank “corn buck” whiskey, or “buck” for short, made from 
fermented crushed corn. Grape wine was also a common drink kept inside the camps, as 
were various concoctions called “low wine,” made from alcohol strained from “Sterno” 
stove fuel. Cooks and foremen mixed this jellied alcohol with sugar water and nitrate 
spirits. Another common drink, “coondick,” was a mixture of grapefruit juice and sour 
mash whiskey. Judge Harley placed both his own homemade liquor and the wine he 
traded from neighbors in the commissary of the turpentine camps. It was widely 
accepted that foremen used alcohol to entice and retain workers in the camps. Billy 
Langdale stated “you had to have some kind of alcohol to keep hands around. It was 
hard work, they probably needed a drink at the end of the day.” But other foremen 
recalled “we had to watch the whiskey, workers jukin’ all night, and not workin” was 
considered bad for business. After drinking all weekend, many workers suffered terrible 
stomach ailments and hangovers.235   
 Workers commonly referred to the first day of the workweek as “Blue Monday.” 
Foremen noted that often little real work got done on Mondays and worker 
productivity was severely impacted. Workers slept in or worked all day repairing  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broken tools, likely broken on purpose to stall the work regiment. Troy Dukes, an “old 
time turpentiner” who ran the Langdale’s Tarver camp dealt with blue Mondays by 
taking a gallon of moonshine and combining it with cold medicine, paregoric, 
“Raymond’s Little Liver Pills,” and “Black Draught” syrup to concoct a homemade 
laxative.  Most of the outhouses sat directly behind the quarters and Dukes watched the 
workers “coming and going about all day long.” William P. Langdale recalled: “the next 
day they’d be just as pretty and nice as you’d ever seen, and they’d go to work the next 
day.”236 
 Gambling was another aspect of turpentine camp life that represented the 
system of debt peonage and also served as a means for woodsman to express their 
masculinity and independence. Men hoped to win money and bragging rights playing 
cards; however, losing perpetuated the debt workers lived under and worsened their 
immediate financial circumstances. The most popular game in the juke was called 
“skins” or “skin games,” which involved four to six players each dealt one card. The 
dealer set the minimum bet and players made side bets throughout each hand during the 
game. Men made bets not only on cards, but on each other’s behavior and other 
miscellaneous events inside the juke. The dealer turned one card at a time. When the 
discard matched the card of that of any player, that player lost, or “got skint.” That 
player may then draw a discard from the top of the deck and re-enter the game. Players 
placed new bets and the game continued. Once the dealer moved through the entire 
deck, dealership shifted to the player to his right. Just like the family feuds Bill Langdale 
recalled of the local saloons, gambling often led to violence between workers.237   
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 Violence was a common occurrence in the juke, often growing out of 
disagreements over gambling or other social quarrels and reveal another key facet of 
both peonage and workers’ cultural expression. Exacerbated by drinking and gambling, 
tempers flared and men often got hurt. Many workers carried a weapon known as a 
“hack” or “puller” or “cutter.” These “cutters” were actually tools of the turpentine trade. 
Workers fastened the devices used to scrape the buckets of turpentine gum into make 
shift knives, which they used in fights. These tools allowed a worker to kill a snake 
while walking in the drift or to gut an offending opponent inside the juke. Billy 
Langdale recalled at least one occurrence when “two men fought at the juke with cutters 
as weapons.” In the heat of a brawl workers also improvised using hot grease, boiling 
lye, or steaming water that they threw on their opponent’s bare skin.238  
 Violence came to characterize the “rough life” in turpentine camps. Owners and 
foremen viewed worker violence as unavoidable and they colluded with local law 
enforcement to keep disputes from drawing legal repercussions to the business. Law 
enforcement rarely got involved in disputes inside the camps. Employers expected 
foremen to manage disputes, even in the case of violence or death without drawing the 
attention of the authorities. Both owners and workers preferred to avoid the attention of 
law officers. One operator near Fargo, Georgia, J.F. Eldridge explained: 
  If a law officer comes into a turpentine camp you immediately lose some of your hands. They 
pull out. Turpentine Negroes are largely transient and they get into trouble in various places with the 
law, so they move out and go to a camp in some other region and when the law shows up you commence 
to lose your hands. So every time a new sheriff was to be elected he appeared at Fargo, in my office, and 
said among other things ‘I can promise you one thing, We’ll never come to Fargo unless you send for us. 
We’ll never have a deputy come into your territory unless you send for him. You handle it and if you can’t 
handle it, send for us.’ There was a perfectly good reason and they all did it just that way. We didn’t have 
a single law officer in that place. 
 For instance, when we had a man killed, a white man, we didn’t send for the coroner or the 
sheriff. I’d go out and pass up and down the street in Fargo and get together five or six chaps—the man 
who ran the fillin’ station and the man who ran the grocery store and son on—and we’d drive over to the                                                         
238 Ibid; Strom, Billy Langdale, (2003). 
  182 
scene of the killing and interrogate all the people we could and then I’d come back and write it out. ‘We 
six white citizens over twenty-one in the county of Clinch (Echols) have set upon the body of John Hicks 
and discovered that he came to his death by gunshot wound in the hands of parties unknown.’ Signed by 
six names, that was it. It was sent to the coroner and cleared the records and that was all of it. We never 
found anything but that.239 
   
 Turpentine farm owners and foremen systematically used debt to retain workers 
in the camps. This practice stemmed from the contract labor laws of the post-bellum 
period whereby black labor was forced to abide by labor contracts or face jail time, 
whereby the state could lease them out to private companies. A Florida statute from 
1891 made it unlawful to accept “money or other personal property” through agreement 
to perform services and then to abandon “the service of the said hirer without just 
cause.” Southern state legislatures established these contract laws to retain labor by 
ensnaring workers in the legal system. Punishment for “jumping contracts” could be as 
much as one year in prison. Thus the use of debt to keep laborers in the camp was part 
of the larger legal system that coerced labor throughout the South.240 
 Harley Langdale Jr. and William Langdale both asserted that by the 1940s, 
especially after World War Two, labor grew scarce, and that profiting off of turpentine 
required keeping workers in the camps. Interviews with the Langdales conducted by 
Dr. Claire Strom and the Forest History Society understandably avoid any discussion of 
their personal transgressions against workers in their camps. However, Billy Langdale 
admitted to engaging in an armed confrontation with another manager while 
“recruiting” workers, and F.B.I. files in the national archives provide ample evidence of 
other family-run turpentine camps in the vicinity of Valdosta, Georgia wherein fathers 
and sons engaged in violence with workers and other labor managers in order to retain  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their labor. The consistency in the records indicate that for turpentine farmers part of 
properly managing labor involved white owners’ use of local law enforcement, and 
personal violence, to keep indebted workers from physically leaving their camps. 
Perhaps the only distinguishing factor in the cases of the Ledbetter, Kennedy, and Davis 
families is that workers and federal officials called attention to their crimes.241 
 In the county of Atkins, at Wilacoochee, Georgia, the F.B.I. investigated a case 
of white turpentine employers engaging in physical violence in order to retain laborers. 
On June 28, 1943, George McCraine Jr., and his two sons, George McCraine III, and 
Baker, visited their neighbor, J.B. Ledbetter after one of their workers, a black man 
named Arthur Brown, left their turpentine camp to work driving a lumber truck for 
Ledbetter. The McCraines accused Ledbetter of “hiring away” Brown from them and 
proceeded to assault Ledbetter. George Jr. then knocked Ledbetter to the ground, 
kicking him repeatedly about the face, neck, and chest, breaking his collarbone, 
blackening both eyes, and bursting several blood vessels in his neck. George Jr. then 
pulled an automatic pistol and shot Ledbetter in the leg.242 
 Both Brown and Ledbetter gave corroborating testimonies to the F.B.I. Brown 
stated that the McCraines “came to my house and told me that I had to go back to work 
for them. I did not want to go back to work for [them] but I was afraid they would 
shoot me if I refused.” Brown returned to work for the McCraines and remained 
employed there indefinitely. Another black employee at the McCraines turpentine farm, 
Murray Blair, stated he “would like to quit but [am] afraid…Mr. McCraine 
would…either whip me or shoot me.” The U.S. Assistant Attorney General, Thomas C. 
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Clark, issued a “preliminary investigation” to determine if Brown was held against his 
will due to debt. The F.B.I. did state that Brown wanted to quit work for the McCraines 
because “they would not pay him.”243  
 Ledbetter sued the McCraines in court; however, the men were determined to be 
“not guilty” due to a Georgia law that stated McCraine was within his rights to shoot 
Ledbetter during the “fight,” as he was protecting his twenty-two year old son, Baker, 
who was present at the time. Ledbetter stated that he believed the trial was “fixed” and 
that since Ledbetter only lived in Atkins County for two years, locals wanted to have 
him “run out.” The F.B.I. found further evidence that George McCraine Jr. had a temper 
when a Valdosta, Georgia Police “Internal Security” report stated that McCraine once 
publicly declared that he “did not believe in God nor the President” and that he was “in 
favor of Hitler winning the war and taking America.” The police report indicated that 
McCraine was intoxicated at the time and the complaint was closed, stating that the 
“subject was not engaged in un-American activities.”244 
 At Ashburn, Georgia, north of Valdosta, one Tom Kennedy and his son, T.E. 
Kennedy Jr, also known as “Buddy,” went to excessive ends to secure two of their 
turpentine hands. In July of 1949, Nat Vaile and his brother Charlie left the Kennedy 
place and caught a bus to Olustee, Florida. On July 31, Buddy Kennedy entered the 
Vaile home in the quarters and assaulted Nat’s wife, Eliza, with a pistol. Kennedy fired 
his gun and pistol-whipped Eliza, knocking her out of her chair onto the floor, and 
demanded to know where Nat and Charlie were. He suspected she had bus tickets and 
planned to follow the men. Eliza stated that Kennedy demanded “those damn tickets” 
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but left without finding them. Tom Kennedy Sr. then arrived and searched Eliza’s home, 
turning over furniture and emptying drawers to no avail. Kennedy Sr. informed Eliza 
that if she didn’t give up the tickets that “Mr. Buddy was going to kill them.” Later the 
Kennedys returned with the local police and arrested her and her sister in law, Ruby 
Lee, Charlie Vaile’s wife. The women spent the night in jail.245 
  The following day, Sheriff Jefferson told Eliza and Ruby Lee that they should 
give Kennedy the tickets or else Kennedy would have them “work on the chain gang,” at 
which point Eliza admitted to having hid the tickets in her Mother’s house. Mr. 
Jefferson assured the women that “they were in his care and nothing was going to 
bother them.” Jefferson then returned them to the Kennedy place where Kennedy’s 
“woods rider,” Mr. Carter, warned the women “not to leave.” Shortly after Eliza and 
Ruby Lee fled Kennedy’s place and went to meet their husbands in Olustee, Florida, 
Eliza moved to Jennings, Florida with her mother and father. Eliza said she would 
testify in court if properly protected but would not sign a statement for fear of 
retribution. The F.B.I. stated that she “does not want to go back to Georgia.”246 
 In August 1950, Lee Otis Davis, and his son, Lonzie Davis of Douglass, Georgia 
appeared at the sheriff Joseph C. Wapelhorst’s office in neighboring Moultrie, Georgia 
with warrants for the arrest of Steven Futch and Earnest Jones, two turpentine hands 
who left the Davis farm and hired on with Roscoe C. Turner at Moultrie. Lonzie Davis 
identified himself as a “deputy sheriff” from Coffee County and had Sheriff Wapelhorst 
accompany the men to Turner’s farm, where they arrested Futch and Jones. Charlie 
Jones’ wife, Essie Lee Jones recalled that on September 27, 1950, around 5:00 p.m., she 
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saw a white man run around the house from the front with a pistol. Futch’s wife, “Ida 
Mae Futch, recalled that she and six small children “were [playing] in the yard…by the 
time we got in the house two white men were coming n the front door.” Essie Lee 
identified the man as Lonzie Davis. Davis threatened to take Ida Mae if they didn’t 
produce Steven Futch.247  
 Ida Mae Ftuch remembered that sometime in January 1950, her husband and 
Charlie Jones moved them to the Davis place to work as turpentine hands. “My husband 
had an agreement with Mr. Davis to work on halves,” she stated. Davis charged Futch 
$200.00 for turpentine boxes, acid, and “hacks” used to chip turpentine trees. The 
Futchs also had to purchase all their groceries from the Davis commissary. “As far as I 
know, my husband never did know how much he earned.” Ida recalled. When Futch 
asked for his pay “Davis would tell him he had not made enough to pay his grocery bill.” 
When Ida Mae got sick, Davis charged her to take her to the Doctor and additionally 
for the prescription. “After that we decided to leave.” Steven Futch was in the bathroom 
shaving when Lonzie Davis “stuck his pistol in the window” and placed him under 
arrest. Ida Mae remembered that, “All four of the men had guns.”248 
 Though it was the mid-twentieth century, the Davis’ actions echoed conditions 
in the 1880s. When the Davis men arrived at Jones’ house in Turner’s quarters, Lonzie 
Davis carried a .45 caliber automatic pistol. According to Jones, Lonzie Davis “invited 
him to run so [Davis] could shoot him.” Davis informed Jones that “he was the law” 
and then promptly arrested Jones in front of his family. Jones claimed he owed “$153 
and some cents,” not the $209 claimed by Davis. He also insisted that he had gone to 
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Camilla, Georgia and then Jasper, Florida where he worked at different turpentine 
farms before hiring on with Turner. He claimed that Davis made multiple trips to 
Florida to attempt to get the owner, Ira Hester, to pay Jones’ debt. Hester refused 
Davis’ demand saying he could not afford to pay the $209, and Jones informed Hester 
that this figure “was too much.” Both Futch and Jones admitted that they owed Davis 
money and Davis took them to Sheriff Erin W. Johnson in Ware County, Georgia 
where they were accused of “Larceny.” Futch and Jones promised to return to work for 
Davis if they could be released on bond.249 
 Davis testifed that he arrested Futch and Jones because they took “the tools 
furnished to them” and that he only wanted the “property stolen” but he also stated that 
he expected the warrants would convince Futch and Jones to return to work for him. A 
“Special Agent” named Moore testifed that he had interviewed Davis and that Davis 
informed him that Futch and Jones were “dissatisfied with their working arrangement” 
because they had “insisted on a more definite arrangement than the fifty percent split in 
proceeds from the gum they dipped.”  The actions of the Davis men show a clear pattern 
of using debt peonage, law enforcement power, and physical violence in order to retain 
their labor. This incident also suggests the workers’ resilience and pro-active attempts 
to better their lives and hold white owners accountable for their exploitative actions. 
Lonzie Davis apparently was the volatile figure the Futches and Joneses claimed he was. 
The F.B.I. reported that in subsequent years Davis served time in Ware County, 
Georgia for “passing fraudulent checks” and for violating “cheating and swindling” laws 
in the state. In 1952, Davis purchased two tons of rice from another farmer with hot 
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checks. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also placed Davis under investigation for his 
activities as both “an addict and seller.”250  
 During World War Two, swelling industrial jobs attracted rural southern 
workers from farms to factory floors all across the United States. Harley Jr. recalled 
that “labor was becoming scarce.” Workers showed a clear dissatisfaction with some of 
the changes in the turpentine industry. “The trees that you were working were further 
back in the woods. The labor didn’t mind being close to town…[but] you had them out 
a certain distance,” With government rations on rubber and oil, gasoline and tires grew 
scarce. “We used mules [again] to bring in gum from the woods—before we used a 
truck.” Dipping crews took a team of four mules several miles into the woods three 
times a day. They carried six barrels of gum at a time. Each barrel weighed 
approximately 500 lbs. This made the work more difficult on laborers. By 1945, William 
P. Langdale, who managed the Mayday turpentine camps recalled, “labor was short, you 
couldn’t get people to work and I got a lot of mine out of the prison system in Florida.” 
“I had murderers, I had every kind. I found out murder wasn’t a bad offense with that 
kind of labor.251  
 Throughout the 1930s and ‘40s, federal government programs, market forces, 
and labor migration converged to make turpentine operations impractical. The 
agricultural regimes of the New Deal allowed large land holders to consolidate their 
land and remove tenants from their property and workers likewise sought better wages 
in urban industrial jobs. However, naval stores were important to the war effort, and the 
Langdales profited during the period. They centralized their still operations, converting 
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twenty-five separate stills into one massive plant. They also purchased stainless steel 
and brass aluminum equipment. “1941 and 1942 were the first years since the 1920s 
that turpentine was really profitable,” Harley Jr. explained. Mechanization of 
agriculture had profound effects on southern turpentine camps. By the 1930s roads and 
bridges were built and the Model-T truck replaced the mule wagon for hauling and 
dipping, as well as transportation of workers. In addition, black outward migration to 
urban and northern industrial jobs contributed to the decline of the old turpentine labor 
system.252 
 Eventually the turpentine industry lost out to timbering and global competition. 
In the 1970s, the Langdales sold all their turpentine equipment to a Guatamalan 
enterprise and quit the business for good. By the late 1980s most of the non-timber 
lands in the Okefenokee were used for recreational wildlife hunting and fishing. 
Hunting clubs brought back the deer population for the first time since the deer tick and 
screw-worm killed them off in the 1920s. A Fish and Game Commission imported deer 
from Texas and Wisconsin to southern Georgia. However, the rural woodsman culture 
that the Langdales and their workers embodied remained central to the identity of white 
and black communities in the Okefenokee region. The informal conservationist ecology 
that woodsmen practiced found new expression in the environmental movement of the 
late 20th century when corporations such as the Langdale company, and federal parks 
like the Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge marketed themselves as enterprises 
through which consumers could experience nature for a price.253 
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 The Langdale Company’s promotional website claims that “The Langdale 
Company’s evolution from that first acre [in 1894] to today has followed an unceasing 
quest to make the most of limited natural and human resources via innovation. Every 
year since the 1930s, the company has planted more trees than it has harvested, and in 
2009 planted its one hundred millionth seedling. That Progressive environmental 
stewardship provides wildlife habitat, clean air and clean water.” Through its own self-
congratulatory language, the company acknowledges the crucial relationship between 
ecology, conservation, and maximizing human labor. What the advertisement does not 
mention is the fact that the “innovation” of the Langdale operations included coercing 
labor through debt peonage and perhaps even physical violence. The Langdale’s 
turpentine camps, a memory of a foregone era, remain rural isolated spaces continually 
reconstructed by human conceptions of nature, labor, and international markets.254 
  In the film “Sprit of the Pines,” ethnographers filmed a man outside a 
Georgia juke joint playing his electric guitar in the afternoon sun and singing: “you 
fight on, you fight on, you keep your sword in your hand, and you fight on.” In their 
own language, turpentine workers expressed their own identity as woodsmen and their 
relationship to the complex system of local conservationist ecology and peonage labor. 
Long gone from the Okefenokee labor camps, African American workers carried their 
culture of resilience with them whether into urban industrial jobs, the military, or to 
other similarly exploitative forms of rural-industrial labor. The economic and political 
shifts of the 1930s and 1940s along with foreign competition dealt a serious blow to the 
turpentine industry and the labor camps where workers lived. Land consolidation and 
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federal policies forced millions of southerners, black and white, off of their farmland and 
out of the turpentine quarters into an even less secure form of commercial agriculture. 
The fruit and vegetable farms up and down the eastern seaboard of the United States 
received the weary southerners seeking decent work for fair wages. What they found 
was a highly exploitative migrant labor system that forced workers into peonage labor 
inside a volatile, isolated, and dangerous environment. 
  Companies like the Naples Fruit and Vegetable Company outside Naples 
Florida paid state employment agencies to recruit workers for jobs picking tomatoes. 
Not unlike the Langdales, the NFVC employers saw themselves as progressives, 
providing transportation, racially integrated living quarters, and provisions to their 
employees. However, reports from the FBI reveal that workers who traveled hundreds 
of miles in crowded buses arrived at the remote tomato farms outside Immokalee, 
Florida to find crowded housing, insufficient food, and a vicious team of labor foremen 
who robbed workers of their wages and physically abused them while colluding with 
local law enforcement. In the era of modern civil rights, peonage labor continued, 
facilitated by employers profit motives, the physical isolation of labor, and indifferent or 
impotent law enforcement. But workers and civil rights activists persisted in their 
resistance, attempting to expose peonage abuses and demanding that the federal 
government prosecute employers and protect migrant workers. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
“We see no peace on the job:” The Effect of the Environment on Labor Violence 
in the Immokalee Tomato Growers’ “Camp Happy,” Naples, Florida, 1965. 
 
 While visiting her sister, Emma Lou King, in Pompano Beach, Florida, on 
Wednesday, January 13, 1965, Mrs. Willa Lee Pruitt of Flint, Michigan, met two men 
who told her that they had escaped from a “slave labor camp” outside the town of 
Naples, Florida. Walter Brinson and Richard Legget rented a room from Mrs. King 
while seeking work to pay for their bus fare home to Mullins, South Carolina. Brinson 
and Legget told Pruitt that several months before, the South Carolina State 
Employment office had promised them free transportation and seven dollars per day in 
wages if they traveled to Florida to pick vegetables. When they arrived at the 
Immokalee Tomato Growers Company farm, eight miles outside of Naples, “way out in 
the woods,” camp foremen told them that the company would deduct fourteen dollars 
per week from their wages for room and board and that they would not be able to make 
any personal contacts outside of the camp. The men stated they “were constantly under 
guard and were unable to leave…and were treated like prisoners.”255 
 Mrs. Pruitt contacted the local branch of the NAACP in Pompano Beach who in 
turn notified the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the FBI. Mr. Taylor 
Williams of the local NAACP chapter asked that “the president of the U.S. [and] the 
governor of the state of Florida” carry out an investigation into the Immokalee camp. 
“There is not another camp in the U.S. like this one,” he wrote. The Commission on 
Civil Rights contacted the Department of Justice regarding the Immokalee Tomato 
Growers camp near Naples, Florida reporting, “statements allege that the camp forbids                                                         
255 DOJ NA RG 60, Class 50, Box 10800, File 50-18-120. 
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workers free access to the outside and in other ways maintains conditions resembling 
involuntary servitude.” On January 20, 1965, the FBI began documenting the reports 
from workers such as Legget and Brinson of “a forced labor camp” known as “Camp 
Happy” located eight miles northeast of Naples, Florida and fifty miles southwest of 
Immokalee, Florida.256 
 FBI investigations into the labor abuses at Camp Happy reveal how private 
business and state employment agencies facilitated a complex system of interstate labor-
trafficking that led to the gross manipulation, defrauding of, and violence against, 
employees by foremen and supervisors who sought to profit from their positions as 
managers of the commercial tomato farm. The reports from laborers inside Camp 
Happy depict a gruesome peonage labor regime that included beatings, sexual 
exploitation, obstruction of justice, and unreported death. Evidence compiled by FBI 
agents show how migrant farm workers and sympathetic civilians in working class 
communities confronted the nexus of isolated farm labor spaces, exploitative and violent 
foremen, as well as hostile local police. Unlike the mostly male workers in the Langdale 
camps whose isolation left them outside the advances made in urban communities, the 
resilience of both male and female workers like Legget and Brinson, and the activism of 
citizens and civil rights organizations that helped them, represent a grass roots effort by 
workers and community organizations to make peonage labor camps more visible in the 
modern civil rights era.257  
 In the tomato fields of southern Florida, commercial vegetable employers met 
the challenges of a volatile environment by exploiting migrant workers through  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peonage labor schemes. The delicacy of tomato crops, dynamic weather patterns, and 
global competition led growers to exploit tomato workers in order to increase their 
profits. Most migrant farm workers lived and labored on the land, stooping, picking, 
and hauling heavy produce across burning sun-drenched fields. They slept in shanty 
shacks or on the ground in the open air. As temporary farm laborers, they suffered from 
bad weather, which depressed their wages and left them subject to profit-driven 
growers and shrewd exploitive recruiters. Workers like Legget and Brinson’s greatest 
enemy was their isolation from their families and legal protection. Inside rural-
industrial farm camps the lack of oversight allowed labor foremen and local police to 
charge exorbitant fees for provisions, sexually abuse female employees, and physically 
abuse workers with impunity. The investigation of abuses inside Camp Happy reveals 
how in the context of a harsh physical environment, growers, workers, and foremen 
clashed over peonage labor regimes in the rural South. 
 The time-sensitive nature of tomato crops made human labor crucial to 
harvesting the delicate produce and in turn contributed to the impulse of growers and 
managers to exploit workers. Workers inside the ITGC camp outside Naples endured 
oversight from a group of labor foremen who systematically stole workers’ wages, 
physically abused them, and colluded with law enforcement and owners to avoid legal 
prosecution. Foremen, sheriffs, and owners blamed workers and “agitators” for the 
violence inside Camp Happy and covered up their own abuses as well as the larger 
structural barriers that failed to protect workers from violence. The resilience of 
workers such as Brinson, Legget, and Pearson, as well as the local community leaders 
who helped them exemplify the mass resistance phase of the Modern Civil Rights 
Movement, where average citizens across the U.S. rejected discrimination and sought to 
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expose it. As economic opportunities and Federal protections such as the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act allowed black and white southerners to increasingly avoid the worst abuses 
of peonage labor regimes, undocumented immigrants who filled the ranks of migrant 
farm labor fell victim to the same abuses for the remainder of the twentieth century and 
beyond. 
 For centuries, the southwestern region of the Florida peninsula, identified by 
ecologists and historians as the Big Cypress Swamp, on the northwestern edge of the 
Everglades, affected and was influenced by humans who found their way to its dynamic 
landscape. First, the Calusa peoples and eventually European travelers and Miccosukee 
and Seminole societies, lived and labored over nearly 2,450 square miles of rugged, 
tropical terrain. Until the twentieth century, Americans and Floridians viewed this 
western edge of the state as a frontier landscape. Historian Gordon Harvey called it “the 
last truly wild place in Florida.” Mild winters and expansive vistas of black-land soil 
allowed early boosters to project an environmental narrative associating available land 
and economic opportunity onto the Florida countryside. The state increasingly lured 
cattlemen and eventually fruit and vegetable producers to the region. However, fierce 
storms as well as small changes in temperature and moisture damaged landscapes and 
destroyed livelihoods. Likewise, the rural isolation of the landscape facilitated 
landowners’ long tradition of exploitative labor regimes that ensnared thousands of 
workers in the forests and fields of southern Florida.258 
 After 1928, with the construction of Florida State Highway 90, known as the 
Tamiani Trail, travelers could cross the Big Cypress Swamp, allowing development,  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particularly of agriculture, on the western Gulf Coast of the state. In the 1930s, oil 
development in the Pineland region of the Picayune Strand on the northwestern edge of 
the basin fostered a land boom, and lumbermen moved into the region to log both pine 
and cypress from the dense forests. The clearing of the forests opened up soil-rich lands 
prime for fruit and vegetable agriculture. Between 1925 and 1964, tomato acreage 
increased from 112 to 2,500 acres in south Florida. The average grower managed 100 
acres of tomato crop, and by 1964, tomato production, the primary commercial 
vegetable crop, was concentrated south of Lake Okeechobee, a trend that tomato 
growers claimed was closely related to climatic patterns and the availability of land.259  
 Although growers chose the Immokalee region for its mild weather, the 
Picayune Strand is characterized by volatile climatic changes caused by close proximity 
to the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean. The influence of numerous lakes and intense 
high and low pressure cells and related air masses across the region create the peculiar 
weather that punctuates the seasons. Fruit and vegetable growers stated they favored 
southern Florida because of the “near absence of freezes.” However, the approximate 
rain and snow levels in January reach as high as 1.7 inches for the month. In 1960, 
Hurricane Donna, the most destructive recorded storm to that date, destroyed large 
portions of fruit and vegetable crops as well as huge swaths of forests in the western 
Everglades. Both cold weather and wind are serious hazards for tomato growers, and 
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even minimal frost and moisture are always potential threats to their profits and the 
livelihoods of workers who labor in the fields.260  
 Climatic volatility and continued deforestation contributed to unpredictable 
weather conditions for tomato growers in southwestern Florida. In 1962, the biggest 
arctic air mass ever to hit the Florida peninsula destroyed vegetable crops, and after a 
brief recovery in 1964, a downward trend in farm earnings followed for the rest of the 
decade. Growers noted that gusty winds remained a serious hazard to their crops 
because “the land is very level and the wooded vegetation which has served as a natural 
windbreak is being removed.” Growers also feared wet and cold conditions, especially in 
January when rain and occasional snow limited the winter and spring harvests. As a 
result, most Florida tomato growers expressed confidence in their ability to raise good 
crops, even in the midst of “whimsical weather.” The Florida tomato grower’s greatest 
fear was that foreign competition and high labor costs would “put him out of business.” 
As one grower reported, “Tomatoes are perishable and cannot be held until labor 
cooperates.”261 
 Commercial vegetable growers in southern Florida operated within a complex 
set of dynamic labor and environmental conditions that facilitated their exploitation of 
migrant farm laborers. Companies like the Immokalee Tomato Growers Inc. took 
advantage of warm weather, vast acreage of available land, and a multi-ethnic low wage 
migrant labor force that followed the fruit and vegetable harvests from the Lake 
Okeechobee region of southern Florida north to the farms of New York and Maine. 
Growers profited from inexpensive real estate prices, the rarity of winter freezes, and a                                                         260 Ward, Tomato Growers, (1973) 105-106. 
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state government that attracted capital investment though relaxed labor regulations 
and low taxes. However, vegetables, and tomatoes in particular, are delicate produce 
subject to damage from even minimal variation in temperature, moisture, and picking 
conditions. Growers managed the sensitive nature of their crop and the labor-intensive 
harvests by exploiting marginalized workers and charging them for transportation, 
squalid housing, insufficient food, and cheap wine inside the camps. By 1965 industry 
media noted that unpredictable weather and employers’ “belligerent attitude toward 
migrant labor” all contributed to atrocious working conditions for migrant labor.262 
  In the wake of the Great Depression, migrant labor patterns and economic 
disparity began to reveal themselves across southwestern Florida’s landscapes: In the 
words of historian Donald Grubbs, “along U.S. 441 … limitless flat vistas of fertile 
ebony soil stretching out to the horizon striped with unwavering thick bars of rich 
green: beans, cabbage, celery, or potatoes, food for the nations tables.” In addition to the 
agricultural produce, “occasional stretches of barbed wire enclose Brahma cattle.” And 
all along the interstate, hundreds of yards of highway frontage were host to “filthy 
hovels nestled among ragweed and wastepaper.” Grubs noted, “These dilapidated shacks 
resemble inferior chicken coups … [but] … these hovels are winter residences of 
human beings,” the migrant farmers who “toil north with the sun every spring.” By the 
1960s, the plight of migrant farm laborers gained increasing public scrutiny as labor 
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organizations tipped off Florida newspapers and national television producers to the 
terrible conditions in the fields and camps.263 
  After 1928, technological changes shaped the development of commercial 
agriculture and migrant labor systems. The Everglades Experiment Station discovered 
that by adding copper sulfate as fertilizer, the sticky black soil could be loosened and 
plowed for agriculture. However, the cost of irrigation, drainage, and equipment 
required to farm the land meant that only large capital could undertake such an 
operation. The region was eventually dominated by massive landholders who exploited 
migrant farm labor rather than by small family farmers. Mechanization of agriculture 
along with New Deal policies subsidizing landowners to reduce their production drove 
millions of southerners off their tenant farms. Many of these poor farmers joined the 
ranks of migrant laborers that followed the harvests up the east coast from Florida to 
New York every season.264 
 In addition to technological changes, the national appetite for fruits and 
vegetables encouraged by the expansion of disposable income during the bull market 
years and facilitated by the increase in refrigeration and transportation technology 
drove investment in commercial agriculture. The Depression undermined consumer 
demand greatly but it also created a surplus of labor that drove down wages and 
working conditions. During World War II demand for produce increased, as did 
transportation of fruits and vegetables to feed a hungry industrial workforce and a 
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swelling military. The post-war expansion only encouraged American’s expectations for 
cheap and available produce.265 
  In an age when more Americans lived in single family housing, ate processed 
foods, and worked in comfortable offices or unionized factories, government, labor 
organizations, and national media increasingly reported on the deplorable living and 
working conditions migrant farm workers endured, pointing out their exposure to the 
physical environment as a sign of their poverty. In 1938, the Florida Industrial 
Commission noted, “workers sleep in shacks, boxes, in cars, tents, or trailers, on the 
ground, or wherever it is possible to rest. They have no facilities for washing and no 
toilet facilities of any kind.” Disease plagued migrant families. “Illness among migrants 
could be traced to … open pit toilets next to the only water supply, or in it.” One 
witness noted a child’s typical meal consisted of a single cold corncob or a tomato, three 
dried prunes, and a can of beer. The same year a state health officer reported seeing 21 
sick children with acute dysentery in one camp. The agent recommended state officials 
close the camp down. They did not. When one added weather to the equation, a difficult 
situation became deadly. When crops froze, workers were left stranded without salaries, 
housing, or sustenance, facing exposure and starvation.266  
Following the Great Depression, the social and environmental conditions in 
southwestern Florida contributed to a peculiar labor system in the fields and camps, 
known as “the contractor system.” Many state officials and journalists saw this system, 
sometimes called the “crew-leader system,” as “quite damnable … [and] … a sort of 
peonage system.” The isolation of vegetable farms allowed crew leaders to serve as 
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middlemen, recruiting desperate laborers to ensure growers their harvest. Growers paid 
crew leaders by the head count. Not unlike the labor agents Sabia and Shwartz who 
recruited men for work in Florida and Alabama, crew leaders recruited workers by 
promising them consistent work and competitive wages. They often employed 
environmental rhetoric, “telling workers of the distant Promised Land of fruitful 
harvest.” They often charged workers exorbitant interest on the cost of transportation, 
housing, food, and liquor while in transit. Crew leaders played growers against workers, 
complaining about uncompromising workers who demanded higher wages then 
charging workers steep interest, keeping the difference for themselves. Crew leaders 
also commonly ran gambling and prostitution rackets and could make as much as ten 
thousand dollars a year.267 
New Deal programs such as the Farm Security Agency (FSA) provided some 
health and housing assistance to migrant workers in an effort to counter the terrible 
living conditions; however, federal programs largely helped landowners and commercial 
farming. During World War Two, the War Manpower Commission and the 
Agriculture Department provided transportation and health services to migrant 
workers, setting up a Migratory Labor Hospital at Belle Glade, Florida. In addition, the 
federal government opened up some camps to house the workers. In addition to 
government programs, the wartime economic expansion drew many workers to 
factories and shipyards, reducing labor pools and creating better overall conditions for 
migrant farm labor. The FSA and WMC continued to carry on their welfare programs; 
however, private business interests and vegetable growers and their organizational  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representatives began a concerted effort to fight federal intervention into labor 
conditions on their farms.268 
In 1943, the National Farm Bureau Federation (NFBF) pressed for hearings on 
House Resolution 96 which provided wartime programs for migrant labor. The NFBF 
wanted to cut further appropriations for the FSA. Growers argued that “all unworkable, 
hampering restrictions … the fixing of minimum wages … hours … housing standards, 
unionization of workers be immediately discontinued.” They further demanded that the 
entire farm labor program be turned over to the various individual states’ farm 
extension services, over which the farm bureaus in each state had complete political and 
regulatory control. Eventually passed as Public Law 45, section 5 stated, “No funds 
appropriated under this Act shall be expended directly or indirectly to fix, regulate, 
impose or enforce collective-bargaining requirements, wage rates, housing standards, 
hours of work, or union membership with respect to agricultural workers.” The bill also 
granted the determination of all housing standards to the growers in the states. 
Florida’s Congressional delegation was foremost in supporting the bill backed by the 
growers.269 
With authority over wages, housing, and health relegated to growers and states 
sympathetic to them, migrant farm workers remained subject to harsh physical 
conditions in the fields and camps. Reformers continued to make comparisons between 
migrant workers and non-human environmental phenomena. Increasing media 
attention brought renewed interest to migrant labor in the post war years. In 1952,  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Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota proposed a bill to raise ten million dollars 
for migrant education. Opponents killed the bill but appropriated six million dollars for 
migratory birds and fighting hoof and mouth disease in cattle. Around the same time, a 
Palm Beach County Health Inspector testified that most of the migrant shelters he 
examined were “unfit for cattle.” In the winter of 1958, an unusually cold blast forced 
workers from the fields to the dilapidated camps and roadsides. Reports emerged from 
the Immokalee area of hundreds of workers starving and freezing in the open air. The 
next year, Congress passed a law stating that “wage standards should meet that 
prevailing in the area” and that housing must be “hygienic and adequate to climatic 
conditions” but was only required to meet local codes. President Eisenhower even 
endorsed a “Committee on Migratory Labor,” which linked the plight of migrants to 
larger civil rights struggles. The committee stated that the migrant workers’ conditions 
amounted to a “striking example of denial of equal protection under the law.”270  
The difference between good harvests and economic insecurity for both growers 
and workers depended upon a complex balance of environmental factors, adequate labor, 
and international competition. Tomatoes must be picked within a few days of a certain 
date in order to allow them to continue ripening while in transit and arrive on the shelf 
in a proper state for consumers. Fall tomatoes are usually picked between mid-
November and late December. Thus precipitation, frost, and freeze are always a 
potential threat to growers’ profits and workers’ stomachs. In 1965, Florida growers 
avoided significant bad weather, reaching a peak production of tomatoes. Workers 
harvested over 23,000,000 40 lb crates of tomatoes from 51,000 acres of land, making up  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nearly 30% of the total vegetable crops that year. But Florida growers reported that 
“increasing intrusion of Mexican tomatoes” caused them greater “anxiety, despair, and 
general discontent.” Florida growers stated that among them existed a “keen 
competition for labor,” and that domestic labor costs forced their crops to be “non-
competitive with foreign production.”271 
Just after Thanksgiving in 1960, television producer Edward R. Murrow’s news 
documentary, Harvest of Shame aired on CBS, generating national public attention for 
the plight of the migrant farm workers and their families. The film’s rhetoric 
intentionally emphasized workers’ exposure to the physical environment and the more 
careful attention paid to animals and vegetables by growers. A local sheriff in Belle 
Glade, Florida, intimated the social disorder he saw in migrants’ presence. “Our main 
problem is … [workers] sleep in and around the bars, in the grass, [and] packing 
houses.” Workers stoically acknowledged their exposure to the environment, describing 
the poor conditions they faced in the fields. While interviewing the Roach family, 
migrants searching for work, the journalist asked, “Mr. Roach, where did you spend last 
night with your family?” Roach replied, “Over in the woods.” Murrow’s voice narrated 
scenes of trucks being packed with vegetables. “Vegetables are refrigerated, and packed 
carefully to avoid bruising … Cattle carried to market, by federal regulation, must be 
watered, fed, and rested for five hours every 28 hours.” People, Murrow continued, 
“men, women, and children journey three or four days for 10 hours without stop for 
food or facilities.” Murrow used the camera to objectify both black and white workers as 
if they were exotic animals. But in the workers’ stoic resolution one can, if careful, 
                                                        
271 Ward, 105-106. 
  205 
identify a profound resilience in the midst of terrible odds. For southern workers, 
simply telling their story constituted an act of courage.272 
The provision of housing and transportation attracted many workers to the 
Immokalee Tomato Growers Camp outside Naples in the winter of 1965. Historians 
note the area of Immokalee, Florida, in particular for the exploitation and lack of 
amenities provided for workers in the commercial vegetable industry. The media 
portrayed Immokalee as a “frontier city” where lack of facilities placed housing in high 
demand, especially during the winter tomato harvests. The local newspaper in Naples, 
Florida, noted the importance of housing in the lives of migrant farm workers. Housing 
played a key role in relations between workers and employers. David Griffith explained 
that housing was an “important instrument of labor control.” For migrant workers who 
lived and labored on the land, minimal respite from the elements was a major incentive 
for employment.273 
In 1965, several migrant workers outside Naples, confronted far worse 
conditions than sleeping in woods and traveling long hours in crowded buses. A series 
of violent incidents documented in FBI records reveal that company workers faced a 
tough group of white and black camp guards who physically enforced peonage labor 
regimes, stole workers wages, and placed strict restrictions on workers’ personal 
freedom in attempts to retain them in the camp. Walter Brinson reported “We see no 
peace on the job.” They made workers “line up just like hogs.” The ITGC camp known 
as “Camp Happy” supposedly employed nearly 600 hundred or more workers. Brinson 
continued, “The bossman whip everyone that talk about leavin.” In the absence of law  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enforcement and justice systems to confront the poverty and exploitation exposed in 
“Harvest of Shame”, multiple workers at Camp Happy, both men and women, black and 
white, reported violent abuses and worked with local civil rights organizations to try to 
reveal the deplorable conditions there.274 
At approximately 3:30 pm on Friday January 8, 1965, Walter Brinson and 
Richard Legget had arrived at the Immokalee Tomato Growers Company farm eight 
miles north of Naples, to find a corrupt and dangerous peonage labor camp. Their trip 
to and arrival at “Camp Happy” revealed the deplorable environmental and labor 
conditions that characterized migrant labor regimes. The bus packed with black and 
white workers carried them the 713 miles from Marion, South Carolina, stopping only 
to pick up other workers or to let them relieve themselves on the side of the road. When 
they pulled into the ITGC camp, isolated “way back in the woods,” the foreman met 
them as they filed out of the bus. Brinson recalled that workers were forced to “line up 
just like hogs.” Foremen carried guns and informed the men and women of the camp 
regulations.275 
Foremen told workers their wages would be seven dollars a day, but that 
lodging charges of $6.50 would be deducted from their pay along with $13.50 each week 
for meals and $25 dollars for transportation on the bus. Foremen lined the workers up, 
issued them bedding and assigned them to “barracks type buildings.” Having worked 
several seasons in Florida picking tomatoes at other farms, Leggett knew that the camp 
was taking advantage of them. Legget did the math in his head and knew that with the 
charges for food, transportation, and lodging, he would not have enough money to send 
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his pregnant wife, Bunice, and their six children back home. The system of withholding 
money from workers wages for provisions in camp was a well-established racket by 
employers to ensnare workers in a cycle of indebted labor.276 
The next day, Brinson and Legget went to work in the fields at 7:30 am, where 
they confronted the severe physical hardship of picking tomatoes in the hot, humid air. 
The high temperature that day reached 80 degrees.  Workers carried heavy buckets on 
their shoulders, sweating as they filled them, adding to their weight. Employers profit 
by the quantity of tomatoes picked, and so they demanded workers rush from the crop 
rows where they stooped to pick tomatoes to the truck to unload their bucket, then back 
again to the rows. Armed with blackjacks and rifles, foremen yelled constantly at 
workers to hurry. In this hostile workplace, when workers slowed or stopped for a 
second to rest, supervisors threatened them with beatings if they did not immediately 
continue picking. Brinson and Legget both witnessed “numerous beatings” of workers 
by foremen.277  
The provisions offered by the camp contributed to the injurious conditions. 
Brinson and Legget reportedly received two eggs for breakfast along with “1 tablespoon 
of grits, 1 tablespoon of oatmeal and 1 slice of bread.” At lunch, workers were given a 
cheese sandwich. “Both meals were unappetizing,” the men remembered. Such meager 
portions hardly met the caloric requirements for men performing such extreme physical 
activity. At the end of the day, the men retired to their sleeping quarters. They 
immediately noticed that the cots were pushed closely together so as to fit more bodies. 
The camp maintained a “wine joint,” where workers could purchase a pint of cheap wine  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for $1.00 or a fifth for $1.50. Cramped and sore, many workers drank to medicate their 
physical and emotional pain. As a result, drunken laborers came in at all hours hollering 
and fighting, preventing Brinson and Legget from sleeping.278 
After one week of working at Camp Happy, Brinson and Legget decided to leave. 
The men reported that they “literally escaped” because foremen denied workers access 
to the outside world.  The company did allow workers to travel by bus to town on 
Saturdays; however, they charged a dollar for the trip, and workers were expressly 
warned that if they tried to leave the camp before they worked off their original charges 
for transportation, lodging, and commissary, they would be charged with the crime of 
“obtaining money under false pretenses.” Even though debt peonage had been outlawed 
in 1911, southern rural industrial employers commonly colluded with local law 
enforcement officials to prevent workers from leaving. Local deputies served as security 
forces for the camps, arresting any fleeing workers and returning them to the camp. 
Under the pretense of going to town to do their laundry, Brinson and Legget managed 
to get away, far away, nearly 120 miles to Pompano Beach, Florida, where they 
informed Willa Lee Pruitt of their experience.279  
Brinson and Legget’s escape and subsequent reporting of abuses inside Camp 
Happy reveal that community and civil rights organization sought to expose inhumane 
working conditions in the rural industrial labor spaces. Several workers emerged from 
Camp Happy, speaking out through local African-American community leaders of the 
violence and suffering inside Camp Happy. Such local activism fits squarely within the 
broader grass roots action that characterized the modern Civil Rights movement. In the 
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1960s, national media attention on larger-than-life figures such as Dr. Martin Luther 
King and political campaigns to end de jure segregation over-shadowed the wider mass 
resistance of the southern freedom struggle. ITGC workers were part of a long 
tradition of labor confrontation rooted in working southerners’ attempts to battle the 
exploitative social order that relied on binding poor whites and African-Americans to 
land through indebted or coercive labor regimes. Employers, foremen, and local law 
enforcement in Naples viewed laborers who challenged their exploitation as ‘agitators’ 
disrupting the necessary order of the work place. Initially, FBI investigations into the 
abuses at Camp Happy appeared to paint a picture of unruly workers and foremen who 
incidentally used excessive force. However, if read in the context of peonage regimes, a 
more complex picture emerges, showing how foremen took advantage of isolated rural-
industrial labor spaces to exploit workers.280  
On February 23, 1965, FBI Special Agents A.A. Armstrong and Joseph H.R. St. 
Pierre interviewed John Salters at the office of the B.W. Morris Real Estate Company in 
Naples, where Salters worked as a maintenance hand. Armstrong and St. Pierre’s report 
begins with the assertion that Salters “is a person whom others in the Negro residential 
section of Naples come to unload their problems.” Salters reported that on the previous 
Saturday night, Bobby White, a young black man who worked at the ITGC camp, 
“showed up in the Quarters with his face injured from having been beaten.” White told 
Salters that foremen at the camp beat him because they said he was “one of the guys the 
FBI sent in to spy on the camp” and as a result “some of the boys in camp were going to  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quit and leave.” A black guard grabbed White and threatened him, saying, “Don’t you 
hear his talking? Don’t leave when we’re talking!” They held a gun on White until the 
white foremen, Ken Mulling, known as “Mr. Ken” arrived with another white boss. Mr. 
Ken accused White of being a “trouble maker” and began beating him. Salters reported 
that after punching and kicking White for a while, Mr. Ken “turned him over to some 
Negro fellows who beat him, and … another Negro laborer at the same time.” That 
night, after the assault, White and the other victim “stole away from the camp” and 
made their way into town.281 
When agents Armstrong and St. Pierre interviewed Bobby White inside the 
Naples Community Hospital the same day, a more nuanced story emerged, revealing the 
relationship between isolated rural labor spaces and peonage. White reported that he 
lived in Lake City, South Carolina, and, like Brinson and Legget, the SC State 
Employment office told him and several other workers about the Immokalee Tomato 
Growers farm near Naples. The employment office told workers transportation was free 
and the company paid $0.87 per hour. However, when White arrived around February 
9, 1965, managers told him he’d have to pay $13.50 per week for room and board and 
$6.00 for a blanket. The camp allowed workers to ride the bus into town on Saturdays 
for the cost of $1.00 round trip. On Saturday, February 13, White and his friend 
“Private” went to town to try to buy some pants. Finding the store closed, they 
returned, but the camp’s dining hall had closed for dinner, leaving them no choice but to 
buy sandwiches for $0.75 cents each. White and Private walked to the small building in 
camp designated as the bar where they played some records on the juke box and drank a 
bottle of beer.  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Around 8:30 pm, they walked to the barracks and found several men playing 
craps on the floor of the dormitory. When White dusted dirt from the floor so as to 
clear the space for rolling the dice, another worker confronted him because, as he told 
the FBI, “some fellows liked having dirt stay on the floor because the dice would slide 
instead of roll.” The man pulled a knife on White. In White’s defense, Private broke a 
beer bottle and “went for the boy with the knife.” White stopped Private, and they left 
the barracks together and headed back to the bar where they saw Leon, a “Negroe boy” 
who worked as a timekeeper in the camp. White reported the incident to Leon, who 
took a rifle from a truck and headed for the barracks. Billy, another black guard at the 
camp, along with several workers followed Leon to the dormitory. White recalled that 
“Billy was halfway high from drinking,” and he and Leon took the knife away from the 
man. What seemed like a fairly common incident of a gambling dispute between 
drunken workers housed in tight living quarters escalated into a case of shocking 
brutality.282 
When Billy and Leon emerged from the dormitory, Billy accused White of being 
a troublemaker and told him “it was time to get a blessing.” Billy began pushing White 
around, and White said, “You know I’m not gonna say nothin’ to you while Leon got 
that rifle drawed on me.” Private tried to intervene and get White to go back to the bar, 
but White went back to the barracks, and Billy and the others returned to the bar. 
Somebody telephoned Mr. Ken, who White reported was “a young white man … one of 
the bosses at the camp.” White and Private decided to leave the camp right away 
“because it looked like someone was gonna get killed that night.” Before they could 
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leave, Mr. Ken arrived with Billy and Leon and said aloud, “This is the way you 
supposed to do for troublemakers” and hit White in the face. White tried to run, but Mr. 
Ken, Billy, and Leon caught him and “piled on him, beat him and kicked him repeatedly.” 
Mr. Ken then put his dog on White while they beat Private and another young man 
who tried to stop the fight. That night after the attack, White and Private packed their 
suitcases and snuck “out the back way” of the camp. On the highway, they found two 
white men who drove them to town. Like Brinson and Legget, many workers who 
escaped the violent armed guards at the isolated Camp Happy sought citizen leaders in 
the “Negroe Quarters” in Naples who would listen to their stories and perhaps help 
them.283  
Once White and Private reached Naples, where they reported the incident to 
several people in “The Quarters,” including John Salters, who convinced them to notify 
the police. They called the Chief Deputy Sheriff, Aubrey Rogers, who explained to 
White that “he could not do anything unless White was willing to take a warrant 
against whoever had beaten him.” In the rural South, such an accusation left White 
exposed to potential violent retribution. Sheriff Rogers took White to the local hospital 
where he was admitted. Agents Armstrong and St. Pierre interviewed a Mr. Joseph G. 
Bertolami, the Administrator at the Naples Community Hospital, who confirmed that 
the Hospital admitted White on February 14th at 1:00 a.m. and treated him for “multiple 
contusions, abrasions, and lacerations on his face, a fractured nose and left mandible.” 
Management and the foremen at Camp Happy as well as local sheriffs contended that 
Bobby White’s case characterized the only real problem, which was that violence inside 
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Camp Happy largely stemmed from the foremen’s attempt to maintain order among 
their workers. 
Local law enforcement officials and foremen at Camp Happy reported that no 
involuntary servitude occurred inside the farm outside Naples. They stated that 
although violence did occur inside the Immokalee Tomato Growers farm, it largely 
emerged out of conflict between drunk and disorderly workers of different races who 
came from various places in the South. They maintained that the ITGC ran one of the 
cleanest, best-managed camps in all of southern Florida and that they could prevent 
violence by improving communication between foremen and law enforcement officials. 
In reports to the FBI, local sheriffs and camp foremen expressed a set of commonly held 
notions in southern communities that "outside agitators" represented threats to the 
social order of their local community but that business and local law enforcement were 
fully capable of handling any social tensions without the interference of the federal 
government.284 
This argument that black and white troublemakers disrupted camp life due to 
conflict over interracial housing bolstered the popular southern white narrative that 
racial integration threatened the social order. When Agents Armstrong and St. Pierre 
interviewed Hendry County Sheriff, Jack Branch, he reported that county law 
enforcement were unable to find any evidence that laborers were forced to remain at the 
farm or forced to work. Branch admitted that “a definite problem existed with respect to 
the labor camp in that both whites and Negroes who are generally uneducated and 
ignorant are housed together in barracks at the camp” and that “most of these laborers, 
both black and white, are from southern areas such as North Carolina, South Carolina,  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and Georgia.” In fact, the company supposedly attempted to mitigate any violence 
migrant workers might instigate in Naples. Sheriffs suggested that workers paid on 
Saturday tended to drink heavily and gamble, which led to “drunkenness and fights and 
it is apparently during the breaking up of such fights that arise as to mistreatment of the 
laborers by supervisory personnel.” In addition, the sheriff suggested that the reports of 
violence filtering into their office “indicated perhaps there has been some abuse on the 
part of … several Negroe employees, among them Leon and Billy,” who held positions 
of authority in the camp, being expected to maintain order. But the agents’ report 
included the statement that the camp contained a juke joint and that “this was allowed 
so that laborers could make such purchases at the camp rather than going into town to 
do it.” This implies the double purpose of keeping workers from disturbing the peace of 
Naples and retaining them in the camp. The sheriff did report that the foreman, Ken 
Mulling, was likely guilty of abusing workers in the course of his duties as timekeeper 
on the farm, a statement widely confirmed by several accounts of workers inside Camp 
Happy.285 
Jack Branch told Armstrong and Pierre that increased communication between 
the camp and his office could increase responsiveness to incidents of violence while 
reiterating the widely-held idea that racial ideologies of black male aggression and black 
female immorality contributed to disorder in the camp. In addition to arguing that 
drunken, gambling workers housed together led to conflict at Camp Happy, Branch 
suggested to Armstrong and St. Pierre that “unwed Negro girls who are allowed to live 
at the camp and who are promiscuous with laborers at the camp” led to fights among 
workers. “Fights over these women occur with frequency,” he declared. Ultimately,  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Branch reassured the FBI agents that “his investigation failed to show that the laborers 
could not leave the camp at any time they desired or that any force was used to keep 
them at the camp or to make them work.” However, further testimony from multiple 
witnesses inside the camp reveal that local law enforcement officials such as Jack Branch 
facilitated—and sometimes directly engaged in—acts of abuse, corruption, and peonage 
carried out by foremen at Camp Happy.286 
The Chief Deputy of Collier County, Florida, Aubrey Rogers, testified to the 
FBI that although the Immokalee Tomato Growers camp was a “progressive” farm 
labor camp, violence increased in the winter of 1965 due the camp's isolation and 
workers he called “trouble makers.” He emphasized the camp’s spatial character as 
evidence of its advanced condition. Rogers stated that the camp was isolated several 
miles from the town of Naples in an “unincorporated area” off of state highway 31. But 
he described conveniences of the camp, stating “the camp consists of barracks-type 
accommodations for single farm laborers, small cottages for couples, and single women, 
as well as a combination dining hall and recreation room, and a commissary.” He 
informed the agents that the buildings inside the camp were “of modern design and 
metal construction.” In addition to providing hot and cold running water, the company 
put in “washing facilities and modern sewage facilities.” Though Rogers sought to 
portray Camp Happy as a progressive farm in its attempts at physical and social 
organization, he suggested that violence arose out of conflict among workers.287 
Like Jack Branch, Rogers put forward racial integration as both a sign of Camp 
Happy’s social advancement and a source of conflict among workers. He informed the 
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FBI agents that the camp was the “first completely integrated farm labor camp” and 
“the most progressive” in the entire Southeastern United States. The company 
employed approximately five hundred farm laborers, including “Negroes, Whites, 
Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans, and Indians.” Rogers asserted it was his 
understanding that workers were not required to reside in the modern camp facilities, 
but if they did so, they were “expected to comply with camp regulations and pay for 
their accommodations … in accordance with their agreement with the company.” He 
asserted that the camp “is set up to the best of the owners’ ability to minimize the 
problems such a camp brings to the community” and that he had “received no 
complaints that any of the workers were made to work in the fields without their full 
approval and consent.” However, Rogers also testified that recently “more fights at the 
ITGC have increased to the point where it is a definite problem.” He told agents 
Armstrong and St. Pierre that “through his own inquiries he had ascertained that … 
troublemakers among the laborers included: Vera Mae Gadson, Leonard Spann, and 
Leroy Lynch.” None of these individuals appear in the FBI reports or affidavits included 
in the file. Furthermore, the testimony of several other workers and statements made by 
the FBI agents themselves convey the actuality that violence inside the camps stemmed 
from abusive foremen’s attempts to steal workers wages.288 
In February 1965, FBI agents Sydney J. Prescott and Rolland J. McFarland 
interviewed Nathaniel Pearson, a 19 year-old male who worked at Camp Happy. 
Pearson’s testimony reveals the interconnection between isolated rural labor spaces and 
foremen’s abusive exploitation of workers. Pearson lived in Florence, South Carolina,  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and like Brunson and Leggett, learned of the job through the South Carolina 
Unemployment Office. Pearson reported, “Mr. Freddie came to my house on Lawson St. 
and asked me if I wanted to go to Florida and work on a tomato farm.” Pearson recalled 
that the recruiter, Mr. Freddie, also convinced William Blanks, Nathan Jackson, and 
Charles “Junior” Atlas to sign up for the job, promising them free transportation. “Mr. 
Freddie told us it would not cost us anything.” Two days later the men along with 
twenty-five others boarded a school bus and left Florence for Camp Happy. Pearson 
recognized the bus driver as Clyde Barnes, “a white man from Pamplico, South 
Carolina.” After traveling for three days, Pearson and the others arrived at the camp on 
Friday around 2 p.m. He stated they “were taken to the camp office nearly three miles 
inside the camp.”  At the office, a woman gave each worker a blanket, 2 towels, and 1 
sheet and informed them $6.00 would be deducted from their pay for the linens. 
Foremen then directed the workers to a large building inside the camp containing 
“about 100 double cots or bunk beds.” Like Brunson and Leggett, Pearson realized 
almost immediately upon entering the camp that the isolated camp, exploitative fees, 
and crowded living conditions put him in a dangerous situation.289 
Pearson and his fellow workers now realized they were being exploited and 
immediately sought to leave the camp. They soon discovered that camp foremen 
committed wage theft and physical violence against workers. “One colored boy who 
joined us at Statesboro, Georgia got homesick and told a foreman named Jack that he 
was leaving.” The foremen said he could not leave or else he would owe them ten dollars 
to pay for his transportation to the camp. Later that night, Pearson witnessed foremen 
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attacking workers within the crowded barracks. A man who Pearson described as “an 
elderly white man” became drunk and continued swearing and disturbing workers who 
were trying to sleep. “A colored guard named Billy came into the building and told the 
white man to stop cussing and making noise.” Billy then left the barracks only to return 
with two other “colored men” who Pearson said were “more or less guards or 
supervisors at the camp.” The men attacked the elderly worker with a stick, kicking and 
hitting him about the head and back. They then took him to a wire enclosure behind the 
dining hall and locked him up there. Regardless of local police suggestions that 
agitators and violence among workers dominated disputes within the camp, Pearson 
and others' testimony reveal local sheriffs’ collusion and even participation in violence 
against workers.290 
Pearson’s testimony and FBI commentary in the archives reveal both police 
misrepresentation as well as nuanced vestiges of southern racial hierarchies. As in most 
peonage labor camps, both white and black guards abused workers regardless of their 
ethnicity. At Camp Happy, all the workers interviewed in the FBI file were black, 
though they widely reported the multi-ethnic character of labor and victims of abuse. 
However, Pearson and others nearly always refer to white men as "foremen" and black 
security as “supervisors” or “time keepers.” On the same night that the black guards 
beat and imprisoned the white worker, Pearson reported “a colored policeman, Billy, 
and two colored men, and a short fat white man” came into the barracks to search for 
knives or other weapons. The following Sunday night, Pearson witnessed Billy, two 
black guards, and the white foreman, Jack, dragging a black worker named Jimmy 
Rogers out of bed and beating him with sticks and a black jack. The foreman, “Jack …  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held a pistol on Jimmy while the other men beat him.” Pearson later added, “The short 
fat white man was also present but he did not beat Jimmy.” Pearson told the FBI he 
believed the guards beat Jimmy because he spoke to other workers who arrived about 
the exploitative conditions in camp. Soon after, several workers would leave the camp, 
eventually reporting the abuses of the foremen there to federal agents, acting as part of 
the wider southern freedom struggle to expose peonage labor regimes for subjecting 
humans to inhumane environmental and working conditions.291 
Foremen in Camp Happy, like guards inside peonage labor and convict lease 
camps across the south, used dogs to intimidate and terrorize workers who resisted 
force. They trained dogs to perform the job of enforcement, and workers testified to the 
violence carried out by foremen via their trusty sidekicks. But in at least one case, a dog 
performed its duties without being ordered by foremen to do so. Nathan Pearson told 
the FBI that on the Monday after he arrived in the camp, he witnessed “a police dog” 
chase down and attack a white worker who got drunk and began cursing and making 
noise. “This dog will chase anyone who runs and will catch and hold the individual until 
someone whistles.” The foreman, Jack Branch, “had been inside the building and did not 
know the dog had chased the man.” Branch heard the commotion and whistled, ordering 
the dog to release the worker just as Billy and the other black guards began beating the 
man with sticks and black jacks. Pearson reported that when Billy beat someone, he 
referred to the beating as “a blessing.”292 
On the Tuesday after Pearson arrived in the camp, while working in the fields, 
one of the black guards, Randolph, said to Pearson that he and the others “were going 
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to ‘get blessed’ that night.” Pearson told the FBI, “He did not give a reason.” When 
Pearson arrived back in camp from the fields that evening, he and ten other workers, 
including William Blanks, Nathan Jackson, Junior Frazier, and Harold Parker, in a 
defiant act of labor protest, turned in their badges and blankets and sheets to the 
foreman, Jack Branch. Pearson reported, “Jack placed the items on his truck which was 
in the camp yard … and told us to ‘beat it.’ We walked out of the camp gate and had 
gone a distance of almost fifty yards when I heard a pistol shot. I turned around and saw 
Jack pointing a pistol in our direction.” Branch didn’t speak to the workers, and they did 
not speak to him when they turned around and walked away from the camp.293 
Migrant farm workers, and those at Camp Happy in particular, consisted of both 
men and women, and some of the worst violence committed by foremen was directed 
against women inside the camp. The exploitation of women’s labor in the fields and 
their bodies as prostitutes in the camps represents the double abuse suffered by females 
inside peonage systems. Women also played a key role in the exposure of abuses inside 
Camp Happy. Annie Bell Bailey swore her testimony to FBI agents Armstrong and St. 
Pierre on February 16, 1965, stating that she began working at the Immokalee Tomato 
Growers Company farm outside Naples after Christmas of 1963 and reported that her 
husband drove one of the busses that transported migrant farm labor. “Three weeks ago 
I stayed off work because my hands hurt. I went in to town to take a boy to court who 
had been cut.” Several men in the camp gave Bailey money to buy liquor for them in 
town, which she did; however, once she returned, a worker named Al Flemming took 
the liquor from her room. When Bailey confronted Flemming, his wife cussed at Bailey, 
who then grabbed Mrs. Flemming by the arm. Ken Mulling intervened in the scuffle,  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hitting Bailey in the back, and then, as she testified, “he kicked me where I sit down.” 
Bailey left camp the next day due to heavy bleeding. Once in Naples, she saw a doctor at 
the hospital. Other workers testified that Bailey was pregnant at the time and that as a 
result of the beating, she lost the baby. However, Agents Armstrong and St. Pierre 
reported that Bailey “does not know whether she was pregnant or not.” Bailey testified 
that the bleeding continued to increase, and she stayed in the hospital for a week. 
Mulling and Branch both told Bailey they were only interested in the $13.50 she 
supposedly owed them for that week’s housing, directly linking her particular assault 
and subsequent departure from the camp to their peonage scheme.294 
Disputes between women and men in the camps often resulted from conflicts 
over prostitution, which foremen arranged as part of their siphoning of money from 
workers in the camp. Nathan Pearson reported that the same night the black police 
officer arrived in camp to search workers’ barracks for weapons, he and Billy and two 
other black guards left the barracks and went to a separate building that Pearson 
reported housed a “colored woman who is single.” Finding a man in the woman’s 
residence, an argument ensued, and suddenly “the policeman hit the woman on the head 
with a flash light and knocked her unconscious.” Agents Armstrong and St. Pierre 
reported that there were at least “5 camp girls working sex deals” inside Camp Happy. 
According to local law enforcement, such disputes, including the incident involving 
Annie Bailey, occurred as guards attempted to keep order or end conflicts between 
workers. However, the violence carried out against these women had everything to do 
with peonage schemes. The assault that Billy Parrish and the police committed against 
the woman in the barracks that night was not solely over the man who was in her cabin.  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A worker named T.W. Byrd reported—and the F.B.I. included in their final report—
that Mulling and Branch took 50% of the money workers paid the girls for sex. Thus, 
workers knew the guards regularly searched female workers’ cabins at night and 
collected money for sexual transactions. Because of women such as Annie Bailey and 
men such as T.W. Byrd, FBI agents began to see that much of the violence committed 
against workers had less to do with maintaining order than with taking money from 
workers.295 
As a result of the overwhelming evidence put forth by multiple workers inside 
Camp Happy, in April 1965, after four months of investigation, David L. Norman, the 
Department of Justice Southern Regional Chief reported, “I have reviewed this file and 
have concluded that violation of a federal statue has probably occurred.” Norman added 
that after first investigating under the peonage statutes, “the camp is certainly run with 
a strong hand” and that “labor is transported there by the management … the cost of 
transportation is deducted from their pay, and they are often told to remain long 
enough to repay [the] amount to the company.” Workers who wanted to leave the 
camp before paying the cost of transportation were “told that they will be charged with 
obtaining money under false pretenses.” Furthermore, Norman confirmed what F.B.I. 
agents inferred from local law enforcement, that “Immokalee Tomato Farm has allowed 
a supervisor who is a special deputy of the Collier county Sheriffs’ Department to 
mistreat farm laborers.” Norman confirmed workers’ reports that “guards often carried 
guns, blackjacks and pistols.” He also noted that “The special deputy, Mulling has a 
large dog which he uses to maintain discipline.” Finally, Norman stated that supervisors 
“have undoubtedly engaged in excessive use of force against some of the workers on the  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farm.” Since Mulling was the only special deputy, he alone acted “under color of law” 
but that others such as Billy Parris who acted violently were to be removed.296 
The DOJ Regional Chief’s statement reflected the long held policy of federal 
authorities, who deferred to local southern law enforcement in cases of disputes over 
labor and civil rights. At the same time, Norman’s directions to the DOJ special agents 
represented a new level of action on the part of the federal government to investigate 
claims of civil rights abuses. Norman made several recommendations, stating that one 
Jim McCune “will go to the Southern District of Florida in April, 1965 to see the 
manager of the farm and the county Sheriff.” He stated that McCune should see whether 
Mulling and Parris still worked at the camp and emphasized that the DOJ would not 
bring any action against the farm now but that they “are going to keep in close touch 
the situation there” and that “the use of dogs, armed supervisors, and other tactics to 
coerce and intimidate workers cannot be tolerated.” Norman issued the caveat that 
although warrants should be issued for persons violating the law, arrests should be 
made “without the use of excessive force against such persons.” Such weak, and 
ultimately meaningless recommendations obviously reveal the indifference of Norman 
to the plight of workers inside the Naples camp.  
Agents St. Pierre and William D. Reagan interviewed Carl Glidden, President of 
Naples Fruit and Vegetable Co. on December 28, 1966, and he admitted that he 
operated the corporation, which had been named and which many still called the 
Immokalee Tomato Growers Company outside Naples, including Camp Happy, which 
he claimed was used “to accommodate farm laborers employed by his company who 
desire to use these facilities in accordance with the regulations his company set out.”  He  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swore no workers were required to use these facilities and pointed out that out of the 
roughly 600 or so workers he employed, only 150 or so stayed inside Camp Happy. 
Glidden explained that he used the state employment agencies to recruit workers who 
harvested his crops, many coming from within the southeast, particularly from South 
Carolina. He clearly stated that the information he provided state employment agents 
included the provision of free transportation plus meals while in transit. Glidden stated 
that so long as employees worked in the fields for five weeks, they would pay no cost; 
however, “in the event they fail to work the whole five weeks, the cost of the 
transportation will be prorated at a rate of $2 per week.” This caveat hardly matched 
the rate charged to workers inside Camp Happy by foremen. Using a term directly 
linked to the slave plantations of the old South, Glidden told the F.B.I. that Jack Branch 
was the “labor overseer” at Camp Happy and that he was in charge of daily operations 
there. The records reveal it was foremen who largely organized the system of peonage 
inside the Naples Fruit and Vegetable Company farm and they who exercised violence 
against workers in order to intimidate them and purloin their wages.297 
In the end, foremen utilized the isolation of Camp Happy to run their graft 
operation and molest workers who resisted. The FBI report includes a “List of Charges 
of Civil Rights Violations in Camp Happy,” submitted by one Freddie Commodore. The 
record does not indicate Commodore’s position or affiliation. Included in the list is a 
revealing series of statements, corroborated by the multiple workers’ affidavits taken in 
1965. The document implicates Ken Mulling, the camp foreman and “Special Deputy” of 
the Collier County Sheriffs’ Department, and Jack Branch, the “Labor Overseer,” as well 
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as many camp guards for much of the wage theft, violence, and extortion committed 
against workers. The list includes the statement that “Jack Branch is an accomplished 
liar (hard to detect) [and] also has extreme sadistical [sic] tendencies frequently.” 
Branch apparently “lied about the Ken Mulling shooting” and himself “shot twice at 
Charles Montgomery.” In addition to shootings, the foremen and their guards carried 
out a host of offenses against workers to ensnare them in their system of peonage. The 
men took money from girls for prostituting themselves, enforcing the sex trade with 
physical violence. They split the transportation fees they charged workers, reporting 
nothing to the company. Branch and Billy Parrish apparently developed a “scheme to 
discredit time-keeper,” who represented a potential witness to their crimes. They sold 
wine and beer to workers, including minors. They attacked and beat a worker named 
William Hunter over the head with a revolver and ordered guards to beat up another 
“colored man” who’s “skull was fractured by a 2x4. A hospital bill for $265.00 
corroborated this incident. In addition to pimping girls inside the camp, Jack Branch 
regularly used the girls, having “sex relations with Arletta, who was afflicted with 
venereal disease [and] (left Naples area to obtain treatment.)”298 
In a haunting though uncorroborated statement, Commodore’s list of charges 
against Branch and the foremen includes a reference to an incident that occurred inside 
the vast isolated space of the Naples Fruit and Vegetable Company farm. Suggesting the 
possibility of innumerable untold incidents in which men and women subject to 
employer violence disappeared, the report states that “Woman who drowned could have 
been saved J.B. wouldn’t let Red Cap go investigate.” The statement does not indicate 
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how or why the woman may have drowned, but the suggestion that J.B., likely Jack 
Branch, kept Red Cap from investigating the death, conveys at best his gross negligence 
for workers’ safety and at worst his personal involvement in the drowning death. In 
rural industrial labor spaces throughout the South, beyond the prosecutorial power of 
law enforcement, employers and foremen abused and sometimes murdered workers in 
the process of exploiting their labor.299 
On January 30, 1967, Frank M. Dunbaugh, the Acting Chief of the Department 
of Justice Southeastern Section, officially closed the case of Camp Happy. After two 
years of investigations and files that directly implicated the employees of the Naples 
Fruit and Vegetable Company, one of whom was also a Special Deputy for the Collier 
County Sheriffs’ Department, the file states, “FBI investigation failed to disclose facts 
indicating a violation of federal statutory law.” It goes on to say, “The specific 
allegations made by complainants, i.e. overcharging in the commissary, poor facilities, 
beatings, etc. are matters not covered by existing statues” and that “Complainants could 
not support with specifics their charge that workers were not free to leave, and FBI 
discovered nothing to support this charge.” Though the charge of “involuntary 
servitude or slavery,” as the file indicates, could not be adjudicated because workers 
were ultimately allowed to leave the camp, the overwhelming evidence indicates that 
within Camp Happy and perhaps many migrant labor camps in the region, the isolation 
of the landscapes and lack of oversight and political will by federal law enforcement left 
workers at the mercy of corrupt, violent employers who remanded and exploited their 
labor force against workers’ will. The men and women in Florida’s tomato fields 
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experienced inhumane treatment at the hands of violent bosses long after the upheavals 
and legal successes of the modern civil rights era. 
As a result of the demographic shifts, social movements, and federal 
interventions of the mid twentieth century the majority of white and black southerners 
managed to avoid the worst forms of peonage labor, but increasingly undocumented 
immigrants working in the U.S. fell prey to the same abusive conditions. Due to 
economic expansion, the strength of labor unions, as well as federal legislation such as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the War on Poverty, Americans saw poverty rates 
reduced by roughly half and fair employment practices expanded. A growing number of 
Americans lived in modern homes, worked in comfortable offices, or urban factories. 
Market globalization allowed the U.S. to become a service and information economy 
while global competition for production and manufacturing pushed American companies 
overseas and pulled undocumented immigrants to America to pick our fruits and 
vegetables. The system of peonage labor that pervaded the South in the early 1900s 
remained in use, particularly in states like Florida, where ‘right to work’ laws 
undermined labor organization and where the federal government ignored the plight of 
non-citizen workers. However, workers and activists continued to resist employers who 
sought to ensnare them in debt through peonage wage theft and threat of violence.300  
In a 2008 congressional hearing on the plight of migrant workers in Florida’s 
tomato fields, Lucas Benitez, a man who picked tomatoes in Immokalee, Florida testified 
regarding “abuses of Tomato workers.” Benitez stated, 
 The job of picking tomatoes is hard and heavy, dirty and dangerous. You run all day in the 
burning sun with a 32 pound bucket on your shoulder, carrying it from the rows where you are 
working to the truck where you dump it out and back. And this is when you aren’t stooped over 
to pick tomatoes. At the end of the day, the cramps don’t even allow you to sleep. Not only is  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your body exhausted, but so is your spirit after having to put up with the yelling of your 
supervisors all day long. 
 
Then in a statement that reveals the intricate and terrible nexus between isolated rural -
industrial environments and peonage labor abuses, Benitez told the United States 
Congress:  
 I was working staking tomatoes, and I got ahead of the rest of the crew. When I stopped for a 
 moment to catch my breath, the boss yelled at me, got down from his truck, and threatened to 
 beat me up if I didn’t continue to work immediately. I was alone in the middle of hundreds of 
 acres of fields, miles from any town.  
 
 Benitez went on to say that women suffered an additional  oppression enduring 
“an environment that is charged with sexual harassment,” [but that] “countless 
workers have suffered the humiliation of beatings, rape, and wage theft by their bosses.”  
In that brief statement, Benitez expressed what thousands of pages of documents in the 
U.S. National Archives Peonage files report: that regardless of federal laws—such as the 
1867 Peonage Statute, The Alonzo Bailey decision in 1911, and the Civil Rights Acts of 
the 1960s—peonage labor systems, whereby workers are forced to work in terrible 
environmental and labor conditions through threat of indebtedness or violence, or both, 
remain in place in the United States in the 21st century. American cultural ideologies of 
economic opportunity, political and social independence, physical mobility, and above all 
individual freedom fail to provide for an economic, political, or social system to prevent 
the abuse of millions of Americans who suffer from varying schemes, most of them 
completely legal, by employers, banks, and corporations to exploit workers, ensnare 
people in cyclical debt, and even force laborers into involuntary servitude.  
 DOJ files related to the ITGC investigation reveal that the physical environment 
directly contributed to tomato growers’ anxiety, desperation, and brutality toward 
migrant farm workers. The resilience of workers like Brinson and Legget and the 
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assistance they received from local black leaders such as Willa Lee Pruitt and John 
Salters represent a prime example of the mass resistance phase of the Modern Civil 
Rights Movement where average citizens across the U.S. challenged the inequality and 
mistreatment they experienced. Foremen, Sheriffs, and Owners blamed workers and 
“agitators” for the violence inside the camp in an attempt to cover up their peonage 
scheme and the larger structural barriers to worker safety. The particular instances of 
violence at Camp Happy clearly occurred as a result of the isolation of workers and the 
collusion of labor foremen, local police, and company owners. Without access to legal 
protection, workers remained subject to poor working conditions, wage theft, and 
physical violence, even death. Though after the economic expansion of the 1960s and 
federal protection for civil rights, southern black and white workers increasingly 
avoided the type of debt peonage they endured inside Camp Happy. However, 
undocumented immigrants continued to face peonage labor regimes and physical 
violence in rural industrial labor camps throughout the twentieth century and beyond.  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Conclusion: 
 Workers subjected to peonage labor regimes throughout the rural industrial 
South confronted a complex and dangerous set of forces that compromised their bodies, 
siphoned their wages, and remanded them to the fringes of society. The Progressive 
notion that man could manage and transform nature to maximize profits drove 
industrialists to design vast industrial operations requiring enormous engines of labor. 
The economic ideologies of wage labor precipitated a race to the bottom in which the 
lowest possible, not even subsistence-level, wages that could still draw men and women 
to the factory or job site became the norm. Racialist ideologies informed the belief of 
industrialists that southern and eastern Europeans and African Americans made more 
suitable candidates for certain types of labor, especially in warm climates. Lax state 
governments and pro-business politicians legislated immigration policies that attracted 
workers from abroad, and the desperation of marginalized immigrants worsened wage 
deflation. Whether from Italy, Hungary, New York, Florida, or Georgia, male and 
female  workers found themselves drawn into networks of peonage labor throughout the 
South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ultimately, workers’ 
vulnerability to employers and foremen made them victims. The difficulty of leaving 
remote work camps and the relative inability of local police, social justice reformers, or 
federal agents to protect workers left them to suffer the environmental exposure, 
poverty, and violence that characterized their daily lives. 
 Peonage workers faced exploitation on train cars and boats or trapped in 
secluded islands, forests, and fields. Misled by malicious labor agencies, workers were 
interred at the hands of sadistic guards and bosses who physically abused them and 
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withheld their wages. Nearly all of the workers examined in this study described their 
suffering in terms of their exposure to the physical environment and violence inside 
rural labor camps. The muckraker journalists and Department of Justice investigators 
who deposed workers indicated that their oppression was partly a consequence of the 
natural environment where the camps were located. However, while workers repeatedly 
complained about being forced to labor under the lash inside a desolate wilderness, 
peonage labor camps were anything but natural. They were and continue to be products 
of the political, cultural, and economic imperatives of a modern private-public corporate 
labor system which devalues workers rights, co-opts local law enforcement, handcuffs 
the federal government through deregulation, and shields  unethical and often illegal 
practices from the view and legal reach of society. Employers and workers did not 
envision or engage with pristine, untouched wilderness, nor did they seek some 
ecologically sustainable system of human use of nature. Rather they saw the forests and 
swamps as places unfit for humans. According to lumbermen, only the construction of 
railroads, lumber mills, housing and stores could make the Alabama forest “the very 
center of civilization.” For workers, the lack of decent housing, edible food, safe labor 
regimes, and fair pay made the countryside a deplorable place to live and work. So, the 
story of violence in rural industrial peonage labor camps is one of both human and non-
human nature. Workers were not solely trapped by the woods and the sea but by the 
balance book, the lash, and the gun.  
 Workers who originally sought opportunity in the woods and bogs across the 
South met peonage regimes with resilient hearts and shrewd intelligence. They forged 
cultures of cooperative resistance, running away, reporting abuses, and testifying to 
federal authorities in the hopes of overturning the systems of abuse and inequality they 
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met. Those who could not escape, exorcised their suffering however they could, through 
drinking and gambling, singing and dancing, foraging and fighting. And though many 
workers subjected to peonage schemes managed to escape or eventually find more 
advantageous employment elsewhere, their narratives of hard labor, indebtedness, and 
violence continue to ring through popular music, film, and fashion as a constant 
reminder that the cultural landscape of the South remains bound to the collective 
memory of workers who toiled in the fields and forests. 
 The fluidity of peonage conditions meant that workers were not always peons, 
guards could also be workers, and peonage camps were porous, even when the 
environment particularly lent itself to restraining human mobility. Peonage itself was 
and is difficult to detect, and its official existence is hard to prove. Peonage regimes 
often operated under the racial ideologies of ethnic European inferiority or black 
shiftlessness and indolence, but such regimes also appeared at times to be part of some 
actors’ pragmatic self-interest, rooted deeply in a workers’ self proclaimed identity as 
southern woodsmen. Peonage could be the result greedy employers, corrupt bosses, or 
tightly woven into one’s personal identity as an environmental conservationist. Carl 
Glideen, the president of Naples Fruit and Vegetable Company even seemed to suggest 
peonage could result from the best intentions of a social progressive. However thin 
employers’ defenses may appear to opponents of peonage, the slippery nature of peons’ 
status reappears throughout the multiple case studies in this period. 
 Thanks to Alexander Irvine’s reporting, we know that ideas about human and 
non-human nature within peonage labor camps also shifted. Pastoral landscapes could 
be enticing to unemployed immigrants from rural European hinterlands only to 
eventually become foreboding symbols of their vulnerability. Men could be treated like 
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dogs; foremen could be as coarse as trees, or as vicious as bulls. Animals could be 
workers, guards, and companions. The same swamps that the Langdales loved and 
identified as the source of their success bred bark beetles, typhoid, and fire that 
threatened their profits and livelihood. Though physical environments never entirely 
determine human behavior, humans experience their lives and express their interests 
within the context of their physical surroundings, particularly through labor. The 
peonage labor disputes in this study emerged across the twentieth century South as 
social and environmental constructs changed from one of frontier opportunity to 
industrial contract labor and again to manufacturing and service economy paradigms. 
With these changes, the violence and oppression associated with peonage labor camps 
became more visible and less prevalent for southern workers.  
 Throughout the twentieth century, peonage labor regimes evolved, as did the 
global economic, political, and social forces they remained bound to. The larger shift 
from an extractive industrial economy to a manufacturing and service economy reduced 
the scope of rural-industrial operations. As Standard Oil made space for General 
Electric and General Motors, employers sought organized, efficient, and educated labor 
to carry out technically proven methods that produced higher quality and more 
sophisticated goods. American businessmen increasingly extracted natural resources 
from overseas where lower labor costs and nearly non-existent environmental standards 
attracted their shareholders’ opportunistic vision. In urban economies, workers could 
leave one job for another or start their own businesses as people increasingly did in the 
service economy of the later twentieth century. 
 Demographic shifts also contributed to the slow decline of rural industrial labor 
systems. Drawn by the economic expansions surrounding the first and second world 
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wars, millions of poor black and white southerners migrated from the turpentine camps 
and tomato fields to urban areas in the South and North, where work in factories, 
offices, or shops allowed wider choice, greater competition among businesses, and more 
fluidity of economic opportunity. Unionization and federal oversight increased profits, 
and in many work sites employment, hours, and wages were systematically documented 
to ensure legal transparency for employers and workers alike. Even in small towns, 
connection to cities through increasingly available transportation and communication 
made illegal exploitation of workers less feasible. As Americans embraced the economic 
growth of the post-war era, peonage labor became less frequent and easier to expose. 
 Another significant change came with the rise of the regulatory, semi-welfare, 
and civil rights states between 1900 and 1965. An increasingly powerful federal 
government aided by an increasingly educated society demanded business and local 
government make certain concessions for the regulation of the economy, the creation of 
a social safety net, and the protection of minorities’ civil rights. After World War Two 
and through the 1960s, poverty seemed to be on a steady decline, and education and 
professional occupations increased in the U.S. and the South. Though old anti-state and 
racial ideologies remained widespread, most Americans found ways to avoid peonage, 
and they had a federal government and civil rights organizations such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center to support them if they were victimized. 
 The increasing prevalence of technology and media had a significant impact on 
the evolving nature of peonage labor in the southern U.S. Telephones, radios, and 
automotive travel informed workers of opportunities in other places and made it easier 
for them to leave an exploitative boss. Muckraker journalists such as Alexander Irvine 
and socially conscious television news hosts like Edward R. Murrow exposed the plight 
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of peonage labor to an increasingly socially conscious population. If racial, gender, and 
economic equality remained illusive realities, most Americans recognized their agency 
as consumers in using the commercial buying power higher wages afforded them. This 
created a national popular culture based on the consumption of goods and media that 
offered unprecedented opportunities to the working class.  
Peonage is not a static socio-economic status or an outmoded form of slave 
labor. Rather, it is a fluid set of social and environmental relationships directly linked to 
modern market imperatives that persistently evade legal and social justice. In fact, much 
of the litigious failure of Gilded Age progressive reformers came from their inability to 
prove that workers were somehow subjected to forced labor for any significant period of 
time. Coercive labor regimes and indebtedness did not begin with American slavery or 
start anew with southern Redemption. Nor did it end with the 1867 Peonage Act, the 
13th Amendment, or the 1965 Civil Rights Act. New government oversight, the 
mechanization of agriculture, and outward social migration did not put an end to 
peonage labor. Rather, different social groups fell into and climbed out of peonage as 
market expansion, federal regulation, and social activism changed the way Southerners 
lived and worked. At its core, peonage is about labor, debt and violence, which often 
remain invisible to the human eye and the collective national conscience until exposed 
by legal justice, media attention, or social action. It is clear that twentieth century 
coercive labor regimes, enforced either through debt or violence, were heavily 
concentrated in rural isolated spaces, particularly in the South. However, indebtedness, 
poverty, and violence also shift over time, and are continually entangled in changing 
constructs of space, visibility, and access to legal protection. 
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 As more Americans work in urban domesticated spaces that are visible to the 
technological advances of smart phone cameras and social media, the form of peonage 
labor that ensnared people such as Mike Trudics and Alonzo Bailey are no longer wide 
spread. Rather, the invisibility that Mexican and Central American immigrants 
experience in the fields of California and Pennsylvania, or the young women of India 
find inside brothels, and the child soldiers of African nations meet within armed militias 
makes them the victims of twenty-first century peonage. When debt and liquidity are 
clouded in speculative investment derivatives, even upper middle class American 
professionals can see their retirement savings and their real estate assets disappear 
overnight, only to resurface on the balance sheets of banking executives’ private 
personal portfolios. So, increasingly, the violence associated with labor and debt are not 
the traditional forms of physical confrontation seen between bosses and workers in the 
forests and fields of the South. However, labor, debt, and violence remain linked to 
social and environmental constructs.  
 When Mary Quackenbos wrote that “The cruelties and licenses practiced … are 
not easy to get at unless detectives could spend many weeks in those camps and subject 
themselves to the dangers,” she spoke to the isolated forests and swamps that 
imprisoned workers and concealed foremen’s abuses. The same holds true today. 
Whether through legal intervention or media exposure, peonage can only be addressed 
once we locate it, put ourselves in a position to understand it, and raise the suffering of 
victims to the attention of society and government. Sadly, as long as humans accept 
opportunistic mythologies that portray market expansion and technological 
advancement as sufficient substitutes for human rights and social justice, the battle over 
labor, debt, and violence on Planet Earth will continue.  
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